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The Time of the Child
Wan-Chuan Kao & Jen Boyle
The Pokémon Go craze went global in the summer of 2016. 
Gamers, through their smartphone screens and cameras, could 
see an “augmented reality” — one animated by adorable poké-
mon that they had to find, catch, and collect — superimposed 
on the world around them. Playing the game inside the Victoria 
and Albert Museum in London, we found ourselves mesmer-
ized by the eerie entanglement of the embodied works of art all 
around us and the disembodied figures of cuteness overrunning 
the place. A strange temporal nexus had transformed and over-
taken the museum. There, behind a Greek statue, lurked Pika-
chu. Inside one of the major aesthetic archives in the world, we 
witnessed not only the backward mapping of the postmodern 
cute onto old artifacts but also the forward projection of cute 
potential from the same relics of art. Moving through a space 
of clashing aesthetic modalities, we were children once more.
The study of cuteness, at its heart, is an investigation of the 
problematics of temporality. Faced with a cute object, the subject 
makes a simultaneous double move: the subject regresses to the 
time-space of childhood and projects the child onto the future. 
The cute is always already the child, the childlike, and the child-
ish across species and animacy lines. Even among more “adult” 
manifestations of the cute — say, sado-cute or porno-cute — the 
ghost of the child, or more specifically, the body of the child, 
remains the foundational source of sensual, emotional, and cog-
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nitive arousal, despite transformations that might have rendered 
the child utterly unrecognizable. Cuteness is therefore a retro-
futuristic aesthetic-affective category, at once nostalgic and tele-
ological. In the rapture of the “Awww” utterance, the cute child 
is endlessly reborn in a tautology of adoration. 
The default double temporal movements of the cute re-
sponse might be explained by Konrad Lorenz’s theory of “child 
schema” (Kindchenschema) that postulates a set of juvenile fea-
tures — such as a round, soft body with a disproportionately 
large head and round eyes — that trigger a person’s instinctual 
caretaking response. The tenacity of the figure of the child, or 
the idea of the child, is driven by biology. Cuteness is an evolu-
tionary adaptation, an aesthetic in the service of biology. But as 
powerful as Lorenz’s theory has been, scholars have questioned 
and complicated the child-schema thesis. As social scientists 
have demonstrated, caretaking is but one of a range of cute 
responses possible; the broader aim of cuteness is to facilitate 
greater socialization, which may or may not involve nurture 
and protection. We have overprivileged the child in the affec-
tive economy of cuteness. Put differently: not every child is cute, 
and not every cute object is a child. The cute object may take the 
subject backward to the primal scene of trauma or forward to a 
postapocalyptic ruin. Thomas LaMarre, analyzing the figure of 
the child in Hayao Miyazaki’s films, contends that “Miyazaki’s 
children or tweens are not so much about purity or innocence 
as about a sensory-motor openness, elasticity, and malleability. 
The child does not simply return you to the old pretechnologi-
cal world but opens the possibility of a posttechnological world” 
(130). There may be a cute child in the past or the future, but 
this child is Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History, howling in the 
wilderness of civilization.
If cuteness, mediated through the child, facilitates a kind 
of aesthetic time travel backward and forward, it paradoxical-
ly freezes time as well. Part of the charm of the cute object is 
its seeming stasis, permanence, and resilience — qualities that 
contribute to a sense of security. Cuteness, as much as it allows 
for temporal fantasies, remains outside of time. The child does 
15
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not grow up. Frances Richards suggests that cuteness “stabilizes 
infancy, or the frailty of old age, or the foolishly unconscious 
actions of a supposedly competent adult, by reframing them in 
an atemporal, nonbiological, and consequence-free zone, not 
entirely unrelated to the fixed reality inside a picture” (95). In 
effect, the cute object is the commodity par excellence, with its 
promise of eternal sameness of the pleasure of consumption.
On the one hand, cuteness is inextricable from modern capi-
talism and consumer culture. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED) dates the first reference to “cute” in the sense of “attrac-
tive, pretty, charming” to 1834. Daniel Harris, Sianne Ngai, and 
Joshua Paul Dale, in their foundational studies of cuteness, have 
mostly replicated the OED’s etymological impulses and confined 
their analyses of cuteness attached to a historiography of the rise 
of modernity, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies. The commodified cute thereby charts the emergence of 
modern categories of gender, sexuality, growth, development, 
production, consumption, habits, and habitats.
On the other hand, because of its temporal versatility (the 
ability to move backward and forward or to freeze), cuteness 
also holds the promise of endowing subjects with agency and 
the possibility of moving before, beyond, and also along with, 
if not entirely escaping, modernity. Ngai suggests that the cute 
object essentially functions as D.W. Winnicott’s transitional 
object, which is crucial to an infant’s transition from a world 
of “me” (the Lacanian realm of images) to a world of “not me” 
(the Lacanian realm of symbols). A transitional object facilitates 
the infant’s adaptation to the mother’s failure to sustain the illu-
sion of being part of the infant’s self by serving as an object that 
is simultaneously “me’ and “not me.” Through the transitional 
object, the infant deploys various coping mechanisms, among 
which are “[r]emembering, reliving, fantasying, [and] dream-
ing the integrating of past, present, and future” (Winnicott 10, 
emphasis added). What is crucial here are the flexible temporal 
maneuvers available to the subject in possession of the cute or 
transitional object.
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But what happens when the integration of past, present, 
and future fails to take place? Or, what happens when one con-
sciously rejects such integration in the first place? The possible 
disavowal of the project of identity formation and integration, 
we contend, is one of the charms of cuteness. In this sense, cute 
studies shares an uncanny kinship, as well as a set of critical ap-
paratuses, with queer studies. Cuteness’s outsideness of time, as 
much as its situatedness within time, mirrors the complex and 
ambivalent relationship between temporality and queerness. 
Queer time, for Jack Halberstam, is a perverse turning away 
from narratives of heteronormativity, modernity’s categorical 
thinking, and consumerist models of gender identity and sexu-
ality (Dinshaw 182). And Michael D. Snediker recently reflects 
on the shared anachronism between cuteness and queer theory: 
“cuteness’s flirtation with anachronism — the only slightly dubi-
ous fantasy that what presently counts as cute would have simi-
larly registered across history — both arises from and gravitates 
toward the same questions of investment and interstitial being 
that queer theory continues to help us re-articulate” (292). If Lee 
Edelman associates the future with “the fascism of the baby’s 
face” (151), Michael O’Rourke, channeling L.O. Aranye Fraden-
burg, notes that “a rejection of futurity […] is at least partially 
about a refusal or recusal of cuteness” and invites us to consider 
cuteness’s capacity for sustenance — to have lived, to be living, 
and to live on. There may be a cute child in the past or future, 
but this child was and will be decidedly queer.
Acting on her queer desire for history, Carolyn Dinshaw 
reaches out and holds onto queer touches across time made pos-
sible by “affective connections with the past” (178). In The Retro-
Futurism of Cuteness, we similarly call for aesthetic and affective 
connections to cuteness across time. But this volume is not a 
genealogy of aesthetic that rescues premodern stillborns, pre-
sent orphans, or future unborns of cuteness. The contributors 
examine cuteness archives, a kind of aesthetic media archaeol-
ogy, without the anxiety of producing historiography. Moreover, 
we question whether or not the time of commodity must be the 
critical paradigm for the aesthetic organization of temporality. 
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The time of commodity, we contend, has led to a restrictive and 
problematic mapping of aesthetic value judgments onto cute 
embodiments across past, present, and future. That is, the con-
descension to and dismissal of “minor” aesthetic categories, in 
tandem with the politics of respectability, are the results of an 
understanding of time based solely on capitalist production and 
consumption. Cute studies has been persistently relegated to a 
critical-aesthetic ghetto precisely because of the commodified 
ghost of the child schema.
The history of aesthetics, of course, did not begin with Kant 
and Burke. Albertus Magnus, in De Pulcho et Bono, defines uni-
versal beauty as one that demands “mutual proportions among 
all things and their elements and principles […] with the clarity 
of form” (qtd. in Eco 25). And while there are elements of what 
could be called an “impure” aesthetics throughout the early 
modern period, sublime affects and proportionality continue 
to be the markers of aesthetic robustness. Cuteness is neither 
the sublime nor the well proportioned. It is a bastard child of 
the dainty and the dumpy; what’s beautiful may not be cute, 
but what’s ugly and monstrous may be. Cute cues and affects: 
softness, roundness, infancy, femininity, helplessness, vulner-
ability, harmlessness, play, enjoyment, awkwardness, neediness, 
intimacy, homeliness, and simplicity. At the same time, cuteness 
is cheapness, manipulation, delay, repetition, hierarchy, im-
maturity, frivolity, refusal, tantrum, and dependence. Cuteness 
is perhaps the aesthetic threshold: “too cute” is a backhanded 
compliment. And more than the pop-cultural kawaii (literally, 
“acceptable love”), “cute” — the aphetic form of “acute” — also 
carries the sense of “clever, keen-witted, sharp.” The Latin acutus 
embraces the sharpened, the pointed, the nimble, the discrimi-
nating, and the piercing. To be cute is to be in pain; cuteness is 
a figure of Roland Barthes’s punctum or Georges Bataille’s point 
of ecstasy. 
The pain of the cute experience is symptomatic of the forces 
of deformation at work in the aesthetic-affective encounter. For 
Harris and Ngai, deformation is sadistic: the cute object invites 
violent handling or mutilation by the subject. The test of cute-
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ness is the transitional object’s capacity to survive the “squeeze.” 
For Dale, in contrast, deformation is masochistic: the subject 
invites violence out of the desire to project the cute object. We 
suggest that deformation is also a temporal maneuver: squeeze, 
hold, and release. If time were a cute object, it too must survive 
the sado-masochistic deformation. The contributors, with a flair 
for cuteness (a queer pose), “squeeze” the cuteness archive. Ac-
knowledging the tenacious hold of the child, the essays in this 
volume nonetheless seek embodiments of cuteness outside of, 
other than, around, or beyond the child. 
Let the Cute Times Roll
Cuteness offers not only an aesthetic-affective “good time” but 
salvation time. In “Torturer-Cute,” Andrea Denny-Brown inves-
tigates the stylization of Christian salvation history in late me-
dieval cycle drama, where temporalities of the human and the 
divine intersect in both the private reading of drama as text and 
in the public staging of drama as performance. Denny-Brown 
focuses on the fifteenth-century Towneley Play of the Dice by 
the anonymous Wakefield Master, which reenacts a crucial mo-
ment of the Passion when a group of Roman soldiers, known as 
“torturers” in medieval Europe, cast lots for Christ’s unseamed 
garment. Stylized expression, Denny-Brown argues, generates 
aesthetic experience across various affective registers: verbal, 
visual, auditory, and kinetic. The Play of the Dice deploys an aes-
thetic modality akin to Ngai’s notion of “mute poetics”: minia-
turization and deverbalization as means of cutifying language. 
As a macaronic hybrid text, the Play stages the cute fetishization 
of the Latin speech of Pontius Pilate vis-à-vis the comedic vul-
garization of the Middle English vernacular of the three Tor-
turers, who are portrayed as childish dandies obsessed with the 
pursuit of pleasures and buffoonery. Cuteness becomes an affec-
tive creative mode; the speeches, bodies, and appearances of the 
Torturers mirror the lowbrow doggerel verse form that shrinks 
in size as the play progresses. The resulting effect is what Den-
ny-Brown terms “torturer-cute,” an aesthetic modality rooted 
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in the Latin tortura (twisting) that works to inflect and absorb 
the shock of salvation violence. In the confluence of temporali-
ties, cute bodies, objects, and feelings become twisted. Cuteness 
serves as a strategy for engaging with trauma and also deferring 
painful confrontation.
The twisting of bodies, made possible by cuteness, finds real-
life manifestation in religious asceticism. Elizabeth Howie, in 
“Indulgence and Refusal: Cuteness, Asceticism, and the Aes-
theticization of Desire,” offers a reflective and provocative theo-
retical twisting of temporality via cuteness. The spiritual disci-
pline of the mortification of the flesh is not so different from 
the cuddly pleasures embodied in the cute object; both, Howie 
contends, place the body under duress and amplify desire. A 
tiny community of medieval monks that dwelled on the small 
island of Skellig Michael, off the coast of Ireland, practiced self-
denial that aroused tiny and childlike desires for comfort and 
fullness. The ascetic body, imitating the crucified body of Christ, 
shares with the cute body a willful woundedness that heightens 
the body’s vulnerability and capacity for intimacy. Allowing for 
contradictions without collapsing them, asceticism simultane-
ously denies desire and places it at the center of spiritual yearn-
ing — refusal works in tandem with indulgence. The ascetic’s 
desire to master the body leads to recognition of his surrender 
to its needs. And the “sweet lack” of cuteness that triggers revul-
sion, Howie suggests, parallels asceticism’s embrace of disgust 
as a desirable form of spirituality. If medieval asceticism’s bodily 
deformation is an aestheticization of piety, contemporary cute-
ness’s bodily distortion is a secularization of asceticism under 
capitalism.
The machinery of capitalism is inseparable from the produc-
tion and consumption of the modern cultural phenomenon of 
cuteness. In “From ‘Awe’ to ‘Awww’: Cuteness and The Idea of the 
Holy in Christian Commodity Culture,” Claire Maria Chambers 
examines the alignment of consumerism, theology, devotion, 
and aesthetics. Chambers contends that the postmodern com-
modification of Christianity via the cute aesthetic exemplifies 
Rudolph Otto’s concepts of “creature-feeling” and the “numi-
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nous.” For Otto, the holy is the numinous because it is terrify-
ing and fascinating. In the face of the numinous, the devotee 
experiences creature-feeling, a sense of lowliness that gestures 
to the absolute might of the divine, and seeks approach to divin-
ity through religious icons and relics. The consumer culture of 
cuteness, however, has transformed traditional object-oriented 
devotional praxes. In particular, the Precious Moments com-
mercial empire of dolls, figurines, and illustrations has given 
rise to what Chambers terms “devotional Christian kitsch”: ado-
ration is possible because of the adorability of the cute object, 
and vice versa. Precious Moments sells because it performs the 
comforts and therapeutic functions of faith; the figurines’ cute-
ness is numinousness. More important, Precious Moments fuses 
the figures of the Child, the Christian, and the cute object. Cute-
ness’s logic of power through powerlessness is thereby mapped 
onto faith. The ideal Christian is not simply meek but cute and 
childlike. Interpreting the Precious Moments chapel at its com-
pany headquarters, Chambers argues that the moment of bodily 
death is transformed into the moment of rebirth; the Christian 
gains a saint-like new body through regression, infantilization, 
and cutification. The cutified religious object suspends the mo-
ment of death and retreats into prepubescence. The Precious 
Moments figurine is what Richard Lindsay would label a “hy-
perreal child”; it is like a child. As the faithful move from “awe,” 
in the presence of numinousness, to “awww,” in that of cuteness, 
the desire for the impossible is the desire for the real.
Cuteness’s power resides in its logic of adoration and arousal. 
As Justin Mullis argues in “‘All the Pretty Little Ponies’: Bronies, 
Desire, and Cuteness,” cuteness ignites forms of desire other 
than innocuous affection or care giving. In fact, one of the most 
charged encounters with the cute object is premised on the ob-
ject’s promise of erotic arousal. Through ethnography and criti-
cal analysis, Mullis investigates modes of erotic engagements 
with the culture of cuteness among “bronies,” adult male fans 
of the animated My Little Pony franchise. Digital technology has 
made possible the proliferation of brony fan art and fan fiction, 
especially erotica depicting cute, anthropomorphized female 
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equine characters engaged in sexual acts across the spectrum of 
sexual orientations. Mullis focuses on a crucial site of cuteness 
culture: fandom that reappropriates commodities for its own 
use and pleasure. Cuteness here is a locus of erotic mobiliza-
tion — adoration and stylization are tools of possession. Mul-
lis further suggests bronydom as the American counterpart to 
the Japanese otaku subculture: young male fans of kawaii young 
girls in anime, manga, and video games. While the two are not 
the same, the cross-cultural parallels share a desire to reshape 
the logic of consumerism and form alternative communities of 
desire. Within the “equestrian economics” of My Little Pony, 
bronies profess their affection for fantasy characters — a form of 
desire akin to the Japanese moé, affection toward fictional char-
acters from fans. It is a desire for the ideal, which is recognized 
by bronies as a desire for the impossible. Yet the impossible, me-
diated through cuteness, is no less real.
The battle over possession of the cute thing is never about 
the thing itself. Marlis Schweitzer, in “Consuming Celebrity: 
Commodities and Cuteness in the Circulation of Master Wil-
liam Henry West Betty,” examines the intersections of celebrity 
culture, memorialization, objects, and the performance of gen-
der and class identities. A child actor, Betty rose to fame in the 
early nineteenth century and captured the imagination of Brit-
ish audiences. As he became ill, Betty’s smallness, vulnerability, 
weakness, and inaccessibility further accentuated his cuteness 
and thereby inflamed his fans’ desire for him. Biographies and 
objects bearing his likeness quickly saturated the market. Sch-
weitzer argues that the triangulation of cuteness, commodifica-
tion, and the child in the early nineteenth century did not cater 
only to women to satisfy their maternal instinct. Instead, most 
of Betty’s fans were men who owned snuffboxes that bore min-
iature portraits of him. The male consumption of snuff through 
literal inhalation was a homosocial performance of status and 
masculinity. Cutified objects permitted men access and proxim-
ity to Betty; they offered vicarious possession and protection of 
the boy actor. Celebrity commodities, however, complicate the 
temporalities of cute objects. While an object has its own bi-
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ography through production, circulation, and consumption, its 
temporal history exists in tension with the temporality of cute-
ness imprinted on it. If the cute object moves through linear 
history, cuteness itself is suspended in childhood. Betty’s memo-
rabilia weathers the passage of time, yet his infantile cuteness is 
immortalized. 
But if cuteness is eternal, does it have a future? A past? Or 
does cuteness, like queerness, struggle against its futurity as 
much as its past? In “Embracing the Gremlin: Judas Iscariot and 
the (Anti-)Cuteness of Despair,” Mariah Junglan Min reads me-
dieval representations of the Judas legend alongside contempo-
rary figurations of Judas in Japanese manga. If medieval aesthet-
ic is rooted in theology, in the equivalence of beauty and divine 
goodness, where does cuteness fit in? Min argues that a theology 
of cuteness is not alien to but exists within theology. More pro-
vocatively, Min contends that one iteration of medieval cuteness 
takes the form of failure and powerlessness, emblematized in 
Judas, one the most cute-resistant figures in Western thought. 
The death drive, in the form of existential and theological de-
spair, anchors the Judas legend; he is a litmus test for the reach 
of divine grace. Yet Judas’s sinfulness has salvation value, just 
as deformity has cute cache; here lies Judas’s cute futurity. De-
spair’s anti-cuteness is blurred with cuteness. Min finds an il-
luminating postmodern revision in Hikaru Nakamura’s manga 
series Saint Young Men, in which Judas appears as a cute teenage 
prankster who is always cheerful and whose transgression has 
already been forgiven by Christ. The manga serves as a secu-
lar sequel to medieval exegesis, and the cuteness of this Judas is 
possible because of his subjugation to divine will and his devia-
tion from beauty. A little queer he is. Nakamura’s Judas is more 
than a form of medievalism; he is an avatar of cuteism itself. 
The Proleptic Cute (Human)
Looking forward and backward in time, the child has become 
a powerful surrogate for the cultural and evolutionary develop-
ment of humanness across scientific and humanistic discourse. 
23
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Rebekah Sheldon’s recently released book, The Child to Come, 
traces deep pressures in a contemporary context on representa-
tions of the child. Well beyond metrics of capitalist consump-
tion, the child now reveals a calculus of biopolitical reproduc-
tion amid rhetorics of catastrophe and post-anthropocene 
logics. The child has formed as an indicator of new hybrids at 
the intersection of human and nonhuman, and conjoined to 
forces that threaten to exceed and disrupt human control and 
power. 
Alicia Corts’s contribution to this volume, “Cute, Charming, 
Dangerous: Child Avatars in Second Life,” explores the disjunc-
tive power of the virtual-actual hybrid and how the child be-
comes the embodiment of an “unstable performance” in such 
spaces: “virtual worlds mask the biological body of the user be-
hind the digital body of the avatar,” allowing the avatar child in 
an immersive virtual world like Second Life to become a con-
veyor of “temporal dissonance.” Such dissonance is so deeply 
disruptive to the normative discourse of sexuality and desire 
that it is re-formed as a regulatory system for subjectivity within 
the virtual environment. 
While Corts’s chapter focuses on contemporary virtuality as 
a portal into a world where the child betrays a radical reconfigu-
ration of human agency, her reworking of virtuality as a concept 
that redefines embodied temporality more broadly — beyond 
the digital — provides a means of rethinking the child across 
historical spaces. The constitution of the child in the Victorian 
era is not just a precursor historically for models of later capital-
ist logics or for a reordered aesthetics of subjective power, but 
also points to the emergence of biopolitical schemas conven-
tionally attributed to a much later period. Such schemas offer 
glimpses of an investment in the nonhuman vitality attached to 
objects, animals, and non-normative modes of reproduction. 
In “What’s Cute Got to Do with It? Early Modern Proto-
Cuteness in King Lear,” James M. Cochran identifies in Shake-
spearean cuteness (across and between animals and humans) 
an affective, conceptual figure that is itself a virtualization of 
“embodiment, desire, and identity” caught at the antithetical 
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crossroads of senility and childishness, which, Cochran finds, 
are both proto- and hybrid subject-objects that lack a well-de-
fined subjective order. What emerges from this order is a form 
of critique based in the “anti-cute”: a hybrid cuteness that is 
conjoined with the monstrous and vile. This critique points us 
toward a performative aesthetic in King Lear that “rejects nor-
mative modes of reproduction, even ‘altering’ reproduction into 
something unrecognizable as reproduction.” We find in this 
reading of Shakespeare a biopolitics that anticipates the ends 
of a coherent and effective human control of nature that is less 
about a temporal finale than a concomitant limit point to hu-
man reproductive capacity, inherently defined by the non-nor-
mative. The “end is near” in Lear is less an apocalyptic closure 
than a virtual limit to the human that is conjoined with each 
performance and articulation of the normative boundaries of 
early modern domesticity and society.
Kara Watts, in “Hamlet, Hesperides, and the Discursivity of 
Cuteness,” picks up on this early modern conceptualization of 
“thingness” through “cuteness” and offers a stunning counter-
response to Ngai’s strict aesthetics of cuteness as commodifica-
tion. Like Cochran, she finds within Shakespearean cuteness an 
engagement with an undefined power of the object. Yet Watts 
pushes this assertion even further to argue that in Hamlet we 
discover an intensive immersion in the virtual and transgressive 
power of the discursive itself. Cuteness within Hamlet not only 
returns cuteness to the problematics of language; it investigates 
how such problematics can become forms of virtual empower-
ment that redefine entirely an embodied relationship to texts. 
“Preciousness,” a model of cuteness in the early modern con-
text that predates a contemporary understanding of the “cute 
object,” informs Hamlet’s self-presentation throughout the play. 
Watts describes Hamlet’s base power play as one of “cute an-
tics.” His antics are a display of reliance on self-belittling. Such a 
performance, however, must steer between the language of ag-
grandizement and undercutting, resulting in a kind of virtual 
performance of selfhood that careens between the assertion of 
and the undoing of personhood. This example leads Watts into a 
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consideration of a queer philology in play that again challenges 
conventional frameworks of temporality: “focusing temporally 
on when certain terms appear or develop, queer philology asks 
about relationships of terms and their networks.” This approach 
not only challenges our assumptions about cute aesthetics in a 
contemporary context, but reorders our methodological habits, 
insisting on the queering of cute studies as a transhistorical en-
terprise.
In “Cute Lacerations in Doctor Faustus and Omkara,” Tripthi 
Pillai takes up a transhistorical study of Christopher Marlowe’s 
Doctor Faustus and Omkara, the 2006 Bollywood adaptation of 
Shakespeare’s Othello. A version of Watts’s interest in lexicons 
and the virtual power of discursive networks as an approach to 
excavating cuteness can be found in Pillai’s work as well. Re-
turning to the problem of language and performance, Pillai ap-
proaches cuteness in Marlowe and Omkara as a “violent instru-
ment of organizational breakdown.” Violence is understood in 
this sense, with assistance from Hannah Arendt, as the principal 
signifier of “the instability and demise of power.” In Marlowe, this 
violence is traced as a “lacerating” cuteness, an incisive perfor-
mance that displaces reproductive and sexual normativity with 
an absence of purposiveness to social performance and gesture. 
A similar function is found in the “itemizing” song-and-dance 
routines of Omkara, where conventional sexual narratives are 
distorted and displaced through “cute” manipulations of spatial 
and temporal registers within the film. Like Hamlet’s antic cute-
ness in that it cuts two ways, lacerating cuteness is empowering 
precisely because it disguises itself as powerlessness.
The volume closes with an expanded critique of the cute 
aesthetic as it appears in Katie Sokoler’s Tampax Radiant cam-
paign and the work of Japanese media artist Yayoi Kusama. In 
“Katie Sokoler, Your Construction Paper Tears Can’t Hide Your 
Yayoi Kusama Neurotic Underbelly,” Kelly Lloyd investigates the 
stickiness or odd “associative logics” of cuteness within popular 
art. She reads for acute similarities in the colorful and manic ad 
campaign for Tampax by freelance photographer Sokoler and 
the work of Kusama. Lloyd asks, how do these very similar ap-
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propriations of the cute aesthetic manage to form highly distinct 
audiences and publics? The formation of disparate publics, for 
Lloyd, betrays a “power struggle inherent to cuteness” itself. The 
viral spread of competing and expansive publics through cute 
aesthetics also foregrounds the infectiousness of cuteness across 
a full discursive spectrum. Watts refers to this mimetic func-
tion of cuteness as a broad “spectrum of appreciation” that cuts 
across “disinterested reaction” (i.e., the “cute” responses elicited 
on websites and social media) as well as “affective experience of 
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The stylistic qualities of the late medieval English play cycle 
known as the Towneley cycle have long intrigued literary schol-
ars, with no aspect demonstrating this more clearly than the con-
cept of the “Wakefield Master,” the name given to an anonymous 
playwright deemed to have written the most distinctive sections 
of the cycle.1 Known for his remarkably inventive uses of poetic 
form, rhyme words, colloquial expression, and verbal play, the 
Wakefield Master’s verbal intensity in the cycle has been read in 
different ways, including as a demonstration of “the abuses of 
language” and the moral complicity of poetry (Stevens); as a re-
flection of humanity and “the variety of the world” (Meredith); 
as evidence of anticlericalism (Dillon); and as critical com-
mentary on the forms of more urban, civic-minded play cycles 
1 The precise date of the Towneley cycle remains uncertain. While the single 
extant manuscript (San Marino, Huntington Library MS HM1) is usually 
dated circa 1500, performances of the play cycle in Wakefield are thought 
to have occurred by the mid-fifteenth century. The cycle’s authorship is 
similarly uncertain. Most critical assessments agree that large parts of the 
cycle have been written or revised by a distinctly creative writer commonly 
known as the “Wakefield Master,” also known as the “Wakefield author” and 
“Wakefield reviser.” Both A.C. Cawley and Martin Stevens have published 
extensively on the style of the Wakefield Master and also discuss the sub-
ject in their edition of the text; see Stevens and Cawley 1: xxviii–xxxi. Peter 
Meredith also supplies a helpful description of some of the features of the 
author’s style (150–57). For a more skeptical treatment of this author, see 
Dane.
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(Nisse).2 This chapter will focus on what the Wakefield Master’s 
style says about the affective pursuits of style itself, examining a 
single play from the cycle — the Play of the Dice, which comes 
directly after the Crucifixion play — that seems designed to pose 
questions not only about modes of verbal expression and the 
judgments that accompany them, but also about the extent to 
which aesthetic experience can be generated by stylized expres-
sion across different, often simultaneous media (verbal, visual, 
auditory, kinetic). If the Towneley cycle as a whole might be said 
to be characterized, via the ostensible talents of the Wakefield 
Master, by pockets of radical ingenuity, then the Play of the Dice 
should rightfully be understood as the play in the cycle that is 
most compulsively preoccupied with innovation as a site of both 
thematic and formal inquiry.3 
Part of the play’s innovation lies in the way it takes on the 
late medieval aesthetic modalities involving a particular biblical 
scene: that of the Roman soldiers who, at the moment of Christ’s 
Crucifixion, cast lots (and in later medieval tradition, play dice) 
for Christ’s “seamless garment.” The scene of the soldiers who 
cast lots for Christ’s garment is an important one. Prophesied 
in Psalm 22 and described in all four gospels (Matt 27:35; Mark 
15:24; Luke 23:34; John 19:24), it was the occasion of one of the 
better known biblical passages, the moment when Christ looks 
down from the crucifix, sees the men playing lots for his gar-
ment, and says “Father, forgive them, for they know not what 
they do” (Luke 23:34).4 In medieval Europe these characters 
2 Stevens, “Wakefield Cycle,” quotation 156 and “Language as a Theme” 100–
17; Meredith 153; Dillon 47–49; and Nisse 75–98.
3 Rosemary Woolf describes the Play of the Dice as “almost inexplicable in-
vention” and an “ambitious attempt at a tour de force” (268), although she 
does not think the play realizes its ambitions. 
4 The phrase spoken by Christ in Luke 23:34 is the first of the Seven Last 
Words of Christ, a popular devotional practice that was often included in 
late medieval Books of Hours. See for example the fifteenth-century illu-
mination by Sir John Fastolf, where all seven “last words” are included in 
the illumination of the Crucifixion (Los Angeles, J. Paul Getty Library MS 
5, fol. 16v). It can be viewed on the Getty Museum’s website. The verse from 
Luke is also directly quoted in the previous play of the Towneley cycle, the 
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were understood to be the same men who mocked, scourged, 
and crucified Christ; they were known as “torturers,” and they 
were imagined in a particular way: that is, as dicing galaunts 
whose obsession with frivolous things — fashion, gambling, 
dancing, and buffoonery — makes their vicious treatment of 
Christ all the more monstrous.5
In the hands of the Wakefield Master, the alarming verbal 
and visual presence of these biblical torturers offers almost un-
limited opportunities for witty experiments with forms, pat-
terns, and textures. Together with their perpetually frustrated 
leader, Pontius Pilate, the three Torturers are the central char-
acters of the Play of the Dice, and their predilections for stylized 
amusement are dramatized across a variety of registers, each of 
which tugs mercilessly at the soberness of the tragedy that has 
just taken place for humanity in the form of the Crucifixion.6 
Their frolicking, silly demeanor; their love of pranks and games; 
their doggerel, tail-rhyme speeches; their obsession with their 
own garish appearance and attire; their social and intellectual 
stupidity and uncouthness; their attempts to prance and dance; 
their mannered displays of neediness and cowardice — such 
performances present the torturers of Christ as aestheticized, 
childish figures of naïve, inappropriate merriment whose moral 
deficiencies shift during the play from abhorrent, to pathetic, to 
almost forgivable. 
The Play of the Dice seems determined to both perform and 
produce this experience of shifting, overlapping, often contra-
dictory affective responses. What does it mean, the play asks its 
readers and audience members, simultaneously to experience 
revulsion and sympathy? That the play focuses its aesthetic cu-
Crucifixion, lines 295–96, a moment that prompts the torturers to answer 
defiantly that in fact they do know what they’ve done (297–98). See Nisse 75 
for a discussion of the scene.
5 On the literary figure of the “galaunt” in late medieval England, see Denny-
Brown 148–78. 
6 In this essay I capitalize the word torturer when discussing the characters 
in the Play of the Dice. I leave the word in lower caps when I am discussing 
Christ’s torturers as biblical characters or cultural figures. 
32
the retro-futurism of cuteness
riosity on ostensibly frivolous objects, such as the cut of a gar-
ment, the butt of a joke, or the roll of dice, merely adds to its po-
tential potency. As the work of literary theorist Sianne Ngai has 
shown, ordinary aesthetic experiences — what she calls “trivial 
aesthetic categories” (21) — speak to a series of often-dominant 
cultural practices quite distinct from more traditional and rare-
fied aesthetic categories, which deal primarily with beauty. For 
Ngai, everyday aesthetic categories such as cute, zany, and in-
teresting are inherently “non-theological” (22) in that they are 
resolutely disengaged from ideas about sublime transcendence, 
a feature she ties to the postmodern condition of production. 
Despite the obvious differences in historical context, intriguing 
parallels can be found in the Play of the Dice. To point to one of 
the more basic intellectual formations of the play, in coveting 
and gambling for Christ’s garment, the materialistic Torturers 
reveal its power as an object of consumer desire and exchange 
value. Unlike Ngai’s postmodern examples, the subject matter 
and medieval context of this play do not allow the experience 
of this coveted object to be entirely separated from its theologi-
cal significance; most medieval audience members would have 
understood the garment’s exchange value to be a humorous 
misinterpretation of the true (i.e., immaterial) value of Christ’s 
garment. Moreover, at the end of the play, the Torturers are, al-
most despite themselves, on the verge of converting to Chris-
tianity, perhaps the ultimate experience of sublime transcend-
ence — and the opposite of what Ngai argues. 
As I argue in this chapter, however, the Play of the Dice deals 
with the aesthetic impact of the Crucifixion, including the po-
tential for Christ’s crucifiers to become the first post-Crucifix-
ion converts, by mobilizing aesthetic categories that look much 
like those described by Ngai. Ngai’s work reveals the experience 
of cuteness, for example, to be intimately related not only to 
tenderness, but also to aggression, violence, and social domi-
nance — experiences that, as I will discuss, are similarly linked 
in the Towneley Play of the Dice. Likewise, the idea that the 
Torturers might be understood through the concept of zaniness 
helps articulate the affective potential of their manic, stylized 
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movements, through which work and play become outlandishly 
confused. Could the torturers of Christ be considered cute? Or 
zany? Following the work of visual artist Takashi Murakami, 
whose “sado-cute” characters conflate menace with innocence, 
it may be more accurate to think about the Play of the Dice as 
offering an experience one might call “torturer-cute”: an aes-
thetic that sets out to brutalize the audience’s sensibilities, but 
that does this in ways that can also elicit feelings of pleasure.7 
The Torturers are sinister and yet also — strangely charming. 
Presented as agents of violence who are also clearly victims 
of violence (from Pilate’s hands, primarily), they seem to par-
ticipate in what Ngai describes as “the unusual readiness with 
which cute reverses into its opposite” (85).8 Moreover, although 
they themselves were involved in Christ’s torture and death (a 
fact they make clear in their initial monologues), in this play 
the Torturers are also positioned as the first humans to expe-
rience a world in which the Crucifixion has occurred. Their 
torturer-cute aesthetic directs attention to this fact, and to the 
way these characters simultaneously inflict and absorb the af-
fective blow — the emotional impact, tortured atmosphere, and 
symbolic weight — of the Crucifixion itself.
Pontius Pilate’s Mute, Cute Poetics
The Towneley cycle has been designated as the most literary of 
all the medieval play cycles, with apparent intertextual referenc-
es to Virgil, Langland, and medieval lyrics, among other literary 
7 For a recent example of the sado-cute aesthetic in Murakami’s work, see 
Hustle’n’Punch by Kaikai and Kiki (2009), in which Murakami’s charming 
characters express themselves with numerous sharp fangs. See Ngai 80–88 
for her discussion of Murakami’s “stylistic mutilation” in the DOB series. 
Daniel Harris discusses a similar idea when he explores the sadism of the 
consumer who buys cute things (5).
8 On Murakami’s cute objects as both agents and victims of aggression, see 
Ngai 85. See also Harris 16 on the relationship of cuteness to “anti-cute.” On 
the spectacle of violence as a particularly inventive and potentially pleasur-
able element of medieval drama, see Enders 174.
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texts, and yet it was also written to be performed.9 The mixed 
register of the plays, along with the possibility that the intended 
audience might have been made up of a blend of learned and 
unlearned people, can be seen from the first monologue in the 
Play of the Dice, which starts with a long stanza of untranslated 
Latin and then moves, with much flourish, to colloquial Middle 
English.10
The play begins on the night of the Crucifixion, which has 
taken place earlier in the day (and in the previous play of the 
cycle). The opening monologue is spoken by Pontius Pilate, the 
Roman prefect responsible for authorizing Christ’s Crucifixion, 
and its ninety-one-line rant seems designed simultaneously 
to establish Pilate’s tyrannical character and to quell audience 
noise. Pilate demands in various ways that audience members 
recognize his godlike power and authority; he threatens to kill 
them in equally various ways if they do not. Beginning with its 
linguistic structure, the primary mode of Pilate’s monologue is 
flamboyant verbal showmanship: the speech starts with a thir-
teen-line stanza in Latin, the only stanza exclusively in Latin 
in the cycle, which then slips into four equally long stanzas of 
half-Latin, half–Middle English lines, and finally ends with a 
smattering of shorter stanzas in Middle English only. The rhyme 
scheme of Pilate’s speech is equally elaborate and devolution-
ary: the first Latin stanza begins as a wall of sound, eight con-
secutive lines ending in identical monorhyme — in rime riche, 
no less — after which the stanza shapes itself into four lines in 
tail-rhyme format (aaaaaaaabcccb). Unlike the perfect Latin 
rhymes of the homogenous initial stanza, the macaronic tail-
9 On this cycle as “the most ‘literary’ of all the medieval Corpus Christi Plays,” 
see Stevens, “Wakefield Cycle” 156. For a summary of the cycle’s uses of non-
dramatic literary works, see Meredith 148–50; for particular examples, see 
Woolf 183 and Nisse 79, 80–94. On the manuscript’s stage directions, see 
Meredith 141–42. I’ve found Nisse’s discussion (77–78) about the difficulties 
of discovering the performance context of the plays especially helpful. 
10 On the probability that audiences for a variety of cycle plays were mixed 
clerical and laypeople, see Dillon 31–34; on the uniqueness of the Wakefield 
Master’s use of Latin throughout the Towneley cycle, see Dillon 31–50. 
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rhyme stanzas that follow (using the newly alternating rhyme 
structure ababababcdddc) include imperfect rhymes and some 
slant rhymes. By line 66, when Pilate switches to speaking Eng-
lish only, the characteristic thirteen-line tail-rhyme stanza form 
in which he has been speaking breaks apart into several shorter 
stanzas of fragmented or reversed-order tail-rhyme schemes. 
Pilate’s opening speech does fascinating things with poetic 
form, not only in the way it plays with the different textures of 
Latin and Middle English rhyme and rhythm, but also in the 
way it explores its own stanza structure, reorganizing the Wake-
field Master’s signature thirteen-line stanza into a series of dif-
ferent forms that comment on their own aesthetic and struc-
tural creation. He seems to be writing for two audiences — one, 
the kind of literary elite that understands Latin and recognizes 
the radical nature of his formal experiments, and two, the bois-
terous local audience that experiences the performative impact 
of his aesthetic. The Wakefield Master’s verses are hybrid in an-
other way as well, in that they seek to heighten the often jar-
ring differences between what characters say and how they say 
it — between content and style. What the characters say is often 
terrifying; how they say it is often, in Ngai’s terms, rather cute. 
One example is in the Latin portion of Pilate’s speech. If the au-
dience member understands Latin, he or she would hear a series 
of sharp commands, boasts, and threats in short order: 
Cernite qui statis
Quod mire sim probitatis;
Hec cognoscatis,
Vos cedam ni taceatis.
Cuncti discatis  
Quasi sistam vir deitatis 
Et maiestatis;
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Dum fero fando. (1–13)11
[Notice, you who stand (by)
That I am of wondrous valor;
Know this,
I will slay you unless you keep quiet.
Learn, all of you
That I am a man of god-like nature
And majesty;






For the members in the audience who do not understand Latin, 
however, the meaning of Pilate’s speech would have been severe-
ly blunted by the fact and form of its Latin language. “Verbal 
swagger” being a hallmark of the Wakefield Master’s villain-
ous characters, Pilate’s lengthy, rhymey use of Latin necessarily 
marks him as a pompous braggart who speaks high-style non-
sense.12 For these audience members, Pilate’s arrogant directives 
that they must, under pain of death, keep quiet and notice, know, 
and learn what he dictates, can offer at best an empty, if rhyth-
mic, demonstration of Latinate sounds, and at worst a blast of 
ardent blather. Even when the form of his monologue breaks 
down to include whole lines in Middle English, his aggressive 
commands in Latin, such as Caveatis! (22; Beware!) and its 
tail-rhyme twin, Me paveatis! (26; Tremble before me!), have a 
similar effect — that of a deadly threat muted almost entirely by 
its inaccessible linguistic casing. What Pilate means to be ver-
bally piercing, vicious, terrifying, and commanding is instead 
11 All citations of the Play of the Dice are from Stevens and Cawley.
12 I borrow the phrase verbal swagger from Stevens and Cawley 2: 584. Phar-
aoh, Herod, and Pilate all speak in versions of this boastful, blustering style. 
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redirected to present aesthetically as verbally silly, flouncy, and 
misguided. 
The affective mobilization and manipulation of Pilate’s lan-
guage can be helpfully understood through Ngai’s work on 
mute poetics. Mute poetics cutify language in various ways, 
beginning with forms of littleness — the minimizing and ob-
jectifying of poems, poetic lines, and words — and extending 
to poetic practices that explore noncommunicative or noncon-
ceptual language, such as deverbalization.13 That Pilate’s use of 
Latin poetics is partly intended to fall on deaf ears engages an 
aesthetic of diminished intelligibility — perhaps benign unin-
telligibility — that softens and tenderizes the aggressiveness of 
the speech as well as the man who says it. This speech has the 
potential to make Pilate’s tyrannical nature seem pitiful and 
pitiable, to compel a certain kind of affective response from an 
audience predisposed, by virtue of Christ’s Passion, to respond 
sympathetically to aestheticized powerlessness. Importantly, the 
paradox of Pilate’s stylized and forceful, yet mute and incom-
municative speech connects to a series of other binaries that 
structure the play’s aesthetic interests and judgments, including 
the dialectical pairings of vernacularity/Latinity, hyperactivity/
stillness, and abundance/restraint. 
Pilate’s mute poetics also correspond to the most fundamen-
tal aesthetic judgment in the cycle, the judgment associated 
with God. In the larger Towneley cycle, God and Jesus are pro-
foundly still and serious characters, often saying nothing or no 
more than a few English words at a time. Critics have described 
the abbreviated quality of divine speech acts in these plays in 
different ways. For Stevens, the language is simple and artless, 
fundamentally opposed to the overly clever, stylized speech 
associated with the morally reprehensible characters (“Wake-
field Cycle” 88–180; “Language as a Theme” 100–17); for John 
Gardner, God speaks in “flat statements of fact” (17); and for 
Meredith, the style of Christ’s language is “ordered” and “old-
13 See Ngai 87–109. 
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fashioned” (152).14 While Pilate’s bilingual verboseness seems 
inherently to contrast with these examples of vernacular flat-
ness, muteness, and restraint (the unstyled combined with the 
unspoken), Pilate is in fact desperate to claim some comparable 
form of divine muteness for himself. In the same way that he ref-
erences himself as divine-like (6) and mimics God by wearing a 
gilded facial mask (the costume worn by God in previous plays), 
so Pilate tries to invoke God’s capacity for muteness by demand-
ing, under threat of violence, silence from his listeners.15 Yet Pi-
late’s attempt fails miserably. Designed from the beginning to 
be thwarted, Pilate’s obsession with peace and quiet — his own 
as well as others’ — provides much of the humor in the speech, 
turning his quest for silence into a kind of ongoing joke where 
the desired objective is increasingly poked and prodded until 
Pilate, vexed to the point of distraction, loses his temper and 
explodes in another round of excessive (self-deflating, self-de-
feating) verbalization.
Take, for example, the exasperation evident in Pilate’s final 
Latin lines, followed by the moment when he shifts into Middle 




Yit agane byd I,
Iura tenete!  
Loke that no boy be to bustus, blast here for to blaw,
Bot truly to me talkyng loke that ye be intendyng.
If here be any boy that will not lout till oure law,
By myghty Mahowne, hygh shall he hyng! (61–69)
14 For a more general discussion of the ways that biblical villains are associ-
ated with transgressive language in the cycle plays, see Clopper.







Yet again, I command, 
Obey the laws!
Look that no boy be too noisy, blowing a (verbal) blast,
But truly look that you listen to my talking.
If there is any boy that will not succumb to our law,
By mighty Mahowne, he shall be hung high!]
Here we see the extent to which Pilate’s final Latin lines are de-
liberately made small, truncated to a mere three to five syllables 
per line and fetishized into a littleness that cannot help but draw 
attention to itself. As happens throughout his speech, Pilate’s 
repeated and strident calls for law-abiding silence signal the 
difficulty he experiences in bringing his audience to complete 
attention; his attempts to perform strength and command are 
undermined at every turn by the apparent refusal of audience 
members to be silent. His final shortened, staccato bursts of sibi-
lant Latin in this passage — “Silete, / […] / Sic speciali” — might 
be seen as an indignant shushing of his impudent audience: a 
distinctly nonverbal way to suppress resistance. Rather than 
hushing his audience into silence, however, Pilate’s punishing 
Latin is the thing silenced.
Pilate’s shift to Middle English in this passage offers another 
form of cutified poetic language and another comment on the 
aesthetic of silence: while the final Latin lines are foreshortened, 
clipped, and approaching deverbalization, the Middle English 
lines, by comparison, are maximized and overstuffed — long, 
tumbling lines of thirteen or fourteen syllables crammed full of 
unfussy alliterative English words and sounds. If Latin’s cutifica-
tion is via miniaturization, Middle English cuteness is achieved 
via chubbiness. What takes two words in Latin — Iura tenete 
(65) — takes twelve in Middle English (68). Instead of address-
ing the entire audience, here Pilate singles out the kind of au-
dience member that most irks him — the unruly “boy” in the 
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crowd who “blasts” him with his babbling (note the impressive 
alliterative mouthfeel here) instead of listening to him speak.16 
The dramatic intention of this statement must be paradoxical: 
such a calling out of the youth in the audience would no doubt 
have encouraged more catcalling, heightening the power play of 
audience participation instead of quelling it. 
By the end of this speech, moreover, Pilate’s demands for si-
lence have shifted their objective: he commands peace and quiet 
no longer so that his own voice can dominate, but for a more 
mundane purpose, so that he can go to bed: 
He has myster of nyghtys rest that nappys not in nonyng.
Boy, lay me downe softly and hap me well from cold;
Loke that no laddys noy me, nawder with cryyng nor with   
     cronyng,
Nor in my sight ones greue me so bold.
If ther be any boyes that make any cry,
Or els that will not obey me,
He were better be hangyd hy 
Then in my sight ones mefe me. (84–91)
[He has mastery of a night’s rest that naps not at noon.
Boy, lay me down softly and wrap me well from cold;
Look that no lads annoy me, neither with crying or with   
     crooning,
Nor in my sight ever grieve me so bold.
If there are any boys that make any noise,
Or else that will not obey me,
He’d do better to be hanged high
Than [be] in my sight once [he] disturbed me.] 
16 On nondiscursive babbling and the poetic abuse of verbal objects as a cuti-
fying practice, see Ngai 98.
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The aesthetics of sleep, as Daniel Harris points out, is inher-
ently cute. Its appeal stems from the sleeping object’s vulner-
ability and docility, its “languorous postures” and “defenseless 
immobility” (7). Pilate still has the capacity to be frightening, of 
course. When he spouts the seemingly innocuous proverb “He 
masters a night’s rest who naps not at noon,” it serves as a chill-
ing reminder of what Pilate was doing at noon instead of nap-
ping: turning Christ over to his crucifiers (John 19:14). Yet, in a 
complete reversal of his previous threats in Latin, Pilate’s citing 
of an English proverb — about naps, no less — also firmly situ-
ates him in the realm of the aesthetically familiar and pleasing. 
The person who cites a proverb is not a threat; he or she uses 
indirection to rest in the cushion of common wisdom — pre-
dictable, comfortable, cheerfully banal.17 The inherent cuteness 
of Pilate’s sleepiness is further enhanced by his attempts to get 
cozy — his requests that his servant lay him down softly and 
wrap him up imply soft bedding and a blanket to nuzzle — and 
also by the protective nature of his servant. Pilate has become 
someone malleable and vulnerable, who needs soft petting and 
security so he can doze. 
As with his previously frustrated attempts to create silence, 
however, Pilate’s carefully orchestrated sleep is destined to be 
interrupted. Not the “boyes” from the audience, but another, 
not-unrelated group of unruly young men interrupt his peace 
and quiet with their excited chatter and activity.18 Moments after 
Pilate lays down his head, the first Torturer arrives on the scene, 
singing a jaunty tail-rhyme speech about his recent experience 
at the Crucifixion.
17 See Ngai 96, however, on the ways that “already-said language” can also 
be used aggressively. On the rhetorical comfort of proverbs, see Yankah 
326–28.
18 On the likelihood that the Torturers emerge, one by one, from the audience 
to say their first monologues, see Diller 98–99.
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Torturers and their Transitional Objects
Like his treatment of Pilate, the Wakefield Master’s treatment of 
Christ’s torturers implements cuteness as a powerfully affective 
creative mode. The Torturers are stylized to best display their 
childish, pranking, fun-loving, stupid, frantic behaviors. If Pi-
late’s potential for cuteness rests in his mute poetics and his need 
to nap, the Torturers’ centers on their bouncy speeches, play-
ful physicality, and affectionate mauling of the garment at the 
center of the play’s biblical plot. While the Torturers begin the 
play as menacing, violent characters, their demeaning interac-
tions with Pilate and their constant fears that Christ’s garment 
will be taken away from them (fears that are ultimately realized) 
leave them feeling dejected and helpless and looking for new 
forms of enjoyment. 
The Play of the Dice uses several poetic and structural de-
vices to characterize the Torturers, starting with the curtail-
ing of Pilate’s macaronic thirteen-line stanzas into regularized 
eight-line double tail-rhyme stanzas in a swinging, thumping 
English doggerel verse. Doggerel verse, usually associated with 
rustic popular poetry, is best known from its use in Chaucer’s 
“Tale of Sir Thopas” from The Canterbury Tales, where it is first 
named as a style of its own (“rym doggerel” [925]), and where 
it is considered so offensive that it causes Chaucer the pilgrim 
to cease rhyming altogether — in essence, to stop being a po-
et.19 While the literary-minded members of the play’s audience 
might understand the Torturers’ use of doggerel in this context, 
however, the sound of the style carries its own meaning: as an 
aggressively rhythmized, doggedly irregular series of thumps or 
jog-trots, doggerel matches well the amusing physical presence 
of large, slightly bumbling men. That the sound of the Tortur-
ers’ doggerel verse is coupled with sing-songy, overnice tail-
rhyme — rhyme scheme aaab cccb — adds to its aesthetic punch: 
this is a combined style that offers audience members the aes-
thetic experience of brutality sweetened by dainty cuteness. 
19 On Chaucer’s doggerel in the “Tale of Sir Thopas,” see Gaylord.
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The three Torturers are unnamed, and they are so formally 
similar that it is easy to get them confused. Each enters the scene 
after having sprinted there from the Mount at Calvary where 
the Crucifixion took place, and each opens his monologue with 
a formulaic warning to the audience to “War, war!” (Beware, 
Beware!) and with a boast about his own badassery. As with the 
mute poetics evident during Pilate’s opening speech, however, 
where the gradual miniaturization of Pilate’s Latin words serves 
to infantilize and cute-ify, each of the Torturers’ three speeches 
is noticeably shorter and more puerile than the previous. Tor-
turer #1, who is presented as the most refined and attractive of 
the Torturers, gets there first and speaks for a full five stanzas; 
Torturer #2, a crass prankster who says he ran so fast to get there 
that he nearly “beshytt” his britches (138), is given four stanzas 
to make his case; and Torturer #3, slow, fat, and violent, who 
says he “brysten both my balok-stones” (166; broke his balls) 
to get there and that his favorite pastimes are murdering and 
hanging others (169), is allowed a speech of only two-and-a-half 
stanzas. This is torturer-cute poetics in triplicate, where the ex-
cessive use of playful, slightly dubious poetic practices by almost 
indistinguishable characters — doggerel, tail-rhyme, repeat tag-
lines, and verbal jokes — creates a parody of what should be vil-
lainous style.20 
Christ’s torturers get their name from the Latin word tortura, 
meaning “twisting,” and their aesthetic manifests this concept 
in different ways. Figure 1, for example, from the Fitzwarin Psal-
ter, shows the extent to which one late-medieval English artist 
imagined the torturers not only as wearing clothing with twist-
ing stripes, but also as contorting their own bodies into twisted 
shapes.21 Such images are often read as a physical manifesta-
tion of the torturers’ deformed morals, but they also serve to 
20 On the Torturers’ use of rhyming nonsense, see Woolf 255. On the ludic 
sensibility of medieval cycle plays, in which Christ’s torturers “turn almost 
all their necessary actions into competitive games,” see Kolve 182.
21 The folio in figure 1 from the Fitzwarin Psalter (Paris, BnF MS lat. 765, fol. 
12r) can be viewed in detail on the website of the Bibliothèque nationale de 
France: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b60005131/f25.image.
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manifest the viewers’ feelings when they observe the torturers 
in the act of torture. The Play of the Dice seems to comment 
on this tradition, introducing a variety of distorted (i.e., tortur-
ous) forms and styles in speech and appearance, and then re-
aestheticizing those forms with a series of softer, gentler, more 
potentially enjoyable affects. Just as the play associates its Tor-
turers with manipulations of poetic form and linguistic register, 
for example, so it associates them with distorted comportment 
and movements. Whereas Pilate, when finally woken from his 
sleep, remains passive by being carried around by his servant 
and placed on his chair (an imitation of Christ’s extreme pas-
sivity that seems to last for much of the play), the Torturers are 
presented as excessively mannered jesters or minstrels, not only 
running to the scene at top speed, but also skipping, leaping, 
and dancing their way through their lines. In a typical moment 
of self-narrated hyperactivity, Torturer #2 can’t help but exclaim 
“I will lepe and I will skyp / As I were now out of my wytt” (136–
Figure 1. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS lat. 765, fol. 12r. 
© BnF. Bibliothèque nationale de France. By Permission.
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37) when he arrives. The Torturers’ haphazard, manic physical-
ity speaks to Ngai’s category of zaniness, in which “the activity of 
spontaneous, goalless play” (188), often by multiple characters 
and within the context of almost certain bodily injury, becomes 
a source of laughter and pleasure. But because the Torturers in 
the Play of the Dice tend to physically distort themselves as a 
bodily reflection of their desire for a coveted object — Christ’s 
garment — we might also see their prancing, frolicking leaps as 
manifestations of those feelings deformed by want: seeing or 
imagining the object of their desire and affection, the Torturers 
take on the contorted quality of the objectified thing itself, the 
cute object that, in Ngai’s words, is “shaped or deformed by the 
subject’s feeling or attitude toward it” (65). In their process of 
cutifying Christ’s garment, they themselves become cute. 
Christ’s seamless garment, the object at the center of the 
Torturers’ attention, is verbally cited with obsessive frequency 
in the Play of the Dice — nineteen times in the 430-line play, 
and by at least seven different terms, some common (such as 
“clethynge,” “cote,” “gowne,” and “wede”) and some cutifying 
(such as “harnes” and “frog”).22 As the first to arrive, Torturer 
#1 carries Christ’s garment with him on stage, and while it is 
not always clear who has possession of the object throughout 
the action that ensues, it seems likely that the garment passes 
from character to character at key moments, ultimately ending 
up in Pilate’s hands.23 Suffice to say, the seamless garment, like 
the body it once belonged to and now symbolizes, represents a 
22 See Stevens and Cawley 586, note to line 117.
23 While it is the central prop of the dramatic action, without proper stage 
directions the unseamed garment’s whereabouts are not always as easy to 
decipher. Torturer #1 appears to carry it throughout the first half of the play 
and seems to be the most possessive of it until it is apparently snatched 
away by Pilate at line 264. There are moments — such as when Pilate allots 
separate parts of the garment to each character, beginning at line 275, and 
when the torturers are searching the garment to find its seams, for ease of 
cutting it, at lines 296–98 — when the garment is likely to have been held 
out by several of the players at once, or perhaps stretched between them. 
Torturer #3 likely takes the garment as his own at line 352, after winning the 
dice game; and at line 371, he finally hands it over to Pilate.
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kind of exaggerated passivity. Like the sacrificial body it once 
dressed, the garment is destined to be manipulated, toyed with, 
and pawed — or as Ngai puts it, when describing the affectionate 
mauling of cute objects, “excitedly loved and mutilated” (89).24 
Harris also describes the compelling physical passivity of cute-
ness, which creates a perverse attraction, “a world of station-
ary objects and tempting exteriors that deliver themselves up to 
us, putting themselves at our disposal and allowing themselves 
to be apprehended entirely through the senses” (8–9). As op-
posed to the earlier plays in the cycle, such as the Buffeting and 
Crucifixion, where the Torturers’ violence is enacted against 
Christ’s physical body, here they maul a soft, blanket-like object 
instead. Moreover, because the events of the play take place at 
night, when most people — including Pilate, as we’ve seen — are 
asleep, the garment takes on the feeling of a transitional object, 
an object of comfort that is carried from one scene to the next 
(and from one play to the next, since it was taken off Christ’s 
body in the previous play of the cycle) and that protects its new, 
childish owners from real and imaginary fears. Torturer #1 states 
as much at the end of his monologue, addressing the mythical 
protective powers of Christ’s seamless garment:
For whosoeuer may get thise close,
He ther neuer rek where he gose,
For he semys nothyng to lose,
If so be he theym were.
But now, now felose, stand on rowme,
For he commes, shrewes, vnto this towne,
And we will all togeder rowne,
So semely in oure gere. (124–31)
[For whoever may get these clothes
He never cares where he goes
For he seems to lose nothing
If he wears them.
24 See also Ngai 93 on the exaggerated passivity of cute things.
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But now, now fellows, stand aside
For here come shrews into this town
And we will all together talk
So seemly in our clothes.]
The fact that the speaker draws attention to the Torturers’ own 
“semely” or visually pleasing clothing here means the players 
were likely wearing some form of ostentatious costume. The 
tradition of portraying Christ’s torturers as flamboyant dressers 
can be seen throughout the visual and plastic arts in medieval 
Europe, where they are often depicted wearing bright, fash-
ionable garments, bicolored hose, and other excessive finery.25 
These images were pervasive and, as figure 1 shows, symboli-
cally powerful, often using vibrant colors and luxurious textures 
to heighten the colorless purity of Christ. On stage, the Tortur-
ers also ornamented their showy costumes with symbolic ob-
jects related to the play’s narrative, such as nails and dice — yet 
another example of the torturer-cute aesthetic they embody.26 
Their costumes were also sometimes ornamented with external 
symbols of Jewishness, such as Hebrew letters, which suggests 
the extent to which torturer-cute aesthetics relied on racial cari-
cature.27
In the moral world of medieval sumptuary laws, the tortur-
ers’ love of fashionable clothing marks them as frivolous and 
materialistic consumers, and in this way further informs their 
desire for Christ’s garment. But while the Torturers in the Play 
of the Dice covet the seamless garment, with the exception of 
Torturer #1, they cannot explain exactly why. Instead they think 
about the garment in terms of its affective impact, as shown in 
this quotation from Torturer #2, who anticipates his response to 
the pleasure he will feel upon obtaining the garment:
25 Schiller 154–57 and Mellinkoff 1:21. 
26 The Coventry Smiths’ accounts for 1490, for example, describe “iiij Jak-
ketts of blake bokeram for þe tormentors with nayles & dysse upon þem” [4 
jackets of black buckram for the tormenters with nails & dice upon them] 
(Ingram 73).
27 Schiller 154–57 and Mellinkoff 1:21. 
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Both on ernest and on hethyng
This cote I wold I had;
For if I myght this cote gett,
Then wold I both skyp and lepe,
And therto fast both drynke and ete,
In fayth, as I were mad. (158–63)
[Both in earnest and in jest
This coat I wish I had;
For if I might this coat get
Then would I both skip and leap
And to that fast both drink and eat,
In faith, as (if) I were mad.]
By contrast, Torturer #1 is especially vocal about the aesthetic 
register of his actions, and his attempts to understand the world 
through his own sensibilities serve as a kind of affective “mind-
er” throughout the play. He is the character who first brings the 
seamless garment onto the stage, and appropriately, his favorite 
word is “semely,” meaning pleasant, comforting, or visually 
pleasing. He is the individual who first comments on the gar-
ments they all wear, “so semely in oure gere” (131). Torturer #1 
also describes spitting in Christ’s face until it is “So semely to my 
sight” (103); and he describes his own attractiveness in similar 
terms, stating, “I am right semely and fare in the face” (192). 
He describes Pilate as “semely suffrayn” (247; seemly sovereign). 
And, in the best pun of the play, he states, when the torturers are 
looking for a place to cut the seamless garment so as to divide it 
among themselves, that “Most semely is, in certan, the seym to 
assay” (296): it would certainly be most seemly to test the seam. 
While the speaker’s first few mentions of this word might 
connote the appearance of substance, by the third, fourth, and 
fifth uses of the same word by the same person, it becomes more 
of a verbal tick than a meaningful descriptor, an example of what 
Ngai calls “markers of affective insistence” in poetic writing 
(184). In this play about Christ’s seamless robe, seemliness — the 
experience of sensory pleasure — is a running joke, the kind that 
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gets cuter with each repetition. In addition, the attempt to cut 
the seamless garment at the seam plays into the idea that cuti-
fied objects, by virtue of their aestheticized passivity, not only 
invite physical distortion and abuse, but also make significant 
affective demands upon their subjects. Here, in a humorously 
vulgar parody of the Crucifixion itself, a garment without seams 
presents itself as a challenge to the Torturers to find its seams or 
to make seams (holes, wounds) of their own, and thus to find a 
way to satisfy their sinister pleasure at destroying the cute object 
in order to possess it. 
Conclusion
Cleverly written, cutified violence is a hallmark of the Towneley 
Play of the Dice. By way of conclusion, what I’ve been describing 
as the “torturer-cute” aesthetic in the play might be understood 
as a reflection of the playwright’s curiosity about something 
that also fascinates Ngai: shifting, uncertain aesthetic experi-
ences that conflate positive and negative affects (2). While the 
Play of the Dice explores the ambivalent, slightly unstable nature 
of aesthetic experiences and judgments throughout the play, at 
the end it directs our attention to a more extreme example. The 
play ends when Torturer #3, fed up with the sorrow and violence 
he experiences when he plays dice games (which, he complains 
in rhyme, usually start with men’s “laghter” [422] and end with 
“mens slaghter” [420]), decides to change allegiances and serve 
the Christian God, because he is the “gentyllyst” (427) of judges. 
To be gentil speaks to noble status in the medieval period and 
carries with it related aesthetic judgments about charm, grace, 
courteousness, and beauty. The implication is that the most 
vehement of all the Torturers decides to convert because he 
finds pleasing the Christian God’s elegance and tenderness, as 
opposed to the more severe affective tactics of the tyrants he 
has been used to serving, Pilate, Mahowne, and Fortune. Pilate 
mocks Torturer #3 for his newfound cleverness, his “conyng” 
(431), but the effect remains: Torturer #3 has shown himself to 
be considering, even analyzing, the variety of his aesthetic expe-
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riences. This is something the Towneley Play of the Dice asks of 
all its readers and audience members. The affective demands of 
the Play of the Dice play are substantial: from the wall of Lati-
nate sounds in the beginning of the play, through the physical 
pliability and sinister petting of Christ’s garment in the middle 
of the play, to the sudden appreciation of the transcendent pos-
sibilities of gentil aesthetics at the play’s end, readers and au-
dience members are confronted by a post-Crucifixion world 
preoccupied with the way stylistic expression can provoke com-
plex, changeable affective states, and further, with the capacity 
for analytical thoughtfulness about the aesthetic categories that 
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Indulgence and Refusal: 
Cuteness, Asceticism, and the 
Aestheticization of Desire
Elizabeth Howie
Centuries before the late nineteenth-century advent of the cute, 
not to mention its twentieth-century flowering in consumer-
ism, ascetic medieval Christians resisted temptation in a way 
that served to inflame desire, to make it more acute, with the 
ultimate goal of eradicating it to achieve greater holiness. Early 
twenty-first-century scholars, such as Sianne Ngai and Daniel 
Harris, resist and refuse the restrictions of traditional scholar-
ship to explore critically the so-called minor aesthetic category 
of cuteness, finding it a form that, like asceticism, also arouses 
desires and embraces seemingly incongruous qualities. While 
asceticism calls attention to desire by denying its fulfillment, 
cuteness conceals the power of the commodity’s insidious desir-
ability behind a masquerade of innocent powerlessness. 
Asceticism is a practice of self-denial in the pursuit of purity, 
whereas cuteness is an aesthetic that indulges in the small, help-
less, fuzzy, and childlike. My impulse to explore relationships 
between such seemingly incompatible concepts comes from an 
admittedly romanticized fascination with the tiny Irish island 
of Skellig Michael and its examples of early Christian monastic 
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structures.1 From around the sixth to thirteenth centuries, the 
rocky island off the west coast of Ireland harbored a monastic 
settlement comprising tiny beehive huts made of stacked stone 
(six) and tiny oratories (two), with tiny gardens built on tiny 
ledges made of stacked stone, where tiny plants were grown to 
make tiny meals. This barely habitable landscape was home to 
a tiny community of monks (at most twelve, with their abbot 
making thirteen), near silent except for repetitive prayer, who 
resisted the simple comforts available at their mainland monas-
tery. Their lives were, by choice, incredibly difficult. Their self-
denial would have aroused not-so-tiny, sharp desires for full-
ness, comfort, safety, even level ground. 
To interpret such austere monastic life in terms of cuteness 
may seem wildly inappropriate for several reasons. The aesthet-
ic of cuteness was not articulated until the nineteenth century 
(Ngai 15), and the monks of Skellig Michael would certainly not 
have perceived their surroundings in terms of cuteness; they de-
voutly sought separation from the world and viewed suffering as 
a path to holiness through the radical simplification of their ex-
istence. Nevertheless, my twenty-first-century understanding of 
asceticism persists in conjuring up imaginary moments of me-
dieval ascetic cuteness that address overlaps between cuteness 
and asceticism in relation to desire and aestheticization, finding 
commonalities including self-denial, vulnerability and needi-
ness, intimacy, woundedness, and bodily distortion. Resisting 
looking for anything literally cute in medieval asceticism,2 this 
project finds some asceticism in cuteness, and will flirt with 
analogy — not to force similarities, but instead to sift through 
1 See Horn, Marshall, and Rourke, especially pp. 7 and 10. More recently, 
Skellig Michael served as a location for Star Wars: The Force Awakens (2015) 
as well as Star Wars: The Last Jedi, scheduled for release in 2017.
2 There are exceptions. In a startling arena, the visions of holy female ascetics, 
I find threads of the cute: Margery Kempe had visions in which she “cuddled 
with Christ in bed and was bold enough to caress his toes” (qtd. in Bynum 
246); Anna Vorchtlin “said to the infant Jesus […] ‘I would eat you up, I love 
you so much’” (qtd. in Bynum 250). Indeed, as medievalist Carolyn Walker 
Bynum points out, “communion was consuming” tiny sips of wine and tiny 
nibbles of bread that stood for the extremities of suffering (250).
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morsels of overlap and relation. In the Derridean sense, here 
analogy bridges two very different, and broad, territories, seek-
ing similarities while maintaining distinctions (Bannet 655).3 
Defining Cuteness
Recent scholarly attention to cuteness provides rich and com-
plex ways to characterize it, the elaboration of which will reveal 
what Ngai terms its instability as an aesthetic (88): its inclusion 
of seemingly opposite tendencies such as powerlessness and 
aggression. Ngai lists qualities such as small size, soft edges, 
simplicity, and malleability; cuteness may also be squishy, silky, 
smooth, and resilient to being crushed (59, 64). Lori Merish 
adds that the cute object typically demonstrates qualities associ-
ated with infancy, such as roundness, as well as eyes and a head 
that are large in proportion to the body (187). For Merish, cute-
ness is an aestheticization of powerlessness because of its rela-
tionship to the childlike (187). Ngai concurs, adding that part of 
the appeal of cuteness lies in its vulnerability (58). Cuteness in 
distress, suffering, is at its most powerfully powerless. Needy, 
weak, and adorable, it elicits a desire that is often protective and 
maternal (Merish 186), and therefore acceptable, regardless of 
how commercially engineered the cuteness may be. For Ngai, 
the cute object must seem particularly sensitive to the viewer’s 
affective response (65). If aestheticization involves the objecti-
fication of affect, for Ngai, cuteness is the epitome of affective 
aesthetic objectification (65).
Cuteness’s powerlessness may be mitigated by barely to mild-
ly threatening, slightly aggressive sharpness, traces of which 
appear in the etymology of the word, according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary: “Acute, clever, keen-witted, sharp, shrewd” 
(qtd. in Ngai 59). It is not hard for something to be so cute that 
3 While analogy may oversimplify comparisons between different entities by 
making two entities seem more similar than they actually are, and thus ar-
tificially eliminate their individuality, Derrida uses analogy to explore the 
indeterminacy of meaning. Analogy then becomes a vehicle for the transla-
tion, in the sense of carrying from one place to another, of meaning.
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it is painful, especially when it arouses desire that cannot be sat-
isfied. Ngai suggests contemporary artist Takashi Murakami’s 
anime-inspired sharp-fanged character, Mr. DOB, as a manifes-
tation of the duality of cuteness: Mr. DOB, a recurring character 
in Murakami’s work since 1993, resembles Mickey Mouse, with 
round face, ears, and huge, wide-set eyes, but with a tiny button 
nose replacing Mickey’s mouse-snout. Over time, Mr. DOB’s grin 
has grown ever wider and more maniacal, revealing increasingly 
menacing sharp teeth, yet his roundness and big eyes keep him 
in the realm of the cute. 
Cuteness, seeming to have a will of its own, also demon-
strates aggression by imposing demands (Ngai 64). For exam-
ple, it may demand that we allow it to submit to us. Its immedi-
ate visceral impact is often counteracted by the viewer’s sense 
of having been manipulated, arousing the viewer’s suspicions. It 
desperately awaits our evaluation of and interaction with it. It is 
a supplicant awaiting our judgment, a judgment that will give it 
power over us. Cuteness thereby engenders its own discipline by 
enforcing particular behaviors of the viewer (Ngai 25); in turn, it 
engages and disciplines its viewer. Its disavowal of power is one 
of its powers. 
Definitions of Asceticism
Geoffrey Galt Harpham notes asceticism’s capacity to allow for 
contradictions without collapsing them (xi). Like cuteness, as-
ceticism works through disavowals while calling attention to 
that which it rejects, in particular, desire and its satisfaction. At 
its most general, asceticism refers to a practice involving acts 
of self-denial, which are steps toward a desired outcome, often 
spiritual; for Harpham, this definition makes asceticism the 
foundation of all culture. As Harpham and others have dem-
onstrated, asceticism is cross-cultural, and may be identified in 
practices both inside and outside of religion (xiii). For these rea-
sons it is impossible to define asceticism conclusively; it resists, 
denies, and foregoes definition. 
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This paper works with a broad definition of Christian asceti-
cism, which takes many forms and has varied greatly between 
sects, genders, geographies, and historical eras. Walter O. Kael-
ber’s summary from the Encyclopedia of Religion is a useful 
place to start, shifting away from Harpham’s more secular defi-
nition: asceticism is “a voluntary, sustained, and at least partially 
systematic program of self-discipline and self-denial in which 
immediate, sensual, or profane gratifications are renounced in 
order to attain a higher spiritual state or a more thorough ab-
sorption in the sacred” (441). The ascetic’s desired outcomes 
from these behaviors range from a negation of human subjectiv-
ity, to a closer relationship with the holy, to ensuring a positive 
afterlife, for example (Deal 426). 
Kaelber points out five consistent traits of religious asceti-
cism: fasting, sexual abstinence, poverty, seclusion, and self-in-
flicted pain (442). All of these traits may exist independently of 
asceticism, but combined with desired outcomes and embedded 
in a faith tradition, they become semioticized, part of a system 
of signification. As semioticized performances, ascetic acts exist 
in a complex web of meanings that are dependent on each other 
and rooted in centuries-old traditions. 
Grappling with desire is at the heart of asceticism’s practic-
es. Harpham points out that denying what one desires doesn’t 
eradicate desire (45). Instead, to deny oneself something is to 
acknowledge its desirability, to amplify awareness of one’s long-
ing for the forbidden item. Desire also inspires and motivates 
ascetic practices, which are undertaken in response to a pas-
sionate longing for a goal such as ridding oneself of desire; yet 
paradoxically a desire to get rid of desire is still a desire (45). For 
example, denying the body serves to accentuate the experience 
of the flesh, of human existence, in acknowledgement of the 
Incarnation’s miraculous merging of the divine and the human 
(Bynum 294). The suffering ascetic’s behaviors are designed to 
fulfill his or her desire to emulate Christ’s suffering on the cross.
Ascetic performances and practices discipline the body and 
mind, even to the point of changing the body’s instinctual re-
sponses to desire and the senses (Flood ix, 4). Asceticism denies 
58
the retro-futurism of cuteness
subjective affect: its behaviors are intended to quash the sub-
jectivity of the practitioner. It is a shrinking of the self (Malina 
162–65), a distortion of the self — including the psychological, 
the social, and the physical self — that results in a purified self 
whose every action is embedded in a new semiotic system. 
Such behaviors have been helpfully contextualized by theo-
logian Richard Valantasis in terms of performance; asceticism’s 
relationship to performance marks its difference from more 
ordinary religious behaviors like prayer and devoutness (107). 
Ascetic performances may be not only semioticized but also 
aestheticized, while ordinary religious behaviors are far less so. 
In terms of aestheticization, in ascetic practice, the ascetic body 
becomes a symbolic form (Harpham xiv). Here I use the con-
cept of aestheticization not in relation to beauty, but instead to 
describe the way that something is intentionally formed, styl-
ized, or objectified, resulting in its being perceived in terms of 
its formal qualities and the affective associations with that form, 
rather than for itself. Such an act of aestheticization makes what 
is formed expressive of the intentions of the one who forms, as 
well as of its embeddedness in ideology, without necessarily sig-
nifying as a sign would. It distinguishes it from the nonaesthetic, 
such as everyday behaviors. The aestheticized and semioticized 
ascetic act awaits the interpretation of its audience, and ascetic 
performances always have an audience, whether that audience is 
the inspired faithful (like those who gathered at the base of Saint 
Symeon Stylites’s column to witness his holy suffering), other 
ascetics (like those who sought out Saint Antony in the desert), 
or God (Valantasis 2). 
Ascetic Cuteness
Asceticism, with its amplified denial of desire in the service of 
religious devotion, and cuteness, with its exaggerated appeal to 
desire on an immediate, visceral level, seem incompatible. Yet 
like a body weakened by starvation, the cute, hungry with sharp 
teeth, needs our tender, loving care. It seeks intimacy, as the as-
cetic seeks profound intimacy with God. Sometimes lonely and 
59
Indulgence and Refusal
isolated, but not by choice or through discipline, the cute prays 
to its viewer for salvation. 
Cuteness longs for indulgence, while asceticism enacts re-
fusal. To indulge is to give in to desire, to permit oneself the ex-
perience of satisfaction. This is what cuteness demands from its 
viewer — whether by fondling, eating, buying, or other ways the 
viewer seeks intimacy with the cute object. Cuteness sanctions a 
lack of resistance: if something is cute, it’s more acceptable to be 
unable to resist it. Cuteness seems to justify giving in, even when 
it fails to provide complete satisfaction. Asceticism denies such 
experiences. The acute pleasure associated with cuteness would 
be exactly the kind of human affective response ascetics seek to 
discipline into nonexistence. Yet science has demonstrated that 
sexual pleasure, eating, and mind-altering drugs stimulate the 
same parts of the brain that feel pleasure when processing im-
ages — just images! — of baby animals (Angier). Cuteness thus 
impinges on the types of pleasures and satisfactions that ascet-
ics seek to renounce. Where asceticism denies sensual pleasure, 
cuteness, by contrast, has such a broad and consistent appeal 
that Ngai uses the term “promiscuous” to describe it (24).
Both cuteness and asceticism have a tendency to excess: for 
example, cuteness with ever-larger eyes and chubbier softness, 
and asceticism with self-deprivations leading to emaciation, or 
to flagellation that inflicts suffering without quite causing death 
(James 354). Even giving in to the urge to endure increasingly 
extreme privations was considered dangerous and could earn a 
medieval monk a reprimand from his abbot (Bynum 240). Yet the 
excesses of cuteness and asceticism are often tied, paradoxically, 
to lack. Cuteness is often cute because it lacks something (Harris 
4), whether that lack is indicated by a generalized neediness, or 
more specifically by helplessness or homelessness; whereas asceti-
cism is built on lack, whether of food, sleep, human companion-
ship, etc. Lack serves a purpose, and is another element of both 
cuteness and asceticism that may be considered aestheticized. 
Cuteness’s sweet lack, as Harris and Ngai point out, is often 
paired ambivalently with revulsion (Harris 2–4; Ngai 60). In this 
context, what would normally be unpleasant and undesirable 
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becomes appealing, a contradiction that also has a role in asceti-
cism. Disgust associated with the body and its weaknesses oper-
ates in both cuteness and asceticism. Disgust evokes pity; being 
pitiable equates to powerlessness. But as cuteness theorists have 
shown, powerlessness, in cuteness, is a kind of power. Cuteness 
and asceticism share a paradoxical relationship to bodily func-
tions and disgust. On the one hand, both cuteness and asceti-
cism emphasize the body freed from bodily functions. Harris 
observes that excretions are eliminated from the cute (11), and 
Merish notes more specifically that defecating or vomiting have 
no place in the cute (189). In asceticism, such an absence of 
bodily functions, whether from deliberate self-starvation or a 
posthumous absence of decomposition, is a sign of saintliness 
(Bynum 211). On the other hand, both cuteness and asceticism 
also make room for disgust in relation to desire. Disgust can 
be a marker of a kind of power in cuteness if it accentuates the 
cute object’s powerful powerlessness. In asceticism, what would 
ordinarily be deemed disgusting can instead be a desirable sign 
of piety if it demonstrates evidence of piously undertaken bod-
ily privations. Asceticism’s relationship to disgust and aversion 
has to do with canceling out the desirability of the body, and 
with visible signs of suffering being aestheticizations of piety. 
The sometimes-disgusting mortifications undergone by ascet-
ics are signs of a movement away from subjectivity and toward 
purity (Adams 29). Disgust removes the conventional sexual de-
sirability of the ascetic body: for example, Saint Symeon Stylites 
suffered horrendously from a gangrenous leg filled with mag-
gots. Yet to his followers, this wound was by no means an indica-
tor of ordinary suffering, but a semioticized mark that took on 
holy meaning. Symeon’s biographer Antonius describes a man 
who “picked up one of the worms that had fallen from Symeon’s 
thigh and saw it as a priceless pearl” (Miller 147). (I can’t help 
but imagine some anime version of this wherein a cutified big-
eyed maggot preens at being perceived as pearly, manifesting 
the type of pride that would be anathema to a good ascetic.) 
Such atrocious wounds would be out of place in conventional 
cuteness, but woundedness of a lesser variety can augment cute-
61
Indulgence and Refusal
ness, as Harris comments in relation to British teddy bear “Lit-
tle Mutt,” who wears an orthopedic boot (6). Further exploring 
the sufferings of the cute or ascetic body, one divergence comes 
from the fact that the cute object, image, or toy is designed as 
suffering, by a (perhaps sadistic) designer who “maims and hob-
bles” (Harris 5). The ascetic, by contrast, is suffering for a creator 
who does not maim or hobble him or her, in many cases; the 
maiming or hobbling is self-inflicted in the name of that creator. 
One attribute of physical anomaly that overlaps strangely 
between the cute and the ascetic is bodily distortion. Limited 
movement and nonfunctional body parts play a role in both as-
ceticism and cuteness. Harris points out that teddy bears, which 
looked more or less like anatomically proportionate bears when 
they were first marketed, have been altered over time so that 
pawless and jointless pudgy limbs stick straight out uselessly, 
or at best, ready for a hug (5, 10). The deliberate distortion of 
limbs, at times to the point of uselessness, is also a component 
of extreme asceticism. For example, as a child, Saint Kevin of 
Glendalough had his arms outstretched to pray when a black-
bird landed in them and built a nest; the (cute) child and future 
saint stayed in that position until the last (cute) fledglings had 
departed (Plummer 137). 
Another feature of both cuteness and asceticism where over-
lap exists, which at first might seem counterintuitive, is the way 
that neediness and/or helplessness become attractive (Harris 4). 
Harris argues that cuteness aestheticizes “unhappiness, helpless-
ness, and deformity” (5), part of the dynamic of powerlessness 
that makes the cute appealing. Deformity, a mark of saintly as-
cetic suffering, is also a mark of the neediness of the cute, but 
only to a certain degree. In asceticism, helplessness is part of the 
practice of resistance and self-denial, and if resistance and self-
denial lead to bodily infirmity that make the ascetic even more 
helpless, then the ascetic’s piety is literally a successful embodi-
ment of ascetic tradition. Deformity as a result of self-inflicted 
suffering is an aestheticization of piety. Valantasis notes that as-
cetics who seek solitude as hermits may only do so because they 
have a support network, and that community in turn becomes 
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the audience for the ascetic’s sufferings (116). Skellig Michael 
was such an ascetic situation: while rough seas prevented travel 
between the island and the mainland for much of the year, the 
monks were not completely separated from their monastery on 
the mainland, at Ballinskelligs. Archaeological investigation by 
Edward Bourke, Alan R. Hayden, and Ann Lynch demonstrates 
that items providing additional sustenance such as wood for 
fires, and meat from domesticated animals like goats, sheep, 
pigs, and cattle, which were not raised on the island itself, were 
at times provided by their brethren (403–4, 411, 467). The her-
metic ascetic’s willingness to give up not only comfort and food 
but self-sufficiency is a willful embrace of neediness.
Cuteness, Asceticism, Desire, and Capitalism
Cuteness’s association with capitalism and commodification 
makes the analogy of cuteness’s indulgence and asceticism’s re-
fusal seemingly counterintuitive. Asceticism, with its refusal of 
comfort and embrace of poverty, would logically appear to be 
completely incompatible with capitalism. For example, in Mat-
thew 19:21, Christ tells a young man that he must sell his belong-
ings and give to the poor if he is to attain the treasures of heaven. 
This anti-capitalistic, anti-consumerist direction has been inter-
preted to mean that similar renunciations are expected of those 
who became monks (Williams 377). Yet connections between 
asceticism and capitalism, the foundational context of cuteness, 
may be found in the work of Max Weber, who, considering the 
roles of desire and resistance in capitalism, labeled capitalism 
as “worldly asceticism” (Harpham xiv). For Weber, the way that 
capitalism required self-denial and discipline made it an adap-
tation of asceticism. Instead of transforming the subjectivity of 
the ascetic, it created a new economic world (Valantasis 36).
Weber contends that with the end of feudalism, asceticism 
became part of everyday life, not just a religious vocation (Har-
pham 29). Capitalism requires one’s capacity to forego immedi-
ate gratification and suffer in the present in hopes of future prof-
it, which Marx referred as “the science of renunciation” (Adams 
63
Indulgence and Refusal
110). If consumers were to buy into this self-disciplined deferral 
of reward, their desire had to be aroused first by commodities 
(111). As loosening class boundaries at the end of the Middle 
Ages eventually made it possible for wealth to be earned and 
amassed, renunciation of everyday pleasures made asceticism 
integral to capitalism (Harpham 29).4 The ascetic capitalist, like 
the early Christian ascetic, at times even sacrificed family rela-
tionships to the pursuit of profit (29). Weber draws connections 
between monastic, community-based asceticism’s emphasis on 
conformity and the type of labor required for factory produc-
tion under capitalism (Harpham 20). Harpham goes so far as to 
say that because of asceticism’s emphasis on labor, “Early asceti-
cism is capitalism without money” (30). 
Secularized asceticism could instill discipline. But if every-
one were disciplined, there would be no one to buy the goods. 
Something was needed to inspire consumption (Adams 111). As 
James Livingston argues, “the desiring subject is a new form of 
subjectivity under capital” (44). One solution, as Ngai so power-
fully demonstrates, is cuteness: just the thing to arouse consum-
ers’ desire for intimacy with cute commodities (54). 
Conclusion
If asceticism were broadly built on refusal and denial as its prac-
titioners seek closeness to the divine, cuteness would seem per-
fectly engineered to thwart ascetic accomplishment. With its of-
ten childlike powerlessness, cuteness at least pretends to appeal 
to the viewer’s goodwill and charity, as if the viewer’s submis-
sion to the cute were always an ethical act, when in the case of 
the commodity, the act supports exploitative economic systems. 
Cuteness seems designed to lead the ascetic astray to founder, 
by disguising indulgence behind a mask of need. 
4 However, Harpham argues that the abandonment of spontaneous enjoy-
ment in the pursuit of wealth happened far earlier than Weber claims, as 
early as the fourth century.
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Cuteness also threatens asceticism because of its ability to 
reconcile the otherness of the inanimate and nonhuman com-
modity into a familial nurturing setting, to bring the commod-
ity in from the cold (Merish 64). Asceticism, in contrast, de-
nies conventional family structure in favor of either solitude or 
a community likewise devoted to self-denial; separation from 
loved ones is a necessity (Bynum 280). What is cute, with its 
helpless appeal to the maternal, would remind the ascetic of the 
deliberately painful loss of familial bond. 
Neither opposites nor analogues, cuteness and asceticism 
may speak to each other productively through a Derridean 
translational analogy. Perhaps in its powerful powerlessness, the 
cute could usefully serve as a poignant device to remind the as-
cetic of much of that from which asceticism must abstain. Cute-
ness’s sharp aestheticization of desire supplements more prosaic 
desires for food, warmth, or companionship. The tiny island of 
Skellig Michael — thinking of it in terms of cuteness, I long to 
call it “my” tiny island and incorporate it into a fantasy of the fa-
milial — has an even tinier neighboring island, Small Skellig or 
Little Skellig, which today is a bird sanctuary. With even steeper 
and more treacherous terrain than Skellig Michael, Little Skellig 
appears never to have been inhabited by humans; instead, it has 
been home to great colonies of birds, some of which no doubt 
fed the hungry monks over the centuries (Horn et al. 36). Were 
a bedraggled baby bird to wash up on the rocky shore of Skellig 
Michael, could even the most devout monk resist it? 
Should such a treat be for the soul or for the belly? If it is de-
nied the belly, does its worldly cuteness become a danger to the 
soul? Or, with its multiple seductions contained in one precious 
package, would it instead be aestheticized as the perfect vehicle 
with which to engage the aches of temptation? Where cuteness 
foments desire, asceticism deliberately seeks out desire in order 
to deny it. Asceticism could find in the cute a most demanding 
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From “Awe” to “Awww”: 
Cuteness and the Idea of 
the Holy in Christian  
Commodity Culture
Claire Maria Chambers
Can God, the divine, the absolute, or the holy be cute? A quick 
foray into contemporary commodity cultures associated with 
several world religions yields “cute” objects and images that 
play mediating roles in the faith lives of practitioners. In South 
Korean Buddhist temples, small, chubby, plaster monks bought 
for a few thousand won adorn shrines and altars, accompanying 
the prayers and intentions of the purchasers. Buddha himself 
may be depicted on posters and lamp covers for his birthday 
celebration in May as a cutified, childlike being, while at temples 
devotees ritually bathe a statue of the Buddha as a small boy 
(figs. 1–4). Contemporary Hindus wanting to teach their chil-
dren about the complex pantheon need look no further than 
Sanjay Patel’s The Little Book of Hindu Deities: From the Goddess 
of Wealth to the Sacred Cow. Each bright spread of the book fea-
tures a god, goddess, demon, warrior, or diva as a cute cartoon 
character with round, exaggerated eyes. The Bala Krishna, or 
Krishna the divine child, may set some precedent for cute depic-
tions of Hindu gods, with his exploits — especially the tale of his 
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butter thievery — captured in popular devotional images that 
picture him as a soft, round toddler shaded in sky blue.1
And in Christianity, the Christ child has always had a special 
place in the liturgical year, from nativity scenes or pageants to 
1 An Internet image search using the term “Krishna butter thief ” yields thou-
sands of examples.
Figure 1. Figurines of monks at a seaside temple in Busan, South Ko-
rea. Photography by author. Figure 2. A child Buddha receiving ritual 
bath in Seoul, South Korea. Photography by author.
69
from “awe” to “awww”
the story of his precocious answer to his parents at the temple 
after having gone missing for three days: “Did you not know 
that I must be about my Father’s business?” (Luke 2:49). Chris-
tian commodity culture suffers no dearth of products that cutify 
the Christ child himself, along with choruses of angels, saints, 
and biblical characters. This chapter will analyze one specific 
product line of cute Christian devotional imagery. The Precious 
Moments world of figurines, dolls, and illustrations signifies 
consumers’ devotion to the divine through their adoration of 
cute, smiling-but-weepy-faced, (mostly) white children with 
strange, teardrop-shaped eyes. While the question of whether 
God, gods, or holy personages themselves are cute is one thing, 
it seems that the answer to the question of whether or not cute 
depictions of the divine exist is a resounding yes. What is it, 
then, that such cute religious imagery performs?
Figure 3. Buddha on a May festival lamp in South Korea. Photography 
by author. Figure 4. A ritual lotus-shaped bath with a child Buddha for 
sale in Seoul, South Korea. Photography by author.
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Focusing on Precious Moments imagery, this chapter will 
explore the cute in Christian commodity culture as a schema 
for the nonrational self, using Rudolph Otto’s argument in The 
Idea of the Holy (1917) that it is only through the nonrational 
experience of “creature-feeling” at the foot of the mysterium tre-
mendum et fascinans (the mystery that is both terrifying and 
fascinating) that anything of the absolute transcendence of God 
can be humanly grasped. According to Otto, creature-feeling is 
not a conceptual or rational explanation of a phenomenologi-
cal experience, but “the emotion of a creature, submerged and 
overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which 
is supreme above all creatures” (10, emphasis mine). Because 
creature-feeling, Otto contends, refers primarily to an object 
outside the self, it points toward the numinous (after the Latin 
numen, divine power or spirit). For Otto, the numinous is pre-
cisely the experience of creature-feeling referring to that which 
transcends the self (10–11). After introducing Precious Moments 
in more detail and analyzing specific images via Otto’s ideas, I 
will conclude by suggesting that religious cuteness, especially as 
signifying a believer’s relationship to time and the absolute via 
the history of salvation, provides a clear example of cuteness as 
retro-futuristic because it conflates childish innocence (repre-
senting the past) with adult decisions regarding one’s faith that 
focus on the future (soteriology and apocalypse).
Cute Studies and The Idea of the Holy
Several definitions of cute within the emerging field of cute 
studies blend well with Otto’s concepts of nonrationality and 
creature-feeling. In particular, what Joshua Paul Dale refers to 
as the “awww factor” (5) may also reveal what we could call the 
“awe factor.” Daniel Harris’s jeremiad against the cute aesthetic 
in capitalist consumer culture argues that consumers are effec-
tively brainwashed into believing that they possess individu-
alized personal taste, when in actuality it’s been spoon-fed by 
advertising. He turns on its head Konrad Lorenz’s well-known 
evolutionary reading of cuteness as a trigger for maternal af-
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fection and concern that therefore increases the likelihood that 
animals will care for their offspring. For Harris, “cuteness is the 
aesthetic of deformity and dejection” (7); stump-limbed and 
weepy-eyed dolls and toys signify a sadistic drive to consume 
and control the other. More recently, Sianne Ngai also critiques 
cuteness as “a kind of consumer fetishism redoubled” that “tries 
to seize hold of and manipulate, as its ‘raw material,’ the una-
voidable fantasy of fetishism” (63), while it “foregrounds the vio-
lence of its production” (78). For Ngai, cuteness as a “soft” aes-
thetic emerges from mass culture in differentiation from “high 
art” as an explicit appeal to powerlessness. However, “[t]he cute 
commodity, for all its pathos of powerlessness, is thus capable of 
making surprisingly powerful demands” (64). For example, the 
consumer may be “seduced” into feeling that buying the product 
carries out the wish of the product itself. This leads Ngai to con-
clude that “[t]he feelings that underpin and traverse cuteness, a 
sentimental desire for a simpler and more sensuous, more con-
crete relation to commodities, are thus more multiple and com-
plex than they may initially seem” (64). Cute objects that appear 
to be victims of aggression readily morph into agents of aggres-
sion themselves, and the consumer may become the consumed 
(85). This “power of the powerless” echoes Otto’s language of the 
experience of the numinous, in which the lowliness of creature-
feeling actually refers to the ultimate mightiness of the abso-
lute. It also parallels a common trope of Christian theology: that 
the first shall be last, the meek shall inherit the earth, and that 
“when I am weak, then I am strong” (2 Corinthians 12:10).
Turning away from the more negative nuances of Harris’s 
and Ngai’s cute commodities, Dale argues that instead of engag-
ing aggressive energies toward weaker others, cuteness actually 
strengthens positive community bonds. While aggression may 
accompany the feeling of being overwhelmed by cuteness, Dale 
suggests that “our response to this feeling has a built-in safety 
mechanism that displaces this aggression, bending it back to-
wards the subject in order to preserve a helpless, unthreaten-
ing object from harm: thus, the pleasure felt by a subject over-
whelmed by cuteness is not sadistic, it is masochistic” (6). The 
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idea that displaced aggression bends back toward the subject 
brings to mind more masochistic rituals of religious devotion 
wherein the practitioner may “punish” him or herself by acts 
of contrition — whether in an extreme manner, as with flagella-
tion or self-mortification, or in softer forms, such as kneeling or 
praying for a certain amount of time.
The connections among aesthetic response, consumerism, 
therapy, and religion deserve careful consideration. Reading 
Max Weber’s study of John Calvin, semiotician Arthur Asa 
Berger notes that there is an important, though generally un-
recognized, religious or sacred dimension to the passion for 
consumption. “[T]he same passions and fervor that animate 
religious belief in people take on a secularized form and shape 
their behavior as consumers in contemporary societies. Adopt-
ing a religious perspective on things, we can say that shopping 
becomes, in an unconscious way and in a disguised form, a 
sacred act” (39). If shopping can self-soothe, the cute object of 
Christian commodity culture performs this therapeutic func-
tion quite concretely, especially if the object embodies the com-
fort of religious belief. 
The most recognizable images in the Precious Moments line 
of products are doll-like child figures with teardrop-shaped eyes 
and bulbous heads. They were first created by Samuel Butcher 
in the 1970s for a line of greeting cards, which he then expanded 
into a giant gift industry that includes porcelain figurines, all 
kinds of printed posters, cards, calendars, devotional Bibles, 
videos, T-shirts, inspirational picture frames, dolls, and Christ-
mas ornaments. For devotees of Precious Moments collectibles, 
appropriately themed caskets and headstones are also available. 
Even though the popularity of Precious Moments paraphernalia 
is staunchly an American Christian phenomenon that appeals 
to both Catholics and Protestants, the imagery is recognizable 
the world over, thanks to the global reach of the gift industry. 
Curiously, not all Precious Moments products are religiously 
themed — in fact, American patriotism is another common 
subject of the imagery — but overwhelmingly the ideology that 
underpins the company and its products is a generalized style 
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of Christian worship and fellowship that emphasizes humil-
ity, meekness, and gentleness, or “loving, sharing, and caring” 
(“Precious Moments Supporting Foundation”). 
Cute Devotional Imagery and the “Hyperchild”
Before discussing Precious Moments collectibles, I would like 
to turn our attention to the Precious Moments park and chap-
el located in Carthage, Missouri. Described as artist Samuel 
Butcher’s “way of sharing the joy of his faith with the world” and 
apparently modeled on the Sistine Chapel, the chapel interior 
includes scenes from the Old and New Testaments. The crown-
ing feature is a mural called “Hallelujah Square,” which cel-
ebrates the lives of children whose lives ended too soon. What 
is striking about the artistic depiction of these children, apart 
from the anatomical oddities of the teardrop-shaped eyes and 
ballooning heads, is that it transforms any human figure into 
what Richard Lindsay calls a “hyperreal child.” In perhaps the 
only critical treatment available on the subject of Precious Mo-
ments, Lindsay’s essay is a report on his visit to the chapel. Lind-
say reads the Precious Moments imagery through the words of 
Umberto Eco, as “those instances where the American imagina-
tion demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate the 
absolute fake” (Eco 8). According to Lindsay,
Precious Moments children are like children, but better. 
They’re pastel-colored and clean, usually light-skinned and 
fair-haired (the American ideal of beauty). They’re always in 
adorable poses, with puppies and kittens, or playing dress-up 
as doctors or teachers. Their shoes and clothes are patched 
and faded to make them look like lovable ragamuffins. And 
they usually reflect some Bible verse or Christian virtue in 
the most innocent, un-self-conscious way. Although they are 
sometimes depicted as mothers and fathers — even as grand-
parents — or doing adult work or driving cars, they are al-
ways large-headed and pre-pubescent.
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But in an uncanny turn, the thing — or rather, the mo-
ment — that is presented as the better-than-real absolute fake 
is the moment of death, which is memorialized over and over 
again throughout the chapel and its visitors’ center, gift shop, 
and surrounding gardens, spaces attended and interpreted by 
these curious “urchins” with their almost-featureless faces.
According to the chapel’s website, the “Hallelujah Square” 
mural depicts the entrance to heaven through the eyes of a child 
(“The Stories in Hallelujah Square”). The mural is composed so 
that the eye is drawn past a golden gate where a blonde Pre-
cious Moments boy (Peter?) greets newcomers, down a path 
past a welcoming committee holding signs that say “Welcome!” 
and “To your heavenly home,” and up toward a larger, cathe-
dral-like gate that opens into a mountainous landscape. Puffy 
white clouds frame the mural, on which perch Precious Mo-
ments angels in prayerful attitudes. One of the little angels in 
the welcoming committee holds his sign upside down — his in-
nocent ignorance intensifies his cuteness, of course. A rainbow 
arches between the clouds, and, in the distance right at the foot 
of the cathedral gate, Jesus himself greets the little newcomers, 
his presence centered in the composition but relatively small in 
terms of size due to the perspective. Butcher has incorporated 
stories of personal loss into the mural, with portraits of his own 
dead relatives, including his son and brother. Butcher also has 
memorialized several other children in the mural, including a 
young woman named Coleenia. Let us consider in detail the 
way in which Coleenia’s story is theologized in context of the 
mural, according to its accompanying literature:
Coleenia came to the Chapel several years ago. She had never 
walked or talked. She was in her twenties but only weighed 
45 or 50 pounds. Mr. Butcher was so touched by the sweet 
smile of this young woman who did not even need her 
breathing machine while she was being shown the paintings 
in the Chapel. He remembered that sweet spirit and when 
he learned that she died, wanted to comfort her parents, so 
he painted her here, dolly in her arms and standing like she 
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had never been able to do on the earth — a reminder of the 
wholeness that awaits us in this very special place. (“The Sto-
ries in Hallelujah Square”)
Coleenia is an example of a “hyperchild” already weakened by 
illness or disability, who is then further cutified by Butcher as a 
Precious Moment. Even though at her death she was more than 
twenty years old, Butcher portrays her as a blonde child hold-
ing a toy. Her spiritual wholeness, seemingly possible only after 
death, is signified not by a realistic portrayal but by a stylized 
portrait that simplifies features and infantilizes the body. Al-
though spiritual progress here takes the form of psychological 
and physiological regression, such imagery speaks to a Christi-
anity that prizes simplicity and unquestioning faith. In one’s last 
days, one is literally born again.
A Critical Reading of Cute Devotional Imagery
For as many devotees there are of Precious Moments, there are 
equally as many who find the imagery disturbing or even mor-
ally questionable. But rather than dismiss Precious Moments’ 
cute aesthetic as somehow not “seriously” religious, I seek a 
more critical reading that invites complications. In her ground-
breaking essay on cuteness and commodity aesthetics with 
regard to the child and the childlike, Lori Merish argues that 
“cuteness engenders an affectional dynamic through which the 
Other is domesticated and (re)contextualized within the human 
‘family.’ Cuteness aestheticizes the most primary social distinc-
tions, regulating the (shifting) boundaries between Selves and 
Others, cultural ‘insiders’ and cultural ‘outsiders,’ ‘humans’ and 
‘freaks’” (188). While aestheticization can certainly be — and 
often is — executed as an act of control, I argue that it could 
just as easily play out as an invitation to communion with the 
transcendent. For example, another part of the chapel is dedi-
cated to Butcher’s son, Phillip, who is memorialized in another 
mural that depicts Phillip’s family gathered around an empty 
bed, while Phillip himself is greeted above by angels at the en-
76
the retro-futurism of cuteness
trance to heaven. Although Phillip was an adult when he died, 
Butcher portrays him as a Precious Moments child. The family 
members surrounding the bed are also represented as children, 
even though this family clearly includes adults. The deliberate 
conflation of disparate temporalities — the moment of death 
and the suspension in prepubescent childhood — plays at the 
boundaries of the beautiful and the grotesque, and allows the 
cute object of religious devotion to represent the experience of 
human limitation (Otto’s creature-feeling) as the experience of 
the numinous. Indeed, for some the imagery is uncanny and 
grotesque, but that perhaps is the flip side of what creates its 
great appeal. What seems to be an oversimplification is actually 
a complication. The cutified imagery may simplify life, but it ac-
tually offers a complex and nuanced spiritual understanding of 
life as moments already lived in death.
As Ngai reflects, “To consider aesthetic categories like the 
cute and the interesting not only as styles of objects but as subjec-
tive, feeling-based judgments — relatively codified ways of shar-
ing our pleasure and displeasure with others — is to go straight 
to the heart of philosophical aesthetics” (38). The cute objects 
Figure 5. Precious Moments bride and groom. Artifact from author’s 
private collection. Photography by author.
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of Christian commodity culture mediate subjective feelings as 
the experience of transcendence. To engage with a cute figurine 
that represents a life-changing event, such as baptism or mar-
riage (fig. 5), is to see one’s feelings of smallness, preciousness, 
and innocence being mediated by an aesthetic that is simultane-
ously religious and secular, spiritual and commercial. Religion 
is a mediating practice, according to Hent de Vries (3–42); in 
fact, it is fair to consider religion itself as a kind of media. As 
religious anthropologist Birgit Meyer explains, “Positing a dis-
tance between human beings and the transcendental, religion 
offers practices of mediation to bridge that distance and make 
it possible to experience — from a more distanced perspective 
one could say produce — the transcendental” (705). But what if 
that object of mediation, a kitschy bisque figure of a child, offers 
a less-than-awe-inspiring encounter with the transcendent, and 
more the tendency to produce a gurgle of affection for the cute 
(“Awww… aren’t you adorable?”). What truly is the difference, 
in terms of performing as a mediating object of the experience 
of the numinous, between, for example, a Byzantine-style icon, 
with its austere contrasts between light and shadow emphasiz-
ing the severe and penetrating gaze of the saint, and a Precious 
Moments figurine, with its dopey smile and weepy eyes? Is one 
more effective than the other as a religious mediator because it 
is perceived as high art rather than a commodity?
Art versus Kitsch
Otto is clear on this question, and his answer is “yes” — high 
art is a more effective mediator of spiritual experience than 
commercial art. However, I depart from his model and argue 
that Precious Moments figurines are demonstrably effective 
mediators of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans as much 
as any Bach mass or Byzantine Madonna, and manifestations 
of creature-feeling itself. Otto’s treatment of different kinds of 
artistic media for approaching the mysterium enacts a hierar-
chy; in fact, he disparages “low-brow” and commercial attempts 
to depict or symbolize the holy because they cannot match the 
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“feeling-nature” of more explicitly “nonrational” art forms, such 
as poetry and music: “[The living ‘something more’ of the fas-
cinans] lives no less in those tense extolling of the blessing of 
salvation, which recur in all religions of salvation, and stand in 
such remarkable contrast to the relatively meager and frequently 
childish import of that which is revealed in them by concept or 
by image” (35). He especially disparages concert music and the 
operas of Wagner as preventing nonrational experience because 
they attempt to represent feeling rather than provoke it. “[A]
bove and beyond our rational being lies hidden the ultimate and 
highest part of our nature, which can find no satisfaction in the 
mere allaying of the needs of our sensuous, psychical, or intel-
lectual impulses and cravings” (36). Should Otto be alive today 
to witness the popularity of Precious Moments, surely he would 
class it with Wagner.
But this is where Otto seems to contradict himself. In cre-
ating a hierarchy for the effectiveness of artistic or religious 
media, he overlooks his own argument that the experience of 
the numinous cannot be categorized by degrees of intensity; it 
always refers to the transcendent, no matter how slight or how 
strong the incident. In fact, he makes a compelling case for the 
gentle and the soft as effective mediators of the “awe” of religious 
experience — and to this we may also add the cute: “The awe 
or ‘dread’ may indeed be so overwhelmingly great that it seems 
to penetrate to the very marrow, making the man’s hair bris-
tle and his limbs quake. But it may also steal upon him almost 
unobserved as the gentlest of agitations, a mere fleeting shadow 
passing across his mood” (16, my emphasis). Following Otto 
here, the cute can be understood as a soft form of the experi-
ence of the mysterium tremendum. If, as Otto suggests, there is a 
spectrum of feeling across which dread and fear are at the most 
intense and a softer “mystical awe” occupies the lower register, 
then the mysterium tremendum is no less or more present. The 
believer can move from the “awesome” power of daemonic hor-
ror to the “awww” of the cutest Christ child: “[T]he ‘uncanny’ or 
‘awful’ […] survives with the quality of exaltedness and sublim-
ity or is symbolized by means of it. And this element, softened 
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though it is, does not disappear even on the highest level of all, 
where the worship of God is at its purest” (17). If the feelings of 
personal nothingness and submergence before the awe-inspir-
ing object that characterize creature-feeling are just as present in 
“softer” experiences as in the exalted, then it follows that these 
same feelings can be just as adequately elicited by cute objects of 
religious kitsch as by soaring classical architecture and ancient 
sacred hymns. Devotional objects are intensely personal; rosa-
ries, scapulae, Bibles, and home altars may be sacred objects but 
are often handled with the familiarity of the quotidian and pro-
fane, and chosen with personal tastes for aesthetic expression 
of the religious self in mind. This is no different for commercial 
objects like Precious Moments figurines. Our aesthetic catego-
ries are matters of personal taste, and nothing is more personal 
than what compels creature-feeling.
Returning to the notion of religion as media, Otto offers a 
similar approach to religious practice and art as “schema” (he 
also sometimes uses the term ideogram). Even those artworks 
of which Otto approves remain limited symbols or schema for 
the numinous to which the non-rational experience of creature-
feeling refers. Put simply, the rational is a schema for the non-
rational. For example, to engage in the rational exercise of the 
composition of a poem is to create a schema for the non-ration-
al experience of transcendence. In another example, Otto refers 
to sex as a schema for the erotic: “[T]he non-rational numinous 
fact, schematized by the rational concepts we have suggested 
above, yields us the complex category of ‘holy’ itself, richly 
charged and complete and in its fullest meaning” (45). Ideo-
grams or schemas can only symbolically indicate the fascinans, 
which is “purely a felt experience” (59). I contend that Precious 
Moments function as schema for “high” religious experience 
because of their low aesthetic value as religious kitsch. They are 
approachable and play between the nonrational existence one 
may have experienced in childhood and the rational decision 
to practice a life of faith as an adult. Precious Moments offer 
identification with experiences of creatureliness, smallness, in-
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nocence, and purity in the face of that which transcends the self, 
but do not assume to explain the transcendent.
The world of Precious Moments figurines is vast. The online 
catalog is divided into categories dealing with the memorializa-
tion of life events and the celebration of holidays. Looking at the 
category of “Sympathy” will yield several compelling examples 
that Precious Moments function as a schema for the nonrational 
experience of the numinous, especially if we return to the dif-
ficult topic of the death of a child. In terms of representing the 
mysterium, Otto argues that commercial artworks “are attempts 
in some way or other, it little matters how, to guess the riddle it 
propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken 
and deaden the experience itself ” (26). Although the figurines 
would certainly fall under this description of rational represen-
tation of the “riddle” of Christian faith, they also sincerely ex-
press experiences of comfort, love, and community in the face 
of the difficulties that the riddle of faith presents for thousands 
of consumers around the globe. While some might approach the 
imagery as gratuitous indulgence in a kind of emotional sensa-
tionalism, the ubiquity of Precious Moments and its longevity in 
Christian commodity culture must speak to a way that it touch-
es the lives of its consumers. A page on the official Precious Mo-
ments website is devoted to “testimonials” from customers. One 
customer writes, “‘Safe In The Arms Of Jesus’ is one of my fa-
vorite Precious Moments. In November of 2006 I miscarried my 
second child, it was one of the hardest days of my life. But when 
I received this Precious Moment it put a smile on my face. Now 
every time I see it I know my baby is safe in the arms of Jesus!” 
(“Testimonials”). If one consults the “Sympathy” section for this 
figurine, a few different products devoted to the loss of infants 
and the experience of miscarriage appear. One, titled “Mommy’s 
Love Goes with You,” shows a mother, with a tear on her plump, 
childish cheek, handing over her baby to a gently smiling angel. 
Apparently it was discontinued but later brought back after the 
company received many customer requests (“Figurines”). 
Another customer writes, “Our Precious Moments are so 
special because of what they represent, the beautiful and sweet 
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way they signify great messages from the Bible, and the memo-
ries and special precious moments with my mom. Thank you, 
Precious Moments, for the great adventures and memories 
in each figurine” (“Testimonials”). For this customer, too, the 
figurines memorialize a loved one and help the customer pro-
cess grief and loss. The imagery represents a belief in not only 
a heavenly afterlife, but also a divine order wherein that which 
goes beyond human understanding — such as the inexplicable 
death of a child or loss of a parent — resides in the greater pur-
pose of the mysterium. 
Again, a “Christianized” reading of Ngai’s approach to cute 
commodity aesthetics is helpful here. Elaborating on Adorno’s 
idea that kitsch parodies catharsis (325), Ngai writes that the 
cute is what “transcends [language] by subordinating itself to 
it, reinforc[ing] one of its simplest but most important claims: 
that art has the capacity not only to reflect and mystify power 
but also to reflect on and make use of powerlessness” (109). For 
Precious Moments imagery, that powerlessness is the power-
lessness of the self in comparison to the terrifying yet fascinat-
ing mystery of the numinous. Helpless at the moment of death 
as at the beginning of the life, the powerlessness of the believer 
pictured in the imagery is in fact a powerful statement of faith. 
While the figurines are indeed kitsch and may perform a cathec-
tic function by directing emotional release, this does not dimin-
ish the reality that the experience of the numinous that they may 
embody for their owners is felt sincerely. 
The Cultural Biography of Cute Religious Objects
As individual objects and as a line of products, Precious Mo-
ments narrate the faith lives of the people who purchase them. 
In cultural anthropology, the notion of the “biography of ob-
jects” is one that “leads us to think comparatively about the ac-
cumulation of meaning in objects and the changing effects these 
have on people and events” (Gosden and Marshall 177). Western 
anthropologists diagram the relationship between people and 
things by way of analogy or comparison with non-Western cul-
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tures. For example, Marilyn Strathern posits that “while West-
erners understand objects to exist in and of themselves, Mela-
nesians see objects as the detached parts of people circulating 
through the social body in complex ways” in a process she calls 
“partible personhood” (qtd. in Gosden and Marshall 173). Ja-
net Hoskins’s work with the Kodi people in Eastern Indonesia 
produced a “paradox” for her research process; while inform-
ants were loathe to answer direct questions about the events of 
their lives, if questioned about the significance of a particular 
object in their ownership, they would reveal much more about 
their own personal history. Objects as narrative devices, writes 
Hoskins, “do not so much reflect ‘the truth’ as construct it in 
a particular way” (4). The Kodi people shape the “narrative 
creation of the self through the vehicle of an object” (21), while 
Precious Moments gathers under a cute aesthetic the desire of 
Christian believers to do just that.
While objects indeed narrate individual lives, objects them-
selves also carry cultural biographies. Cultures construct objects 
in much the same way that they construct people, as Igor Kopytoff 
argues: “In the homogenized world of commodities, an eventful 
biography of a thing becomes the story of the various singulari-
zations of it, of classifications and reclassifications in an uncer-
tain world of categories whose importance shifts with every mi-
nor change in context. As with persons, the drama here lies in the 
uncertainties of valuation and of identity” (234). Precious Mo-
ments imagery, especially that of the large-headed, short-limbed, 
and rounded child with the teardrop-shaped eyes, can be under-
stood as similar to the commodities Kopytoff analyzes because it 
represents its buyers. The “drama” of the Precious Moments child 
is one wherein the individual consumer is subsumed into the ho-
mogenization of the cute aesthetic, which erases differences and 
individual features so that all are collected into the arms of Jesus 
and the angels. To identify with a Precious Moments child is to 
see oneself enveloped within the all-encompassing embrace of 
the Christian God, where “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is 
neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female, for you all 
are one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). This experience of being 
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subsumed can be likened to Otto’s description of creature-feeling 
in the experience of the numinous.
Conclusion: Cuteness and Retro-Futuristic Devotion
Thinking of the relationship between the singular and the many, 
I will end by discussing a curious fact about the “Hallelujah 
Square” mural in the Precious Moments Chapel. Jesus himself, 
even though his were the ultimate “precious moments” — the 
crucifixion and the resurrection — is not consistently depicted 
through the cute aesthetic. The Christ child is allowed the Pre-
cious Moments treatment in nativity scenes, but never an adult 
Christ; he is always “real,” with adult proportions, stature, and 
detailed facial features (where Precious Moments children lack 
noses and eyebrows and have almost no mouths). Christ is the 
only singularity among the many Precious Moments children, 
because he is, among all the other figures, the most human 
as much as he is divine. Christ cannot be a Precious Moment 
because a Precious Moment is the manifestation of one’s rela-
tionship to Christ himself. The well-known hymn by Charles 
Wesley sums up the theology of Precious Moments perfectly: 
“Gentle Jesus meek and mild, look upon a little child, pity my 
simplicity, suffer me to come to thee” (Wesley 180) — that is, I 
am of the indistinguishable many who, in coming to Christ, dis-
cover singularization through him. This is a kind of mysticism 
of creature-feeling practiced through the consumption of cute 
commodities. According to Otto, the experience of creature-
feeling leads toward self-annihilation: “the estimation of the 
self, of the personal ‘I,’ as something not perfectly or essentially 
real, or even as mere nullity, a self-depreciation which comes 
to demand its own fulfillment in practice in rejecting the delu-
sion of selfhood” (21). This is not “‘feeling of our createdness’ 
but ‘feeling of our creaturehood,’ that is, the consciousness of the 
littleness of every creature in face of that which is above all crea-
tures” (22). In being like every other Precious Moments child, 
the individual embraces his or her own nothingness, trading 
singularity for entry into the kingdom of God.
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The retro-futuristic story of salvation in the Precious Mo-
ments world is one where the individual believer must first re-
gress to the past and re-experience the innocent faith of child-
hood in order to approach the saving grace of the yet-to-return 
messiah through self-obliteration and suffusion with the divine 
at the moment of death. Precious Moments imagery therefore 
deploys a retro-futuristic aesthetic through its cuteness, an aes-
thetic that reimagines the past as somehow occurring in the fu-
ture (or the future as somehow occurring in the past), blending 
older technologies and styles with the yet-to-be. Soteriologi-
cally, Christianity performs religious retro-futurism because it 
reimagines the past events of Christ’s manifestation to his dis-
ciples after his resurrection as occurring again in the future and 
ensuring the salvation of believers. This final revelation of God’s 
plan for the world is the “apocalypse.”2 The future-oriented mes-
sianic story of Christian salvation is embodied in the Precious 
Moments figurine. In identifying with a Precious Moment, 
the believer “goes back” in time to reimagine oneself as a child 
meeting Christ/God (that is, experiencing the precious moment 
of death). One must regress in order to progress; one must un-
know oneself by stripping away identity and individuality in or-
der to “know” God — a helpless, innocent, and cute child at the 
foot of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans.
2 Not unrelatedly, postapocalyptic punk is a popular subgenre of steampunk 
style, which epitomizes the retro-futuristic aesthetic.
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“All the Pretty Little Ponies”: 
Bronies, Desire, and Cuteness
Justin Mullis
Bronies are adult male fans of the hit animated TV series My 
Little Pony: Friendship Is Magic (2010–present). It is the latest 
incarnation of the 1980s My Little Pony franchise, a toy line of 
cute plastic pony figures created by Hasbro with an accompany-
ing animated series. According to Patrick Edwards and Marsha 
Redden — the nation’s “premiere bronyologists” (Orsini) — self-
identified bronies have a medium age of twenty-one and are 
predominately male, heterosexual, and college educated.1 What 
makes bronies truly remarkable is the sustained media coverage 
they have received over the past seven years from a number of 
diverse outlets.2 Such widespread coverage has thrust brony fan-
dom into the public eye, transforming bronies into “figures of 
fascination and derision in equal measures” (Manuel). The most 
popular assertion, made by both supporters and detractors of 
brony fandom, is that the adult male fans’ affection for Friend-
ship Is Magic — a show made for and sold initially to elemen-
tary-school girls — indicates a shift toward more egalitarian at-
1 Bronies range from fourteen to fifty-seven in age and are 86 percent male, 
84 percent heterosexual, and 62 percent either college students or college 
educated (Edwards and Redden).
2 Outlets include Slate magazine, the Jerry Springer Show, the Colbert Report, 
Fox News, New York magazine, the Wall Street Journal, npr, the Los Angeles 
Times, The Guardian, pbs, tv Guide, Cosmopolitan, and the Howard Stern 
Show.
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titudes among North American young men with regards to the 
gendering of pop media. This egalitarianism has become the key 
premise of many brony studies, both lay and academic. Edwards 
and Redden, for example, compare bronies to the hippies of the 
1960s and their message of peace, love, and understanding in 
the wake of the Vietnam War. Brony fandom thereby emerges as 
an oppositional response to 9/11 and the ongoing American War 
on Terror (Stohs-Krause).
However, what such examinations of bronies either neglect 
or downplay are the erotic facets of fandom, specifically the 
practice of “clopping,” brony slang for masturbating to eroti-
cized images of female pony characters (Alvarez). Such images, 
most commonly found online but also at brony conventions, 
depict the Friendship Is Magic ponies engaged in a wide spec-
trum of sexual poses and erotic acts ranging from soft-core to 
hard-core, straight to queer sex, BDSM, and futanari (female 
characters with male genitalia). Brony erotica is also featured 
in a range of styles, from a purist devotion to the visual look of 
the show to revisionist expressions of the ponies as zoomorphic 
humanoids or even cutified anime girls with mane-like hair. 
If we are to truly understand the brony phenomenon, I be-
lieve we must engage it fully at every point, including how bro-
nies express themselves sexually through creative acts such as 
cutified erotic fan art and fan fiction, as well as through sexual 
practices such as clopping. I also juxtapose bronies and the Japa-
nese moé otaku, adult men with a predilection for anime tar-
geted at young girls and fan productions that portray the cute 
female anime characters in sexually explicit ways. 
The Rise of Brony Fandom and Sexuality
Developed for television by Lauren Faust, My Little Pony: 
Friendship Is Magic is set in the land of Equestria and centers 
on a bookish unicorn named Twilight Sparkle, who is tasked 
with learning about “the magic of friendship” with the help of 
her four pony friends. The group embarks on adventures rang-
ing from the mild mannered — organizing a birthday party — to 
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the epic — stopping the evil chaos-dragon Discord from taking 
over Equestria.3 Friendship Is Magic received strong initial re-
views from critics, who cited it as an outstanding children’s pro-
gram for young girls (Ashby; VanDerWerff; Lloyd). However, 
the show also garnered the unexpected attention of members 
of the infamous online English-language image-board commu-
nity 4chan.org, specifically the /co/ subforum that is dedicated 
to discussing cartoons and comics. Modeled after the popular 
Japanese image board 2chan.net, the site’s main attraction and 
source of over 30 percent of its Internet traffic is the infamous 
/b/ subforum, based on 2chan.net’s own Nijiura subforum, 
where users post random images in an attempt to “shock, enter-
tain, and coax free porn from each other” (Douglas).4 Though 
4chan.org users initially sought out Friendship Is Magic in order 
to ridicule it, many who watched the show ended up becoming 
fans of it instead (LaMarche). 
It was on 4chan.org that brony and bronies originated as 
catch-all terms for these adult male fans of Friendship Is Magic. 
While the most popular etymological explanation for brony is 
that it is a portmanteau of the words bro and pony, some, such 
as Mike Bernstein, program director for the brony-centric on-
line radio channel Everfree Radio, maintain that the term’s true 
origin was a play on the aforementioned 4chan.org subforum, 
“/b/”, where the brony phenomena first began (Griffiths; A Bro-
ny Tale). 
While Edwards and Redden acknowledge that “sexual fan 
fiction and fan art are a large part of the Brony community” 
(Orsini), they have nevertheless declined to explore this aspect 
of the fandom as part of their statistical analysis. They claim 
that it has proven “too sensitive” if brought up, often causing 
3 Faust’s prior credits include the acclaimed Cartoon Network series The 
Powerpuff Girls (1998–2005) and Foster’s Home for Imaginary Friends 
(2004–9). See Strike. 
4 As Terrence McCoy notes, 4chan.org’s notoriety is based on the fact that it 
is both the birthplace of “wildly popular memes such as Lolcats” and the 
source of such unsavory activities as the 2014 celebrity photo leak scandal 
(McCoy).
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their interviewees to shut down on them completely and thus 
necessitating that all questions regarding sex and sexuality 
be left out — especially questions such as “whether fans have 
sexual feelings toward the show’s equine characters” (Orsini). 
Some researchers, such as Venetia Laura Delano Robertson, 
have acknowledged the practice of “clopping” but likewise have 
failed to explore the subject in much detail (31). The exception 
is Bill Ellis’s very thorough analysis of clopping as part of the 
larger body of “bronylore” that exists on the Internet (303–11). 
Others, including Bethan Jones, Alexis McKinnis, Sadie Gen-
nis, and Lane Moore — have asserted that those who produce 
pornographic My Little Pony fan art for sexual gratification are 
either a “subgroup” within the larger brony community or do 
not exist at all. 
Conversely, in my ethnographic exploration of brony fan-
dom, I have encountered no difficulty getting bronies to talk 
openly about the existence of Friendship Is Magic fan-produced 
cartoon pornography and erotica. The bronies I’ve spoken with 
readily admit to knowing about such material, and some even 
acknowledge having created it and/or used it for its intended 
purpose. Even those who denied partaking in it were all too ea-
ger to tell me where to find it, naming websites that have been 
set up specifically to host such content — with the two most fre-
quently mentioned being Rule34.paheal.net and e621.net.5 
One example of erotic fan art found on Rule34.paheal.net, by 
an artist identified by the name “cobra_mcjingleballs,” depicts 
the female pony Fluttershy and the male pony Big Macintosh 
engaged in doggy-style sexual intercourse. Fluttershy’s bunny 
friend looks on in shock and disbelief. Here the characters are 
drawn exactly as they appear in the animated TV show, with the 
5 When I began researching Bronies in 2013, Rule34.paheal.net hosted 53,731 
images tagged “My Little Pony,” among which 49,419 were also tagged as 
featuring characters from Friendship Is Magic. As of January 2017, the num-
ber has increased to over 95,401 sexually explicit images. Meanwhile, e621.
net surpasses Rule34.paheal.net with a total of over 147,037 images tagged. 
Unlike Rule34.paheal.net, not all the images on e621.net are explicitly por-
nographic or erotic.
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obvious exception being that both characters now possess hu-
man genitalia that is clearly visible in the drawing.6 
In contrast, an image by artist “swissleos” on Rule34.paheal.
net features no sexual activity. It simply depicts the six main 
female pony characters reimagined in a highly anthropomor-
phic manner, drawn essentially as anime-style women but with 
pastel-colored skin and equipped with pony ears, tails, wings, 
and horns. All the characters are on their knees with exposed 
human breasts and genitalia and are completely naked expect 
for the fetishistic attire of black thigh-high stockings, shoulder-
length gloves, and neck chokers.7
A final example, also from Rule34.paheal.net, takes the form 
of a comic created by artist “MegaSweet” and depicts the six 
main female pony characters as fully human anime-style wom-
en with their hairstyles modeled after their respective ponies’ 
manes. Each panel depicts one of the characters engaged in 
doggy-style sexual intercourse with an anonymous human male 
and is accompanied by a speech bubble featuring mid-coitus 
dialogue of the variety frequently found in pornography.8  
In each of these examples the composition contains a num-
ber of recurring stylistic motifs that conform with Hiroki Azu-
ma’s moé character schema and Masubuchi Sōichi’s definition 
of kawaii. Some common features include the use of pastel 
colors; soft, rounded line art; unnaturally colored hair; the pres-
ence of animal ears and tails; large, reflective eyes indicative of 
anime characters; and expressions of juvenility. This last point 
is especially evident in all of the pieces of brony erotic fan art 
cited above: the female characters are all drawn in a manner 
suggesting a combination of sexual naiveté and embarrass-
ment, including the presence of flushed faces, characters biting 
their lower lips or squinting their eyes in apparent discomfort, 
or characters trying (unsuccessfully) to hide their naked bod-
ies from their partners or each other. In the comic drawn by 
6 Cobra_mcjingleballs. Rule34.paheal.net, 6 Aug. 2012. Web.
7 Swissleos. Rule34.paheal.net, 24 Aug. 2015. Web.
8 MegaSweet. Rule34.paheal.net, 19 Apr. 2011. Web.
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“MegaSweet,” the mid-coitus dialogue bubbles feature such coy 
expressions of sexual satisfaction as, “My books never said it’d 
be this goooood~!” (Twilight Sparkle), “Hoo Boy! I’m walkin’ 
funny after this!” (Applejack), and “Wowie zowie, my brain just 
went powie!” (Pinky Pie). All of these expressions lend an air of 
cuteness to the images common in such erotic fan works.
For bronies this kind of erotic fan art is often treated with 
a remarkably blasé attitude, as well as an overarching assump-
tion that such pornography is a part of everyone’s everyday lives. 
Mark, a twenty-nine-year-old brony who lives in Austin, Texas, 
and who was very open with me when I asked him if he had 
ever partook of any erotic My Little Pony fan art or fan fiction, 
put it this way: 
I mean everybody, everybody watches porn, everybody 
reads porn. It’s not a secret. If you say you don’t then you’re 
either a liar or a liar… So some of the stuff I have seen and I 
do kind of like it. Um… there was a dōjinshi [a fan-produced 
comic book, often of an erotic nature] that like a year or two 
ago, that had some REALLY SPECTACULAR art in it. And it is 
one of those things where you’ll be looking at something and 
you’ll kind of think to yourself, “I don’t know if I should be 
turned on by this?”
Another interviewee, a twenty-two-year-old brony named Jeff 
whom I met in Charlotte, North Carolina, was more hesitant 
but also acknowledged the existence of My Little Pony erotic fan 
art: 
I either tend to ignore or I… I mean every once in a while I 
would look at it… just one! That’s it! But I’m not a big perv of 
that kind of thing but uh… I just tend to let the other people 
enjoy what they enjoy and like when it comes to that sort of 
stuff.
In Chicago, I put the same questions to John, a twenty-five-year-
old filmmaker, theater technician, and part-time illustrator, and 
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asked if he had ever produced and/or read any erotic My Little 
Pony fan art or fan fiction: 
I’ve never done any Clop-fic. There was a comic I was sent at 
one point, by someone who does pursue it, which was kind 
of adorable, I’m not going to lie. But yeah… I’ve seen some 
erotica. I’ve read the one or two comics… because it really 
was kind of adorable and the writing was really kind of ador-
able and it happened to be erotica. And I liked the stylization 
because they weren’t like ponies fucking, they were more like 
humans. And the art was well done, I’ll use that phrase. There 
was no clopping involved, but it was well rendered. But at 
some point… you will see some My Little Pony: Friendship 
Is Magic erotica.
This last sentiment was also echoed by Paul, who lives in Atlan-
ta: “The visual stuff you will see at some point. You’re on a forum 
and you’ll scroll past some stuff. So yeah at a certain point you 
really can’t escape it.” Indeed, the reality is that erotic Friendship 
Is Magic fan art is so pervasive that the New York–based brony 
convention Ponycon recently had to implement “strict rules 
against” fan artists bringing “adult content” to the show since 
they were billing themselves as a family-friendly venue (Toth).
If bronies are willing to be forthcoming regarding such 
practices, then the reason this topic has proven problematic 
for some journalists and researchers must undoubtedly be that 
it elicits feelings of unease, as Anne Gilbert has documented. 
Likewise, Edwards and Redden, in an interview with the Daily 
Dot, openly acknowledged that they are bothered by the sexual 
aspect of brony fandom, which they refer to as “the dark side” of 
the group (Orsini). However, if we are ever to truly understand 
bronies, we must be willing to move past such discomfort and 
address the issue of brony sexuality head-on. 
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Otaku and Bronies
How, then, are we to think about the sexual aspect of brony 
fandom, which many find particularly troublesome? I would 
suggest taking a cue from the bronies themselves and begin by 
considering the common interest in Japanese pop culture that 
the majority of bronies seem to have. Brony fandom’s origins, 
history, and practices draw heavily on Japanese fan culture, in-
cluding its beginnings on Japanese-style image boards, the use 
of Japanese terminology like dōjinshi and futanari in reference 
to erotic fan-produced comics and art, and the fact that all my 
interviewees described themselves as being fans of anime. All 
the bronies I have spoken with proved very knowledgeable 
about anime and readily compared scenes from My Little Pony 
to those from popular anime series. In fact, several of my inter-
viewees told me that their first encounter with brony fandom 
was at an anime convention. 
Japanese pop culture enthusiasts are often referred to as 
otaku, a term that Tamaki Saitō explains is most often “used to 
indicate adult fans of anime, but can obviously be expanded to 
include fans of manga and video games, those who collect scale 
model figures of characters from these media, aficionados of 
monster movies and other special effects genres, and so forth” 
(“Otaku Sexuality” 83). In other words, the term otaku can be 
applied generally to anyone who has an obsessive hobby or in-
terest, roughly corresponds to the English terms geek or fan, and 
can easily accommodate bronies as well (Saitō, Beautiful Fight-
ing Girl 12).
Like bronies, otaku are mostly men who are in their late teens 
or early twenties, are primarily heterosexual, and attend col-
lege. And like bronies, adult male otaku are often active fans of 
shōjo manga and anime series whose target audience is actually 
elementary-school-age girls (Galbraith, “Otaku” 205). Many of 
these shōjo (literally meaning “young girl”) titles fall into the su-
perhero genre known as Mahou Shoujo, or “Magical Girl,” such 
as the internationally recognized series Sailor Moon that fea-
tures “cute young girls” who wield magical powers (Ellis 300). 
95
“All the Pretty Little Ponies”
Many otaku, like bronies, claim that they enjoy these girls’ 
shows because of their high production values. Patrick W. Gal-
braith and Anne Allison note, however, that another reason is 
that “Magical Girl” shows like Sailor Moon share some of their 
DNA with popular Japanese boys’ shows like Super Sentai, the 
basis for Mighty Morphin Power Rangers, with its winning for-
mula of “a group of superheroes who morph from ordinary 
teenagers, fight alien enemies, and diversify by season (adding 
new characters, costumes, tools, and powers)” (Allison 131). The 
parallels between the two kinds of series are entirely intention-
al, as both Sailor Moon and Super Sentai have the same parent 
companies: film and TV production company Toei Co. and toy 
company Bandai.9 Many of these story tropes and marketing 
strategies are present in Friendship Is Magic as well, with one 
interviewee adamantly insisting that creator Lauren Faust must 
have “watched herself some Sailor Moon” while formulating her 
My Little Pony reboot. This conclusion is not hard to come to 
since Faust also worked on Powerpuff Girls, which is essentially 
an American take on the “Magical Girl” genre and was created 
by her future husband Craig McCracken, who has been very 
open about discussing his love of Japanese pop culture (Allison 
158–59).10
Whatever the case, many otaku also openly acknowledge that 
they think the female protagonists of these series are sexually at-
tractive, and that they enjoy producing, collecting, and “getting 
off ” to explicitly eecchi (erotic) or hentai (pornographic) images 
and of characters from these anime, which are identical to those 
featuring ponies from Friendship Is Magic, and are likewise cre-
ated by fans and posted online or sold at conventions like the 
9 See also Jenkins, “In Defense.”
10 For McCracken’s discussion of the influence of Japanese pop culture on 
his work, see McCracken. The parallels between Friendship Is Magic and 
Power Rangers are also noted by Dan Mintz, a writer for the animated sit-
com Bob’s Burgers. In an episode, Mintz pokes fun at brony fandom via the 
fictitious “Equesticles,” adult men obsessed with a children’s TV show called 
The Equestranauts, “a sort of hybrid of the cute ponies and Mighty Morphin 
Power Rangers” (Ham).
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popular Tokyo-based dōjinshi fair Comiket (Saitō, “Otaku Sexu-
ality” 228). This has resulted in otaku, like their brony counter-
parts in the US, occupying a rather tumultuous position in Japa-
nese culture and being constantly viewed as a source of public 
sexual anxiety and aspiration.
It is not surprising, then, that researchers who specialize 
in the study of otaku have made the subject of otaku sexuality 
key to their understanding of fandom. Drawing primarily on 
the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, Saitō argues 
that because our experiences with reality are always mediated 
and thus inherently fictional, what makes otaku — and fans in 
general — unique from other more passive media consumers is 
their ability to shift their orientation effortlessly from one medi-
ated reality to another, to have “multiple orientation(s)” (Saitō, 
Beautiful Fighting Girl 26), which thus allows them to become 
fully invested in the alternate realities depicted in various me-
dia. Saitō is quick to stress that this does not mean that otaku, 
and fans in general, cannot distinguish between “reality” and 
“fantasy.” Rather, they simply do not privilege the de facto real-
ity of their daily lives to such an extent that it interferes with 
their ability to become completely immersed in different re-
alities, such as those encountered in manga, anime, or even a 
cartoon about a magical land populated by talking ponies. The 
immersion is so complete, Saitō argues, that male otaku can 
even achieve sexual gratification from an animated character 
because, for them, the animated character is just as “real” as any 
flesh-and-blood woman (Saitō, Beautiful Fighting Girl 28–31).
In Japan, the phenomenon of otaku developing sexual feel-
ings for fictional characters is so prevalent that it has its own 
term, moé, with “moé culture” becoming a source of great aca-
demic interest since the early 2000s. Galbraith defines moé as 
“an affectionate response to fictional characters […] situated 
in those responding to a character, not the character itself ” 
(Galbraith, Moé Manifesto 5–6). This is to say that those who 
claim to experience moé understand that their feelings originate 
from only themselves and not the fictional character. Galbraith 
stresses that those who experience moé are not responding to 
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a “material object, sound, costume or person, but rather to the 
character” (Galbraith, Moé Manifesto 7). In other words, fans 
are not falling in love with animation cells, plastic toys, or real 
women in costumes, but rather with an abstract personality that 
such materials represent.
As briefly mentioned before, Hiroki Azuma has identified 
a series of recurring key elements in female character designs 
that are most likely to elicit feelings of moé. These include un-
naturally colored hair, animal ears and tails, large reflective eyes, 
and loose-fitting gloves and socks that obscure the shape of the 
hands and feet (Azuma 42–44). Such elements conform to the 
aesthetic known as kawaii that, according to Sōichi Masubuchi, 
“is typically characterized by smallness, juvenility, innocence, 
and dependency, as well as physical components such as round-
ness, pastel shades, and animal qualities like ears and tails” (qtd. 
in Robertson 24), but which, Ellis notes, is nevertheless often 
deliberately “juxtaposed with violent and sexually explicit im-
ages” (307).11
Both Azuma and Masubuchi also make clear that within moé 
culture, fictional characters do not have to be strictly human 
but simply anthropomorphic. As moé advocate Toru Honda ex-
plains,
In moé culture, anything can take the shape of a cute girl. 
Machines. Utensils. World nations. As long as it is female, 
and human in shape, a moé character does not have to be 
based on a human. You can get a lot of pleasure from anthro-
pomorphizing objects into cute characters. You can’t have a 
relationship with an object, but if it is in the shape of a girl 
then there are more possibilities. A cat, for example, can be 
11 Azuma and Masubuchi’s formulations of kawaii features overlap with and 
expand on the work of ethologist Konrad Lorenz’s influential child schema 
(Kindchenschema), which argues that conventional notions of cuteness are 
primarily based on physical features most commonly found in infants such 
as a large head, a round face, big eyes, and juvenile behavior, and which 
serve an evolutionary function in motivating caretaking behavior in adults 
and enhancing offspring survival. See Morreall.
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represented by a cute girl with cat ears and tail. It’s obvious 
that the cat-ear phenomenon began with someone thinking 
“I wonder what a cat would look like if it was a human?” 
Then all sorts of desires get wrapped up in that image. (qtd. 
in Galbraith, Moé Manifesto 121)
Here, the cute anthropomorphic cat-girls to which Honda re-
fers are a staple, almost a cliché, in Japanese pop culture. Fred 
Patten notes that these characters “first appeared in […] mid-
1980s direct-to-video erotic anime as fantasy sex kittens and 
Playboy-type bunny-girls” (Patten) and later migrated to main-
stream fantasy and sci-fi anime, even crossing over into the 
“Magical Girl” genre with series like Tokyo Mew Mew (2002–3) 
that proved popular both domestically and abroad.12 Obviously, 
many of these characteristics are also present in Faust’s anime-
esque pony designs as well as the erotic fan art inspired by them. 
Perhaps the reason bronies feel sexually drawn to these eques-
trian characters is because they are part of a generation brought 
up on anime, and many of them had their first real taste of fe-
male sexuality in the form of the cute female characters that ap-
pear in these shows (Robertson 29).
However, Saitō argues that what otaku find most sexually 
appealing about these cute female characters is their inherently 
fictional nature. In an interview, Saitō stated: “When I wrote 
my book [Beautiful Fighting Girl] in 2000, it was assumed that 
drawings of cute girls were a substitute for real girls. The think-
ing was that those who could not make it with women in real-
ity projected their desires into fantasy. But with otaku that was 
never the case. The desire for the three-dimensional and the 
two-dimensional are separate” (qtd. in Galbraith, Moé Mani-
festo 179–80). Setsu Shigematsu similarly argues that while the 
desire for fictional girls is indeed a “substitute,” what it is substi-
12 The predilection for erotic anthropomorphism in Japanese manga and ani-
me can be traced to the mediums’ founding father, Tezuka Osamu (1928–
89), whose daughter discovered a secret stash of sexy mouse-girl drawings 
by him in 2014 (Baseel).
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tuting for is not real girls but rather “a lack of desire for the ‘real 
thing’ — a lack of desire that young men are ‘naturally’ supposed 
to possess for real young women” (Shigematsu 131–32). Moreo-
ver, Saitō contends that what otaku want is not to see their fan-
tasies brought to life but instead to be transported to “an utterly 
imagined space with no correspondent in the everyday world, 
a space of perfect fictionality” (Saitō, “Otaku Sexuality” 245) 
where they can live out their fantasies, including sexual ones, 
in a way that sociologist Volker Grassmuck has characterized as 
“pure, abstract sex, the simulation of stimulation.”
Such a space is best found in comics and cartoons, especially 
Japanese manga and anime, which avant-garde Japanese artist 
and pop-culture historian Takashi Murakami maintains adheres 
to a style called “Superflat.” As Azuma explains, Superflat “in-
dicates an imaginary space without depth or thickness, where 
even the eye of the camera does not exist” (qtd. in Saitō, “Otaku 
Sexuality” 241–44). Because this imagined space “escapes the 
regulation of the camera’s eye, [it] appears structureless” when 
in fact “the control exerted by various contexts supersedes eve-
rything else and establishes an order distinct from structure,” 
creating in the process an environment of “sexual intersubjec-
tivity” in which the limitless “imaginative power” of “otaku sex-
uality” can assert itself (Saitō, “Otaku Sexuality” 245).
Fans in the postmodern era, as Azuma observes, no longer 
approach media such as manga and anime from the standpoint 
of a narrative, but rather as a series of recurring visual mo-
tifs that can be catalogued across the medium as a whole, and 
whose reoccurrence and recognition form the main source of 
pleasure. Azuma calls this fixation with the elements of a work 
at the expense of an actual narrative the “database theory” of 
media consumption and argues, in an almost behaviorist mode, 
that fans are naturally drawn to products that possess such ele-
ments (Galbraith, Moé Manifesto 172). Furthermore, by divorc-
ing these elements from the confines of the narrative, fans are 
free to explore endless imaginative possibilities surrounding 
said elements, possibilities that either could not exist within the 
confines of the “official story” or because they involve what Mi-
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zuko Ito describes as “depictions of what many people would 
consider ‘alternative’ forms of sexuality” that are deemed taboo 
or dangerous in real life (qtd. in Jenkins, “Otaku”).
Likewise, the female characters that fans are most likely to 
encounter in an imagined Superflat space are no more likely 
to be realistic than the space itself. Galbraith observers that 
the physical appearance of anime characters “does not resem-
ble” that of “a human […] but takes on its own internal realism 
within manga/anime” (qtd. in Jenkins, “In Defense”) and that 
the sexual appeal of such characters is not rooted in the “desire 
[for] a human with such a face” but rather is wholly “separate 
from [the appeal of] a human face” (Galbraith, “Lolicon” 106).
This means that the admittedly offbeat desires of otaku, Saitō 
contends, cannot be accurately labeled as “perverse” because the 
objects of their affection do not exist in reality but are fantasy 
characters — often superhumans or anthropomorphized ani-
mals — who are incapable of existing apart from their fictional-
ized contexts (Saitō, “Otaku Sexuality” 245). Likewise, bronies 
should not be labeled as closeted zoophiles since the objects of 
their sexual fantasies are not real ponies but rather cute anthro-
pomorphic stylizations of animals; the level of anthropomor-
phization notably increases in erotic or pornographic fan works 
(Ellis 298). In fact, bronies seem to have no interest in actual 
ponies at all, as one interviewee told me: “I don’t really care for 
the look of real ponies […]. But I find [the ponies in Friendship 
Is Magic] appealing because […] they don’t have hooves, they 
have these weird little stumps and these little tiny nubby noses 
and the big giant anime eyes.”13
Critical work on otaku sexuality is important because it 
shows how the sexuality of brony fandom is a crucial aspect of 
the community that need not be ignored, neglected, or shunned. 
It is, rather, a normal byproduct of male fans who are heavily in-
vested in a given fictive universe; the pop-cultural elements of 
which allow them to explore their own sexual identities (Ellis 
304). However, while Saitō maintains that the desire for fictional 
13 See also Ellis 310.
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characters is not perverse, he also acknowledges that it is not 
natural insofar as one is not born desiring relationships, be they 
amicable or erotic, with fictional characters, and that such de-
sires must instead result from “training or study” and be devel-
oped over time (qtd. in Cather 239). 
But why should one wish to cultivate such desires? The com-
mon-sense answer would be that such individuals are lonely and 
desire partners. Indeed, Edwards and Redden report that the 
overwhelming majority of bronies, 96 percent, are single. But 
even if that were the case, why turn to fiction? What is motivat-
ing these young men’s “lack of desire for the ‘real thing’” (Shige-
matsu 131)?
Equestrian Economics
One explanation for why some young men prefer cute fictional 
women to relationships with real women is that they simply 
don’t believe they can afford to date real ones, in the most literal 
sense of the term. In the late 1990s and early 2000s Japan suf-
fered a major economic downturn from which it has failed to 
recover. In such an economy, many men are unable to obtain 
the financial status needed to successfully attract romantic part-
ners or even “be eligible to fraternize with young women” at all 
(Shigematsu 132). Toru Honda calls this “love capitalism” and 
paints a cynical picture “of commoditized romance that forces 
people onto expensive dates to fashionable places […] not only 
out of reach for most men, but also entirely unappealing,” and 
that reduces “women’s motives for dating and marriage […] to 
economic ones” (Jenkins, “In Defense”). Given such a world-
view, many young men instead chose to “opt out of this compe-
tition and […] invest in […] two-dimensional images of cute-
ness” (Shigematsu 132).
If a bad economy is the catalyst for the birth of moé culture, 
then there is no reason to believe that such a phenomenon is 
limited only to Japan. Takuro Morinaga predicts “that the pres-
sures contributing to the [moé] phenomenon are shared glob-
ally, and that moé will become a big market in other countries 
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too as more and more men end up on the losing side of the 
economy” (qtd. in Galbraith, Moé Manifesto 132).14 The United 
States was itself in the grips of an economic recession between 
December 2007 and June 2009, the summer before Friendship 
Is Magic debuted, and struggled to climb out of this financial 
pit with “the unemployment rate for men and women 20 to 24 
years old,” the median age of most bronies, being just “11.4 per-
cent, versus a low of 7.2 percent in 2007” (Pethokoukis). Only 
32 percent of bronies are employed either part-time or full-time 
(Edwards and Redden).
For James Pethokoukis, America is currently in a cultural cli-
mate very similar to that of Japan, where young, college-educat-
ed adults find themselves living with their parents while work-
ing dead-end jobs as “baristas and bartenders with Bachelor’s 
degrees” and trying to deal with this depressing reality by peri-
odically escaping to worlds of fantasy. If more American young 
adult men are following the trend first set forth in Japan of “es-
caping to virtual worlds of games, animation and costume play” 
(Giles) to deal with the existential uncertainties of life and love 
in a bad economy, it only makes sense that these same young 
men would begin turning to fictional women as “a low-cost, 
low-stress solution to this problem,” as Honda terms it (qtd. in 
Galbraith, Moé Manifesto 122). I contend that brony fandom is 
best understood as a manifestation of moé culture within the 
United States and that the practices of bronies creating, trading, 
and consuming My Little Pony: Friendship Is Magic erotic and 
pornographic fan works are reactions to the perceived sexual 
cynicism of dating in a depressed economy.15
But as Galbraith points out, the adoption of what Saitō calls 
“drawn sexuality” opens up a host of problems as men engaged 
in moé culture “still seem to maintain goals for success, namely 
14 Another recent example of moé culture invading the United States is Phar-
rell Williams’s 2014 hit song “It Girl,” whose music video combines ele-
ments of anime and Japanese “dating simulator games” and was produced 
by Takashi Murakami’s company Kaikai Kiki. The “It Girl” is a young anime 
girl, an “archetypal moé character” (Alt).
15 See also Galbraith and Jonathan B., “Moé Manifesto Interview.” 
103
“All the Pretty Little Ponies”
getting paid and laid, that are recognizable to hegemonic mas-
culinity.” Rather than abandoning these goals or reevaluating 
their means of obtaining them, men simply “want things on 
their terms, which can come off as somewhat entitled” (qtd. in 
Jenkins, “In Defense”). More than entitlement, Tatsuhiko Shi-
busawa argues that moé is in essence a “one-way street” where 
the fictional female “most perfectly satisfies the essential sexual 
urges of the male […] because both socially and sexually” such 
a character “is utterly ignorant. And being ignorant [is] like lit-
tle birds and dogs — symboliz[ing] the total object, the object of 
play, and one that cannot express itself of its own accord” (qtd. 
in Galbraith, “Lolicon” 116 n.10). Shibusawa’s comments also re-
call feminist scholar Meenakshi Gigi Durham’s declaration that 
what a patriarchal society most desires of its women is “compli-
ant, docile sexuality” (Galbraith, “Lolicon” 116 n.10). And what 
kind of woman is more docile than a fictional one? In fostering 
relationships with fictional characters, bronies are creating what 
Galbraith calls “a space of autonomous sexuality” that can only 
be maintained through the active rejection of real women, thus 
marking it as an inherently “sexist position” (qtd. in Jenkins, “In 
Defense”).
The Male Colonization of a “Girls’ Show”
The irony of brony fandom is that a show originally designed to 
shine a spotlight on the diverse ways in which young girls can 
express femininity has instead been colonized by adult men as a 
way of demonstrating an alternative means of masculinity. This 
fact was recognized early on by Emily Manuel:
The bronies’ own behavior en masse in the fandom reinforces 
the same old male-center/female-margin dynamic, as does 
much of the media coverage. Female fans are squeezed from 
the frame as objects worthy of consideration of their own. 
Some have proposed the male-centric term “brony” be ap-
plied to all adult MLP fans, an un-reflexive marking of the 
male as universal. This is indicative of a broader claiming of 
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the text as normatively the domain of men, a far from unique 
dynamic in fandom — just one of a million reasons why a 
feminist narrative like MLP:FiM is still so sorely needed by 
girls and women.
As Manuel notes, the media’s love affair with brony fandom 
betrays an obvious double standard. For girls of any age to be 
interested in boys’ toys, like Transformers, is neither remark-
able nor indicative of the progressive redefinition of traditional 
gender roles (Truitt). This is because guys who like Friendship Is 
Magic are special not simply because they like a show targeted 
at children but because they like a show targeted at girls, who 
are presumed to be inferior to boys in every way, including their 
taste in toys and cartoons. By liking a girls’ show, bronies are 
seen as rejecting their superior male status in favor of an inferior 
female one, while girls who embrace men’s entertainment are 
simply adopting a more cultivated sense of taste.16 
Contrary to popular belief, bronies do not represent a sig-
nificant shift in young men’s understanding of gender politics, 
what it means to be masculine, how they view women’s enter-
tainment, or even women themselves — a stance that was made 
possible only because its pundits chose, for whatever reason, 
to ignore and/or dismiss the sexual aspects of brony fandom. 
When such aspects are taken into account, however, the picture 
changes dramatically and claims that bronies constitute a pro-
gressive movement in gender politics crumble. 
Nevertheless, the creation and use of pornographic fan art 
featuring the Friendship Is Magic characters is a complicated 
phenomenon. It not only demonstrates the bronies’ own immer-
sion into the world of the show but also serves as a means for 
young men, frustrated with what they perceive to be a romantic 
market of increasingly diminishing returns, to express them-
selves sexually. From this perspective it becomes clear that bro-
nies’ infatuation with the cute pony characters from Friendship 
Is Magic is not pathological but rather “a survival mechanism 
16 On female exclusion from fandom, see Gosling.
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in a media-saturated world” (Shamoon 96). Cuteness serves as 
a source of sexual arousal for bronies because it is understood 
as an indication of feminine naïveté and innocence — assurance 
that the woman in question will not attempt to exploit them ei-
ther emotionally or economically. Because such assurances are 
impossible in real life, however, bronies have chosen to insulate 
themselves in an imagined space of sexual autonomy where the 
objects of their desire are fictional and thus lack independent 
wills.
Lastly, such practices also serve as a means for these fans to 
avoid the stigma of safe, domestic superficiality that is so often 
associated with women’s media by actively rejecting female par-
ticipation. Joanne Hollows notes that one of the chief ways male 
fans discourage the participation of female fans is by populating 
their fandom with graphic pornography that objectifies women. 
This not only reinforces its “illicit and ‘outlaw’ status,” both seen 
as fundamentally male attributes, but also serves as a means for 
members to display how truly masculine they are by “demon-
strating how far or low you can go” (43–44). Bronies, by deriving 
pleasure from masturbating to images of cartoon ponies from 
a children’s show, visibly mark themselves as practitioners of 
a non-mainstream form of sexuality, thereby reinforcing their 
masculine status and alienating female fans who find such dis-
plays misogynistic.
None of which is to say that bronies are not truly transgres-
sive. Embracing a work of commercial art not expressly made 
for you is a transgressive act in itself, as is being open to alterna-
tive forms of sexual expression such as moé and clopping. But 
as Hollows reminds us, “in every act of transgression there is 
always something, or someone, that is transgressed” and that 
often such acts of transgression are “only sustained by processes 
of ‘othering’ and it is always important to remain aware of who, 
and what, is being ‘othered,’” often unintentionally (49). 
It is in the same vein that brony fandom is best understood as 
an American variation of Japanese moé culture. But such an un-
derstanding also necessitates an acknowledgment that, know-
ingly or not, the rise of the bronies has further contributed to 
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the othering of both women and women’s entertainment so as 
to further promote the masculine as normative and superior. 
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Consuming Celebrity: 
Commodities and Cuteness 
in the Circulation of Master 
William Henry West Betty
Marlis Schweitzer
On a shelf in the vaults of the Folger Shakespeare Library sit 
several snuffboxes bearing the image of Master William Henry 
West Betty, the child actor who dominated the British stage be-
tween 1803 and 1806 (figs. 1 and 2). Small, pretty, and delicate, 
these snuffboxes are undeniably “cute,” in keeping with the as-
sociation of cuteness with fragility, empathy, and desire (Merish 
187). Like other cute objects, they invite human touch despite 
their vulnerable materiality, as if to say, “Hold me carefully or 
I will break.” The tiny portraits painted onto the ivory lids en-
hance the boxes’ cuteness by depicting the “Young Roscius” in 
his most famous roles, from Shakespeare’s Romeo to the charac-
ter of Norval in John Home’s Douglas. In turn, the skillful min-
iaturization of Betty’s image amplifies the cuteness of the boy 
himself, whom audiences admired as much, if not more, for his 
physical charms as for his convincing stage impersonations.
It may seem anachronistic to apply the term cute to objects 
created in early nineteenth-century Britain since the word cute 
did not enter common parlance until the mid-1800s, when it 
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was marked as a distinctly American term (Ngai 59; Steinberg).1 
Nevertheless, a study of Master Betty and the commodities pro-
duced to celebrate him reveals that both the concept of cuteness 
and the triangulation of cuteness, commodities, and children 
were well underway in Britain decades before the word itself 
took hold.2 By focusing on Betty’s popularity with male audi-
ences and detailing the various performances of masculinity 
that arose in response to him, this chapter also advances new 
1 According to Steinberg, the word cute first appeared in the 1700s as a deri-
vation of acute and was typically used as a synonym of “clever, keen-witted, 
sharp, [and] shrewd.”
2 On cuteness as a mid-nineteenth-century development, see Merish 188 and 
Ngai 59.
Figure 1. Box with Master Betty as “Romeo” in Romeo and Juliet. 
Courtesy Folger Shakespeare Library. Figure 2. Box with Master Betty 




understandings of the social functions of cuteness, pushing be-
yond tendencies to associate cuteness with maternal care.
As one of the first child celebrities of the modern era, Mas-
ter Betty circulated within an evolving economy of cuteness 
wherein he was valued for his size, charm, and vulnerability, 
especially when he was ill or otherwise indisposed. Audiences 
admired Betty’s physical appearance and collected biographi-
cal pamphlets, caricatures, and a range of souvenirs bearing his 
likeness out of a desire to commemorate his performances and 
engage with him socially in form if not being. Such objects were 
central to the production of what we now recognize as celebrity 
culture, as they mediated the relationship between Betty and his 
audience in both public and private spaces.
Although some historians see celebrity culture as a distinct 
phenomenon of late capitalism, Simon Morgan insists that 
celebrity needs to be understood “less as a somewhat arbitrary 
status assigned to this or that individual, and more as a cultural 
and economic formation which plays a wider role in society 
as a whole” (98). In Morgan’s equation, individuals become 
celebrities in the moment when “a sufficiently large audience 
is interested in their actions, image and personality to create 
a viable market for commodities carrying their likeness and 
for information about their lives and views” (98).3 Celebrity 
culture thus emerged in tandem with the rise of capitalism, and 
both were enhanced by the production of cuteness. Indeed, as 
Charles Harmon contends, “from the broadest vantage, cuteness 
can be seen as instrumental to the stabilization of capitalism 
itself ” (133–34). Put bluntly, the cute keeps the wheels of capital 
turning. “Cuteness might be regarded as an intensification of 
commodity fetishism’s kitschy phantasmatic logic but also 
as a way of revising it by adding yet another layer of fantasy,” 
Sianne Ngai writes (62). When the cute object entices onlookers 
3 Other scholars share this view of Betty, as the title of Jeffrey Kahan’s recent 
study, Bettymania and the Birth of Celebrity Culture, attests. In his book, It, 
performance studies scholar Joseph Roach traces the emergence of celebrity 
culture to the court of Louis XIV.
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to hold, caress, cuddle, and care for it, it “speaks to a desire to 
recover what Marx calls the ‘coarsely sensuous objectivity of 
commodities as physical objects’ that becomes immediately 
extinguished in exchange” (63). Far from passive, innocent, or 
amoral, the cute can issue “surprisingly powerful demands” as it 
stirs intense feelings of desire and longing (64).
Historically, children have been aligned with commodities 
through their performance of cuteness, while miniature com-
modities have in turn been associated with children through 
their apparent vulnerability and fragility (Merish 186; Stewart 
43). For Lori Merish, this link between commodities and chil-
dren often provokes a maternal or feminized response in those 
who encounter the cute: “[T]he cute always in some sense desig-
nates a commodity in search of its mother and is constructed to 
generate maternal desire; the consumer (or potential consumer) 
of the cute is expected […] to pretend she or he is the cute’s 
mother” (186). This association of cuteness, children, and deep 
maternal longing can be traced to the groundbreaking work 
of the zoologist and ethnologist Konrad Lorenz, the “father of 
modern cuteness research,” who in the 1950s observed that “the 
perpetual pattern known as cuteness […] was a sign stimulus 
which served as an ‘innate releaser’ of the human caregiving re-
sponse” (Sherman and Haidt 248). For Lorenz, cuteness in ani-
mal and human babies awakened dormant responses in adult 
parents, compelling them to devote special care to their young.
While Lorenz’s work continues to inform cute studies, recent 
research has complicated his understanding of the biological 
function of cuteness and its association with caregiving and the 
maternal. In a 2011 article, psychologists Gary D. Sherman and 
Jonathan Haidt assert that “[c]uteness is as much an elicitor of 
play as it is of care. It is as likely to trigger a childlike state as 
a parental one” (248). Moving away from Lorenz’s suggestion 
that cuteness releases caregiving, they maintain that cuteness 
“releases sociality” in humans and invites a broad range of what 
they term “affiliative behaviors,” which include various forms 
of social interaction that range from touching and cuddling to 
teasing and playing (249). Caregiving might arise from these af-
115
Consuming Celebrity
filiative behaviors, but it isn’t immediately released, nor is it nec-
essarily the primary response to cute entities, whether human 
or nonhuman. 
Sherman and Haidt’s theory helps to explain one of the most 
troubling and paradoxical aspects of cuteness: cute objects can 
simultaneously provoke caretaking urges as well as intense feel-
ings of disgust or anger (59–73). Indeed, for Ngai, the materiality 
of cute objects, namely “their smallness, compactness, formal 
simplicity, softness or pliancy,” can “call up a range of minor 
negative affects: helplessness, pitifulness, and even despond-
ency” (64–65). Daniel Harris similarly identifies cuteness as an 
“aesthetic of deformity and dejection,” citing the popularity of 
the blundering Winnie the Pooh with his snout in a honey pot 
or the fully equipped “Vet Set” that allows caregivers to band-
age a wounded (stuffed) puppy and other imaginary pets (6–7). 
Cute commodities and cute children thus activate much more 
than an “erotics of maternal longing” (188). They release diverse 
forms of sociality that include both tenderness and harm.
As this chapter demonstrates, Master Betty and the cute 
commodities created in his image prompted a range of com-
plicated social and antisocial responses, from declarations of 
love and admiration to vicious attacks on his image and reputa-
tion. This is not to deny the importance of maternal longing to 
Betty’s appeal but rather to suggest that Betty and the objects 
that constellated around him provoked “affiliative behaviors” 
that extended well beyond maternal caregiving to include the 
desire to hold, possess, occupy, and dominate.4 To explore these 
behaviors, this chapter traces Betty’s rise to fame and follows fan 
efforts to gain access to him through biographical pamphlets. It 
then turns to caricatures of Betty’s performances and offstage 
life as evidence of artists’ attempts to package the child actor’s 
cuteness for public consumption. More than documenting the 
4 In her study of cuteness in Japanese culture, Anne Allison observes that 
while girls were primarily associated with cute commodities in the 1970s 
and 1980s, cuteness as a commodity is now desired as much by men and 
boys as by women and girls (40–41).
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boy’s celebrity, however, these images point to the anger, disgust, 
and threat of violence that erupted in response to Betty’s cute-
ness. Finally, I look to several commemorative objects, notably 
the series of Betty snuffboxes discussed above, to consider how 
audiences consumed and quite literally inhaled the boy.
Bettymania
William Henry West Betty was born in 1791 in Shrewsbury and 
raised on the outskirts of Belfast. According to contemporary 
biographers, the boy fell in love with the stage after attending 
a production of Pizarro starring the celebrated actress Sarah 
Siddons in the role of Elvira. Siddons’s performance apparently 
made such a strong impression on young Betty that when he 
returned home he set about learning all of Elvira’s speeches “in 
imitation of Mrs. Siddons” (12), and begged his father to let him 
pursue a theatrical career, to which his parents acceded (Harley 
13). Curious to know whether their son had potential, Betty’s 
parents approached Mr. Atkins, manager of the theater in Bel-
fast, and his “ingenious and experienced prompter, Mr. Hough,” 
for advice (13). The men agreed that with proper training Betty 
might be a success, and Mr. Hough became the boy’s tutor. 
In August 1803, several weeks shy of his twelfth birthday, 
Betty gave his first public performance in Belfast, playing the 
role of Osman in Aaron Hill’s Zara. Surprised and delighted by 
the boy’s portrayal of the tragic hero, the audience responded 
“with universal admiration […] and tumultuous applauses” 
(Harley 15).5 Betty’s next performances, as Young Norval in 
Douglas and Rolla in Pizzaro, drew increasingly larger crowds. 
Following this success, Betty embarked upon a series of provin-
cial tours, performing in Dublin, Cork, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Birmingham, Sheffield, and Liverpool. According to biogra-
pher George Davies Harley, audiences were “delighted and as-
tonished” by Betty in the role of Richard III: “a higher opinion 




cannot be conveyed of his imitative powers, than that a mere 
child should convey the justest conceptions of the character, al-
though his voice and appearance so little correspond with the 
spectator’s idea of the crook-backed tyrant” (72). Here it is the 
miniaturization of Richard III — the juxtaposition of a juvenile 
voice and figure with the words and actions of a tyrant — that 
renders Betty both cute and astonishing. This cuteness took on a 
decidedly erotic turn when Betty as Richard wooed Lady Anne; 
according to Harley, his address “never fail[ed] to gratify the fe-
male part of his audience” (72), who presumably felt something 
much stronger than maternal desire for the actor. 
As this account suggests, Betty’s growing fame and delightful 
cuteness invited audiences and would-be audiences to display 
a range of “affiliative behaviors” that, in Haidt and Sherman’s 
terms, included “attempts to touch, hold, pet, play with, talk to, 
or otherwise engage” him (249). Some fans were satisfied with 
a glimpse of the actor; for example, en route to Birmingham, 
his chaise was surrounded by hundreds of curious fans “who 
seemed perfectly happy in the opportunity of viewing the theat-
rical prodigy” (Bisset 37). Hotels and coach companies likewise 
benefited from the surging “Bettymania” as “families of distinc-
tion” traveled from London to gain access to the young boy and 
learn what all the fuss was about. At the Doncaster Races, a spe-
cial “Theatrical Coach” conveyed passengers from the racing 
grounds to Sheffield where the Young Roscius was playing (47).
As the Betty hype intensified, a growing number of authors 
published competing accounts of the actor’s early life, drawing 
on biographical details, critical essays, and poetry to sing the 
young boy’s praises — or in some cases, to challenge those who 
were mesmerized by the child. Collectively, these pamphlets 
demonstrate how cuteness in a child “releases sociality” and 
arouses the desire to hold or engage the cute subject. Indeed, 
the number of Betty pamphlets in circulation between 1804 and 
1805 provides evidence of a market hungry to consume details 
and images of the young boy and the recognition on the part 
of male pamphleteers that claiming affiliation with Betty would 
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yield significant financial rewards, if not some degree of per-
sonal satisfaction.6 
One of the earliest publications was Strictures upon the Mer-
its of Young Roscius, written by J. Jackson, a theater manager in 
Edinburgh and Glasgow who “had the honour of first introduc-
ing Betty to the notice of a British audience” (qtd. in Harral 35). 
Despite his enthusiasm, however, Jackson lacked the insider 
knowledge asserted by later pamphleteers. By contrast, when J. 
Bisset of Birmingham published his Critical Essays on the Dra-
matic Excellencies of the Young Roscius, he claimed to provide 
“the most authentic information respecting every particular of 
this wonderful Child of Thespis,” since “the account of the birth 
and commencement of his theatrical career” had come directly 
from “the Parents of his juvenile Hero” (“This Day” 71). And 
certainly Bisset’s compilation of Betty criticism, letters to the 
editor, and excerpts from Hough’s correspondence with theater 
managers offers a wealth of detail about the juvenile actor’s early 
performances. Like other pro-Betty biographers, Bisset posi-
tioned himself as a caring surrogate father figure dedicated to 
upholding Betty’s reputation. At the same time, the biographer’s 
physical and emotional proximity to the child actor presumably 
enhanced his own social status and performance of gentlemanly 
conduct.
Not to be outdone, Harley declared that his Authentic Bio-
graphical Sketch of the Life, Education, and Personal Character, of 
William Henry West Betty, the Celebrated Young Roscius was su-
perior to others because it included Betty’s “correct Portrait, en-
graved from an original Sketch” (“Mr. Harley’s” 71).7 Like Bisset, 
Harley boasted about his access to the young boy and to artists 
who had accurately captured his likeness. “I have undertaken to 
6 Not all pamphleteers and critics had favorable things to say about Betty. 
Between 1804 and 1805, at least twenty Betty pamphlets entered circula-
tion — some complimentary, others skeptical.
7 Harley’s claim points to disagreements among artists who asserted that 
their portraits of Betty were superior to those of their competitors and ac-
cused others of misappropriating their work. See “The Young Roscius” 27 
Dec. 1804, and Betty. 
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pen the following pages of authentic matter,” he wrote, “presum-
ing that an intimate knowledge of him both on and off the stage, 
together with the documents which I have had an opportunity 
of procuring, may enable me to form a more accurate account 
of his talents” (5). By emphasizing the authenticity and accuracy 
of their accounts, Harley and Bisset fed the growing economy of 
cuteness that surrounded Betty, offering readers the kind of im-
agined access to that they already enjoyed (or so they claimed). 
Betty in London
On 3 December 1804, Betty gave his first London performance 
at Theatre Royal, Covent Garden, in the role of Achmet (Selim) 
in Barbarossa, John Brown’s tragedy about the Algerian ruler. 
Curious to see if the boy was really all that others claimed him 
to be, a huge crowd gathered outside the theater hours before 
the doors opened, making it impossible for those closest to the 
entrance to move. The situation went from bad to worse, as a 
journalist recalled:
In this state, the heat and pressure, after a time became so 
intolerable, that a variety of persons fainted, and others were 
in danger of suffocation, and other injuries, from the weight 
and force of the numbers from without, who could not be 
prevailed upon, by the representations or the shrieks of the 
people confined within, to desist from attempting to force 
their passage.
The danger at last becoming extreme, the guards were 
almost unanimously called for, by the terrified persons 
who were included between the inner and outer doors, and 
who could not make good their retreat. (“Covent Garden 
Theatre” 72)
This account vividly documents the intense desire that Betty’s 
name and presence aroused in the London audience. Primed 
by circulating pamphlets, newspaper accounts, and images, the 
men and women gathered outside the theater could no long-
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er contain their yearning to see and potentially touch the boy. 
Significantly, however, the urge to engage with Betty produced 
a kind of sociality that was destructive and self-serving rather 
than loving and tender. “[A]ssembled with the same intention” 
(i.e., to encounter the child), the Betty-crazed crowd paid little 
heed to those suffering around them.8
While audiences were somewhat more restrained in the 
weeks following Betty’s debut, large crowds continued to flood 
Covent Garden and Drury Lane in the hopes of catching a 
glimpse of the boy. His admirers included the Prince of Wales, 
the Duchess of York, and other members of the royal house-
hold, as well as the prime minister and members of Parliament.9 
Throughout this period Betty continued to whet the public ap-
petite with a diverse repertoire, resuming his celebrated per-
sonations of Young Norval in Douglas, Romeo in Romeo and 
Juliet, and Frederick in Lover’s Vows, alongside more ambitious 
portrayals of Hamlet and Richard III, miniaturizing and thereby 
cutifying roles that were typically associated with mature male 
actors. For many fans the diversity of these parts testified to 
Betty’s uncanny virtuosity, though some critics observed that he 
was much less convincing as a romantic hero like Romeo (“Cov-
ent Garden” 70) and suggested that he was overstretching the 
limits of his talent as Hamlet (“Drury Lane Theatre” 81). Against 
such criticism, Betty’s friends and fans sprang to his defense, 
protecting him from attacks they considered unwarranted and 
unjust (A Sincere Friend 82).10 Such passionate efforts point to 
the intensity of (male) fans’ imagined relationships with Betty, 
whom they perceived as delicate and vulnerable and therefore in 
need of their protection.
8 The critical response to Betty’s London debut was largely positive. London 
critics praised his technical skill, his “bold, correct and graceful” attitudes, 
his “striking and elegant” posture, and his convincing portrayal of strong 
emotion (“Young Roscius” 73). 
9 In February 1805, Betty visited the House of Commons with his father, 
where he chatted with several representatives and dined with the Duke of 
Clarence (“Master Betty accompanied” 77).
10 See also Bisset 50–63.
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These responses to Betty criticism point to the ways that fans 
expressed their devotion to the boy and sought contact with him 
both inside and outside the theater. “The attraction of the young 
Roscius is not limited to the stage,” claimed one report, “for he 
cannot walk along the streets without drawing crowds, who nat-
urally press after him to see the most extraordinary pickpocket 
that the Theaters ever knew” (“The attraction” 75). Although the 
author’s description of Betty as a “pickpocket” — presumably a 
reference to the boy’s salary and inflated ticket prices — alludes 
to a more skeptical view of his talents, most theatergoers saw 
Betty as a precious object. Indeed, the writer’s description of 
crowds surrounding and “naturally press[ing] after” Betty in the 
streets recalls the incident when hundreds of fans surrounded 
the boy’s carriage. Here the desire to hold, touch, and possess 
the cute child gave rise to social behavior that stretched beyond 
love and admiration to include more physically threatening be-
havior. According to another account, those unable to acquire 
tickets to see him at Covent Garden or Drury Lane went so far as 
to wait in the street outside the front door of Betty’s Southamp-
ton row house, hoping to catch “a peep before his drawing-room 
curtain!” (“Some people” 75). Pushing beyond public space into 
private space, the crowds pursued Betty with a hunger tinged 
with the threat of violence — just how far would they go to catch 
“a peep” of him in his own home, this account seems to ask, and 
what would happen after that? The harder it became to access 
Betty’s physical person, the cuter he became to those privileged 
enough to catch a glimpse of him on the stage, in the street, or 
behind closed curtains. 
These accounts of close encounters with the cute child ges-
ture toward the entanglement of cuteness with access. Inaccessi-
bility amplifies cuteness and enhances desire, fueling a capitalist 
economy of cuteness that can be directed toward the acquisition 
of surrogate objects that carry similar attributes. When indi-
viduals are thwarted in their desire to touch and hold the cute, 
they become susceptible to other forms of sociability, which can 
intensify and take on less desirable aspects, including negative 
affects such as anger, disgust, and violence.
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Often, though, the desire to hold and touch Betty’s body 
manifested in displays of concern for Betty’s health and physical 
well-being. Before the actor’s first move from Covent Garden 
to Drury Lane, manager Richard Sheridan announced: “Mas-
ter BETTY shall not perform more than three times a week, and 
that he shall not be brought forward even so often, if it shall 
appear to be in the slightest degree inconvenient to his health or 
feelings” (“We are happy” 73). Carefully timed, this announce-
ment positioned Sheridan as a benevolent, fatherly manager 
anxious about jeopardizing his star’s health, while emphasizing 
the exclusivity of a Betty performance. When Betty became ill 
and had to withdraw from a scheduled performance, audiences 
were so overcome with worry that the Drury Lane management 
published a notice with letters from Betty’s father and doctor 
verifying the young boy’s illness, complete with vivid details of 
“bilious vomiting” and “cold and hoarseness” that rendered his 
voice barely “audible in his room” (“The Young Roscius,” 19 Dec. 
1804, 76). In the days that followed, London papers published 
regular updates on Betty’s progress with graphic accounts of the 
specific treatments administered (e.g., enemas, bloodletting). 
For their part, Betty’s family posted notices outside their door 
to address the “numerous and incessant enquiries of the Nobil-
ity and Gentry” (“The Young Roscius,” 22 Dec. 1804, 76). 
Such extreme reactions to Betty’s ill health highlight the role 
of vulnerability, weakness, and distance in accentuating cute-
ness. Although, as Merish asserts, “[w]hat the cute stages is, in 
part, a need for adult care” (187), the cute also invites feelings 
that are less about caring than about possession and domina-
tion. When Betty became sick, his already-attractive body be-
came the focus of intense public scrutiny and heightened desire, 
a desire aroused in part by his sudden inaccessibility. Hidden in 
the inner sanctum of his bedroom, Betty was literally untouch-
able, even by members of the nobility and gentry, which only 
made him seem more fascinating, more defenseless, and in need 
of greater care. In other words, Betty’s forced withdrawal from 
the stage made him cuter through his association with “the di-
minutive, the weak, and the subordinate” (Ngai 53). At the same 
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time, the public’s intense interest in Betty — their demand to 
know everything that was happening to his body behind closed 
doors — highlights the distressing flipside of maternal long-
ing — longing to the point of obsession. Here, Emmanuel Levi-
nas’s reflections on need, desire, and the consumption of others 
seem particularly relevant. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas dis-
tinguishes between need and desire, asserting that with need, “I 
can sink my teeth into the real and satisfy myself in assimilating 
the other; in Desire there is no sinking one’s teeth into being, 
no satiety, but an uncharted future before me” (117). Betty’s fans 
consumed pamphlets, objects, and information about the boy in 
their urge to get closer to him. But this consumption only fueled 
desire as they failed to sink their teeth into his being. 
Picturing Master Betty
The sociability released through Betty’s circulation extended to 
the work of London’s caricaturists, many of whom created satiri-
cal images of the young boy, his father, and the managers who 
competed for his talent. As one might expect, most of these im-
ages accentuate Betty’s vulnerability, size, and cuteness, showing 
him in close physical contact with the adults who surround him. 
For example, in William Holland’s caricature from December 
1804 (fig. 3), Betty as Young Norval (Douglas) sits on the lap 
of the actress Mrs. Harriet Litchfield as Lady Randolph, Young 
Norval’s mother. Holland’s exaggerated use of scale, with a min-
iaturized Betty and a round, fleshly Litchfield, enhances the ten-
derness of this scene, a reunion of a mother with her long-lost 
adult son. Betty looks like a small, delicate child in his mother’s 
arms, hardly the brave warrior of Home’s play; indeed, the jux-
taposition of Litchfield’s ample bosom with Betty’s small head 
seems to be a play on typical Madonna-and-Child tropes. The 
poetic caption in the upper-right corner of the page hails Betty 
as “Nature’s own sweet little fellow,” emphasizing his “genius,” 
“charm,” and delightful cuteness. And certainly Litchfield’s ten-
der glance at the child and her soft touch on his waist and arms 
amplifies his apparent need for adult care. 
124
the retro-futurism of cuteness
Yet the caricatur-
ists also hint at long-
ing that falls well 
outside the realm of 
maternal care. In fig-
ure 4, published on 30 
November 1804, four 
days before Betty’s 
debut, the caricatur-
ist R. Ackermann 
imagines the frustra-
tion of adult manag-
ers and actors forced 
to contend with 
Betty’s celebrity sta-
tus and his childish 
whims. Dressed in 
turquoise with a yel-
low sash waving, the 
young actor playfully 
leaps over the grum-
bling Covent Gar-
den theater manager 
John Philip Kemble, costumed as Hamlet. Paraphrasing Ophe-
lia’s lines, Kemble bemoans his fate: “woe is me / Seeing what 
I have seen / Seeing what I see!! / Oh Roscius!” Again, Betty 
appears much younger than his thirteen years, while Kemble 
seems dismayed that the rambunctious child has reduced him 
to a glorified governess, a mere shadow of his authoritative male 
self. Indeed, whereas “Lady Randolph and Douglas” associates 
caretaking with women, Ackerman’s “Theatrical Leap Frog” al-
ludes to the dangers of cuteness for men who come into contact 
with it. Through touch, Betty transforms all adults into his play-
things — he cutifies others through his cuteness, thereby desta-
bilizing hierarchies of gender and releasing feelings of anxiety 
and frustration alongside tenderness and love. In fact, the carica-
turist’s depiction of “leap frog” may have been a sly reference to 
Figure 3. TCS 61 Lady Randolph and Doug-
las, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
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same-sex desire and 
sexual congress; in 
1772, a slanderous 
poem published in 
the Public Ledger ac-
cused the celebrated 
actor–manager David 
Garrick of “play[ing] 
at length that hateful 
game leap frog” (qtd. 
in Thomson 128). This 
reading of the carica-
ture’s sexual under-
tone gains credence 
considering the ac-
counts of the many 
men who admired 
Betty, sought his com-
pany, and purchased 
goods bearing his im-
age. 
Other caricatures 
point more explicitly to cuteness’s ugly underbelly, especially 
where subjectivity is concerned. In the caricature titled “The 
Young Roscius Weighing the Manager’s Gold” (fig. 5), Betty’s 
status as a desirable commodity is made explicit. Bound by gold 
chains to Sheridan, manager of Drury Lane, and Thomas Har-
ris, representing Covent Garden, Betty questions the value of 
the gold on offer, observing that it “appears to be sterling on 
both sides.” Sheridan, on the right, promises that his offering 
is “true Pizarro gold brought by my slaves from the mines of 
Peru” (an allusion to the play Pizarro), while Harris assures him 
that his gold is pure. Although Betty appears to have the upper 
hand in these negotiations, his enchained body implies that the 
child actor has more in common with Sheridan’s Peruvian slaves 
than his lucrative contracts would suggest. As the two managers 
grasp the gold chains, they look as though they might tear the 
Figure 4. TCS 61 Theatrical Leap Frog, 
Houghton Library, Harvard University.
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boy apart in their efforts to possess him. Through its alignment 
of cuteness with Betty’s commodity status, the image not only 
“aestheticizes powerlessness,” in Merish’s terms (187), but also 
aestheticizes the violence (or the threat thereof) arising from 
efforts to dominate the supposedly powerless commodity. The 
result of such aestheticization, Ngai claims, is enhanced cute-
ness: “If aestheticization is always, at the bottom line, objectifi-
cation […] the latter in turn seems epitomized by cutification” 
(65). In other words, objects become cuter and therefore more 
desirable through the symbiotic processes of objectification and 
commodification. 
Consuming Betty
Within days of Betty’s London debut, entrepreneurs flooded the 
market with medals, fans, paper dolls, cups, “Norval caps,” “Ach-
met turbans,” and snuffboxes commemorating the young boy’s 
performances.11 Collectively, these commodities anticipated the 
full flowering of a “culture of commemoration,” Asa Briggs’s 
11 See various clippings in Collectanea, especially those on 75.




term to describe the 
British desire to cel-
ebrate all manner of 
battles, coronations, 




tion of an array of 
material goods, from 
high art to cheap. Not 
surprisingly, these 
objects invited and 
endorsed diverse so-
cial behaviors. For 
example, some com-
modities, like a set 
of paper dolls now 
housed in the Folger 
Shakespeare Library 
(fig. 6), encouraged 
Betty fans — presum-
ably but not necessarily children — to put themselves in the role 
of the young actor and of his many adult male characters si-
multaneously (“Young Albert,” Ziegler), to identify with the cute 
boy as they held and manipulated his effigy. Here, as with most 
Betty commodities, the miniaturization of the boy actor is criti-
cal to the promotion of his cuteness. Indeed, these paper dolls 
highlight the importance of toys for the promotion of cuteness 
as a privileged aesthetic category. As Harris observes, children 
are taught to be cute by “recogniz[ing] and enjoy[ing] cuteness 
in others” (13). By playing with cute toys, the child learns “the 
dual roles of actor and audience, cootchying as much as he is 
cootchy-cooed” and comes to appreciate “the nature and value 
of cuteness” (13, 14). Not all Betty objects were intended for chil-
dren, however. Other objects, like the “Roscius Dance Fan,” ap-
pealed directly to women, encouraging them to perform their 
Figure 6. Master Betty “paper dolls.” Cour-
tesy: Folger Shakespeare Library.
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femininity through the mediation of the young Roscius, whose 
image they presumably carried in their hands as they moved 
across the dance floor (“The Young Roscius — New Fans”). But 
of all the Betty memorabilia produced at the height of the boy’s 
popularity, snuffboxes invited the most personal, even intimate, 
encounter with the actor, or at least his image.
Snuff is ground-up and distilled tobacco, often scented with 
jasmine, rose, bergamot, lemon, or other strong scents, and is 
inhaled directly through the nostrils. Snuff takers carried their 
snuff around with them in small boxes from which they removed 
small pinches at a time, sometimes as frequently as every ten 
minutes. In the early eighteenth century, one observer described 
entering a London coffeehouse where a “Fluttering Assembly of 
Snuffing Peripatetiks” had gathered. “[T]he Clashing of their 
Snush-Box lids, in opening and shutting made more noise than 
their Tongues,” he remarked snidely (qtd. in Hughes 15). 
Snuff ’s enduring popularity among the social elite and emer-
gent middle class in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
expanded the market for lavish snuffboxes, including ones or-
namented with miniature portraits that were painted onto vel-
lum and then ivory with watercolors. Many gentlemen turned 
to collecting snuffboxes as a hobby, as well as a means through 
which to perform class and gender identity. Both Lord Byron 
and Beau Brummel were known for their extensive snuffbox 
collections and the Earl of Harrington was rumored to possess 
enough snuffboxes for every day of the year, with specific boxes 
designated for morning, afternoon, and evening use (Hughes 
17). Portrait subjects included famous individuals, loved ones, 
and even family pets — treasured subjects that, in the process of 
miniaturization, became cuter and more portable, and therefore 
easier to possess and display. 
The symbiotic relationship between miniaturization, cuti-
fication, and commodification becomes immediately apparent 
when looking at the Folger snuffboxes of Master Betty (Harmon 
133–34; Stewart 37–69). These snuffboxes vary in size and de-
sign, and their miniature portraits provide different glimpses 
of the boy actor, offering evidence of the number of men who 
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made up Betty’s fan base.12 Some highlight Betty’s attractive 
facial features and curly mane of hair, while others show him 
in character. Interestingly, the thick lace ruff on Betty’s shirt in 
figure 7 connotes softness and delicacy; the lace leads the eye 
where we might expect to see some décolletage if Betty had been 
a woman. By contrast, the snuffbox in figure 8 places less em-
phasis on the child’s physical features (though the artist depicts 
a very active body) than on his skill and talent as an actor. An-
other pair of finely detailed snuffboxes represents Betty in the 
role of Romeo (a lover) and Douglas (a warrior) (figs. 1 and 2). 
Their similar designs indicate that they may have been part of a 
set produced to appeal to fans’ collecting instincts. In some cas-
es, the snuffbox illustrations are reproductions of frontispieces 
or other artists’ portraits of the actor, a practice not uncommon 
at the time.13 
As objects of devotion and affiliation, these snuffboxes of-
fer insight into the collectors’ desires, their intimate, embodied 
relationship — imagined or otherwise — with the “Young Ro-
scius,” and their distinct performances of masculinity. Size is an 
important factor in this: as small, transportable objects, snuff-
boxes were typically “carried in the left hand waistcoat pocket 
from which [they were] withdrawn with the right hand and 
passed to the left hand” (Hughes 16). In other words, a snuffbox 
was an everyday accessory for most gentlemen, a crucial part 
of the wardrobe. Held in the hands or worn in the waistcoat 
pocket, it was concealed between the outside world and the 
snuff user’s body. In this respect, the snuffbox invited a form of 
“pocket intimacy” between the male user, the snuffbox, and the 
cute, miniaturized body represented on its cover (Allison 45), 
a distinctly masculine form of intimacy amplified by the snuff 
taker’s habitual touching and opening of the box. This intima-
cy took on a public dimension whenever the male owner took 
12 Some boxes in the Folger collection may have been used for other purposes, 
such as holding jewelry or other small tokens. Women did consume snuff, 
but the practice was typically gendered male.
13 Compare the illustration on the snuffbox in figure 8 with the frontispiece to 
Authentic Memoirs of the Young Roscius.
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snuff in public, as many did at coffeehouses and theaters. Amid 
the noisy clatter of opening and closing lids, the flash of a box 
lid identified the snuff taker as a Betty fan and alluded to other, 
unarticulated queer desires. 
But more than this, the snuffbox carried material (snuff) 
that its owner ingested into the body through the nasal passage-
ways — an action, following Levinas, of consuming or “trans-
muting” the other into the self (111). One can imagine, then, a 
tangled web of erotic associations that male theatergoers may 
have felt as they paused for a pinch of snuff (meeting a need), 
glanced at a miniaturized image of Betty on the snuffbox lid 
(stoking desire), and then looked up from their snuff-taking to 
watch the child actor playing miniaturized heroes onstage (con-
suming without satiation). By this I’m not suggesting that taking 
snuff was an inherently sexual act or that it prompted same-sex 
desire. Nevertheless, one can imagine that there was something 
decidedly queer about the sensual combination of the cute boy, 
Figure 7. Box with Master William Henry West Betty as “Young Ros-
cius”, mauve base. Courtesy: Folger Shakespeare Library. Figure 8. Box 




the cute snuffbox, and the delicious rush that apparently fol-
lowed the act of taking snuff. Through the act of ingesting snuff, 
audiences consumed cuteness and breathed the other into their 
bodies. 
This reading of Betty’s cuteness complicates Merish’s obser-
vations about the “erotics of maternal longing” and the way that 
“[c]uteness performs the de-sexualization of the child’s body, 
redefining that body from an object of lust (either sexual or eco-
nomic) to an object of ‘disinterested’ affection” (188). Far from 
desexualizing Betty, the miniature snuffbox and the material it 
held accentuated the boy’s cuteness and his erotic appeal, releas-
ing a form of sociality that was anything but disinterested or 
maternal. Rather, the sociality freed through the consumption 
of cute objects and the cute child was closely bound up with 
public performances of masculinity and male consumption.
My interpretation of the complex, queer, and sensual — if not 
sexual — dynamic between Betty and his male fans is support-
ed by accounts of the number of men who attended the young 
boy’s performances and swarmed the pits to get close to him.14 
At Betty’s first appearance at Covent Garden, for example, the 
crush in the pits was so intense and the air so stale that several 
men passed out and had to be lifted to the boxes to safety. “We 
have not heard of any fatal accident,” commented the Morning 
Herald, “but the fainting, bruises, and minor contingencies are 
beyond all enumeration (“Theatre” 72). This account challenges 
assumptions about the link between cuteness and benevolent 
care, demonstrating how the sociality released by cuteness can 
also provoke violent, self-destructive acts. Theatergoers’ desire 
to gain access to Betty and inhale the air around him resulted in 
physical injury and fainting. No softness and cuddles here, but 
bumps, bruises, and enumerable aches.
14 Early nineteenth-century British audiences were quite diverse with respect 
to class and gender. The feminization of theater audiences that Merish and 
others describe was a later development.
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Conclusion
Despite all the hype that surrounded his first performances, 
Master Betty’s career was short-lived. Audience desire for the 
child prodigy, while intense for a season, waned the following 
year as the limitations of his vocal and physical range became 
apparent. After performing for several more seasons, Betty 
officially retired in 1808 at the age of seventeen (Kahan 129).15 
Nevertheless, something of Betty and his cuteness lives on in 
the many Betty commodities that reside in archives today. These 
pamphlets, caricatures, paper dolls, cups, and snuffboxes con-
tinue to “mak[e] surprisingly powerful demands” on those who 
encounter them (Ngai 64). “Touch me, hold me, want me,” they 
seem to say. And the willing historian yields: the cute is irresist-
ible.
15 Betty attempted to return to the stage in 1812, 1815, and 1818, but he would 
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Embracing the Gremlin:  
Judas Iscariot and the  
(Anti-)Cuteness of Despair
Mariah Junglan Min
Nakamura Hikaru’s manga Saint Young Men (SYM; 聖☆おにい
さん) is a slice-of-life comedy that has just entered its eleventh 
year of serialization. Word is that there are no future plans for an 
official English translation, due to the volatile religious climate 
in the US (Thompson); this is sad news for anyone who might 
enjoy seeing the Apostles Peter and Andrew show up at Jesus’s 
door for an annual Easter prank, wearing bald caps and kasaya 
robes and informing him that they’ve decided to convert to Bud-
dhism (Nakamura 5:101). The previous sentence might sound at 
first like a bewildering combination of words, but the situation 
makes reasonable sense within the context of the series, which 
takes as its premise that Jesus and Buddha are roommates on 
a long-overdue vacation in modern-day Japan. A rotating cast 
of characters from both religions (as well as from the Greco-
Roman and Norse pantheons) makes guest appearances in their 
daily low-key adventures, and Judas Iscariot formally joins the 
list as well in the same Easter prank chapter.
Drawing from SYM and medieval literary output, I examine 
the figure of Judas in his medieval and modern incarnations, 
specifically as he relates to the concept of cuteness. Working pri-
marily with the theorizations of Sianne Ngai and Daniel Harris 
as basis, I suggest that a theological understanding of cuteness 
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can be applied to medieval representations of Judas. This defini-
tion of cuteness engages with the darker valences of cuteness in 
its modern guises as identified by Ngai and Harris: a failure to 
attain perfection that is paradoxically appreciated for its short-
comings, and a subjugation that results from power imbalances 
between the object and the viewer. I then explore how these op-
erations remain current in the secularized world of SYM, how 
they have been transformed, and how the capacity of art to elicit 
empathy joins the medieval and the modern across time, espe-
cially when Judas is viewed through the theorizations of whole-
ness that disability studies offers.
Cute for the Middle Ages
Nearly two decades after De Pulchra et Apto — his lost Mani-
chean work on “the beautiful and the fitting” — Augustine re-
lates his evolved position on beauty in these terms: “The eyes 
delight in beautiful shapes of different sorts and bright and at-
tractive colours. I would not have these things take possession 
of my soul. Let God possess it, he who made them all. He made 
them all very good, but it is he who is my Good, not they” (239). 
From the Neoplatonism of Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius to 
the Aristotelian scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas, the medi-
eval conception of beauty varied in its details from thinker to 
thinker; nonetheless, it retained a moral and theological core 
that extolled God as the ultimate source and manifestation of 
beauty.1 To be beautiful was to be good, and to be good was to 
be the image of God.
In contrast, Ngai theorizes cuteness as an example of an 
aesthetic category that is “fundamentally non-theological, un-
able to foster religious awe and uncoupling the experience of 
art from the discourse of spiritual transcendence” (22), as op-
posed to the sublime. Unlike cuteness, sublimity was a notion 
current to the Middle Ages, closely related to the attributes of 




God. Augustine links the force and effectiveness of the sublime 
style to its “source in divinity” (Jaeger 159), and Cistercian doc-
trine ties the sublime to divine grace in particular. “Grace is, in 
a certain sense, something sublime and grandiose, because it is 
the manifestation of divine grace: It is the sensible transpiring 
of the beautiful soul and of the divine image, and ultimately, of 
God himself ” (Monti 28). Ngai’s point that the sublime is inher-
ently theological is, therefore, well borne out in medieval usage. 
However, I would like to suggest that when we move metonymi-
cally through the chain of associations between the beautiful, 
the sublime, and the divine, it is possible to develop a concept 
of the cute that is not categorically alien to theology but rather 
lies within it. That is, we can begin to trace the outline of a medi-
eval cuteness that permits itself to be talked about in theological 
terms. 
It is tricky business to pinpoint what physical features might 
be associated with cuteness, medieval or modern. Ngai calls 
cuteness “an exact cross between the dainty and dumpy” (53). 
Daniel Harris writes that “[c]uteness […] is closely linked to 
the grotesque, the malformed” (3), which seems unobjection-
able enough at first glance; but it is difficult to square this with 
his ensuing description of The Simpsons as a type of the anti-
cute, “a direct subversion of the insipidity of cuteness, with its 
cartoon characters’ harshly contoured shapes, gaping, lipless 
mouths, and enormous boiled-egg eyes” (19). If “[t]he aesthetic 
of cuteness creates a class of outcasts and mutations” (Harris 4) 
to begin with, then the physical disparity between the cute and 
the anti-cute cannot be significant enough to demand their se-
clusion into mutually exclusive categories. The lines are blurred 
even further when we observe the ubiquity of the same set of 
supposedly anti-cute characters in merchandising directly de-
signed to appeal to consumers through cuteness, from Funko 
Pop! figures to Band-Aids to Marge Simpson’s face and blue bee-
hive on a line of products released by MAC Cosmetics. 
What specific features any individual identifies as cute may 
ultimately be a case of variable mileage, but on the whole, cute-
ness is understood as something carefully quarantined away 
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from beauty. Cuteness is the verdict we resort to when we find 
ourselves unable to quite call something beautiful, the province 
of things that have failed to be beautiful — things that have come 
to lack “fairness, symmetry, or proportion” (Ngai 54) — in one 
way or another. At the same time, this failure still holds value 
because the cute is always already valued. Ngai stresses that the 
emotions elicited by cuteness are “mixed or equivocal feelings” 
(236); backhanded as the compliment may at times be, it is a 
compliment nonetheless. This is the first facet of cuteness that I 
want to keep in mind when developing a medieval notion of the 
cute. Cuteness is an odd and awkward aesthetic category, popu-
lated by things that we so often define and appreciate according 
to how they diverge from the perfection of beauty. 
The second facet is “the asymmetry of power on which cute-
ness depends” (Ngai 11). Harris and Ngai are keenly attuned to 
the power relations constructed between the object of cuteness 
and its beholder, with Harris describing the cuteness of child-
like things as “exaggerating the vast discrepancies of power be-
tween the sturdy adult and the enfeebled and susceptible child” 
(11), and Ngai interpreting cuteness as a concept to be “explicitly 
about the appeal of powerlessness as opposed to power” (58). 
When these first and second facets are taken in conjunction, 
they begin to highlight how cuteness is formulated by the twin 
processes of appreciation and subjugation. Cuteness is the realm 
of imperfect things that lack power over the beholder, things 
the beholder imperiously judges to be imperfect and yet holds 
close to themselves, things to whom we say, like a stern aunt in 
a Regency novel: You are not beautiful, but you have a certain 
charm about you.
In retroactively projecting cuteness onto the Middle Ages, my 
aim is not to argue that there was a medieval notion of cuteness 
per se that predates the term, nor that Judas Iscariot would have 
been readily designated as a site for cuteness by any medieval 
theologian. In addition, at least in the medieval leg of this paper, 
it matters little whether Judas is verifiably cute like a small baby 
animal or a bright-eyed cartoon mascot; medieval theorizations 
of beauty are more concerned with its broad moral dimensions 
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than with what specific characteristics make something beauti-
ful, and as we have seen above, it is nearly impossible to codify 
the physical qualities of cuteness. Rather, the medieval defini-
tion of cuteness I wish to develop draws from the darker va-
lences of cuteness as a concept-at-large, the recesses in which 
lurk failure and powerlessness.
Judas Iscariot as a Medieval Limit Case
Since the medieval notion of the aesthetic can be comprehended 
in theological terms through the figure of God, what then is the 
corresponding space in which cuteness might reside? How do 
we fill in the following blank in this analogy?
BEAUTIFUL : DIVINE GOODNESS :: CUTE : ________
What would it mean for something, or someone, to be recog-
nized as located far from the divine, to be defined for the distance 
of their remove from the divine, and yet for that shortcoming to 
hold some value? How might someone’s moral failures be the 
very thing that renders them meaningful? Enter the medieval 
Judas.
In his extensive study of the motif, Paull Franklin Baum des-
ignates as “the mediæval legend of Judas Iscariot” (571) a phe-
nomenon found throughout texts produced in late medieval 
Europe. In these works — dramatic scripts, hagiographies in 
prose and poetry, in Latin and the vernacular — Judas is given a 
sordid backstory that reads in part like a direct copy of the story 
of Oedipus.2 According to the legend, Ciborea, wife of Reuben, 
is pregnant with a child who (as is told to her in a prophetic 
dream) will cause the ruin of the Jewish people. The couple sets 
the infant adrift on the sea in a basket. He washes ashore on the 
coastline of Scarioth (hence Iscariot), where he is discovered by 
its childless queen. Trouble begins to brew when the queen gives 
birth to a son, as Judas resents his adoptive younger brother, 
2 Whether it is a linear descendant of the Oedipus myth or simply the result 
of homoplasy is debatable. For a defense of the latter possibility, see Ed-
munds.
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torments him endlessly, and finally murders him. Having fled 
to Jerusalem to escape punishment, he joins the court of Pilate 
and becomes his trusted right-hand man. One day, Pilate comes 
across a garden with magnificent apple trees and is consumed 
with desire for the fruit. In the course of breaking, entering, and 
stealing, Judas kills the owner of the garden and eventually mar-
ries his widow. When she relates all the hardships she has suf-
fered in her life, Judas realizes that he is the baby she relegated to 
the sea, and that he has killed his father and married his mother. 
In an attempt to right his wrongs as best as he can, he seeks 
out Jesus and becomes a member of the inner apostolic circle. 
However, he does not last long in this position before he lapses 
back into his old reprehensible ways, betraying Christ for thirty 
pieces of silver and hanging himself when he is overcome with 
regret.
The Oedipal addition to what is already a miserable character 
arc in its biblical form has the effect of doubling and thus em-
phasizing several salient features present in the story of Judas. 
Lee Patterson sees despair as the most important link between 
Judas and Oedipus: “As the son is called back to the mother, 
so is Judas called back to his original nature; and the paternal 
injunction of penance — ‘you can be saved if you will worthily 
repent’ — must be rejected both now and forever. Despair is, af-
ter all, the inability to repent — the inability, that is, to change” 
(414). The recursive cycle of sin and suffering, as embodied by 
Oedipus in particular and by the Thebes of the Thebaid in gen-
eral, is understood here to be playing out — in the form of a sex-
ual drama — the same compulsion towards stagnancy that leads 
Judas to suicide. There are other possible ways of knitting Judas 
and Oedipus together,3 and of these, I want to turn our attention 
to what Baum calls “a wish to show that no matter how great the 
sin, true repentance brings full pardon” (483).
3 For instance, one of the primary horrors of the myth of Oedipus is the ac-
cidental nature of his crimes. What are the repercussions that a severing of 
sinner and sin might have on the exegetical role of Judas? If God in his om-
niscience and unassailable authority allows a thing to happen, how much 
responsibility does an involved individual bear for the outcome?
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By supplying Judas’s life before his apostolic career with a se-
ries of appalling crimes spanning the gamut from fratricide to 
thievery to patricide to incest, the Oedipal backstory represents 
him as a man whose sins are more numerous, and perhaps more 
visceral, than the betrayal for which he is so infamous. But me-
dieval exegetical tradition is surprisingly lenient towards Judas’s 
betrayal of Christ; the unforgiveable sin that damns him to hell 
is not the selling of the Messiah but despair. Judas is wrong to 
assume that divine mercy would never be able to absolve him 
for the betrayal, and his choice to deny the efficacy of penance 
and the possibility of grace is the most sinful act of all.4 Compar-
ing the accounts of Judas’s death in Jacobus de Voragine’s Latin 
Legenda and William Caxton’s English translation makes this 
soteriological assertion visible on the narrative level. According 
to the Legenda: 
However, he was sorry for what he had done, threw back 
the money, and hanged himself in a halter, and, as the gos-
pel tells us, “burst asunder in the middle and all his bowels 
gushed out.” […] It also was fitting that the bowels which had 
conceived the betrayal should burst and spill out, and that 
the throat from which had emerged the voice of the traitor 
should be strangled by a rope. (de Voragine 168)
In contrast, the corresponding section in Caxton’s translation 
reads: “and nevertheless at the last he brought them again to the 
temple, and after hung himself in despair, and his body opened 
and cleft asunder and his bowels fell out” (Caxton). There is no 
mention in the English of Judas’s treacherous bowels and throat. 
Caxton’s Englishing of the Judas legend takes conscious care to 
highlight despair, even at the cost of eliminating outright refer-
ences to betrayal at this crucial final moment.5
4 See also Snyder.
5 A textual case countering this majority trend would be the South English 
Legendary, which holds an extremely punitive view of justice and lists all 
of Judas’s sins — thievery, murder, suicide — as rightful reasons he deserves 
death by hanging.
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Heaping a host of additional sins on top of what Judas is held 
accountable for in scripture prods at the outer boundaries of the 
doctrine that repentance will make up for virtually any sin. If 
a traitor like Judas could be redeemed through divine mercy, 
would the same hold true when he is also guilty of several mur-
ders and incest to boot? When is the grace of God incapable of 
reaching someone? Within this theological framework, at least, 
the correct answer is never. The atonement of the eponymous 
protagonist in the morality play Mankind can be read as an al-
ternate history in which the what-if scenario of Judas’s repent-
ance is explored. Ashamed of the prodigal life he has led, Man-
kind seeks to hang himself from a tree rather than face Mercy 
again. “I am not worthy to have mercy be no possibilite […] The 
egall justyse of God wyll not permytte sych a synfull wrech / To 
be revyvyd and restoryd ageyn; that were impossibyll” (822–32), 
he says. Mercy replies, “Aryse and aske mercy, Mankend, and 
be associat to me […] Thy obstinacy wyll exclude the[e] fro the 
glorius perpetuité” (827–29), the final line a dire warning against 
the one unforgiveable sin. The medieval Judas is a kind of limit 
case for salvation, in that he holds theological value because 
he — as someone who is identified primarily as a sinner, dou-
bly so in the Oedipal legends — helps explicate the extent of the 
sweeping embrace of divine grace. Even sins like Judas’s do not 
lie beyond God’s capacity to forgive. Judas’s sinfulness can be 
read as a form of theological cuteness because his sins — much 
like qualities associated with cuteness, such as deformity or ex-
aggeration — are considered valuable at the same time that they 
are recognized as a failure to be perfect, divine, or beautiful.
On the other hand, despite all this talk of the possibility of 
recuperating him, Judas never attains salvation.6 He slips into 
despair, hangs himself, and is consequently damned. In Ar-
noul Gréban’s Le mystère de la passion, Judas is carried off to 
hell by Despair herself to be swallowed whole by Lucifer, then 
gnawed by a horde of swamp serpents for all eternity (Gréban 
22025–134). It is curiously apposite that out of all the sins in the 
6 Except in a lost sermon of St. Vincent Ferrer. See Daileader 29.
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world, despair is the one that brings him to this point. Despair, 
at heart, is a mistrust and denial of the salvific power of God. 
Judas’s resorting to despair is his refusal to acknowledge God’s 
sovereignty and to shy away from the long arm of the divine. It’s 
worth asking the question again: when is the grace of God in-
capable of reaching someone? Never — unless, that is, the man 
willingly withdraws himself from God’s grasp. By rejecting the 
offer of salvation, Judas stages his own form of rebellion against 
divine might, effectively asserting that he is not subject to this 
hierarchy of power.
Or he would, if only such a thing were feasible at all. As it 
stands, Judas exists within the Christian context of medieval 
cultural output, and his gestures prove to be ultimately ineffec-
tual. When the entire sequence of the Passion and Crucifixion 
is understood as part of the divine plan, the betrayal is noth-
ing that God did not anticipate or engineer, which prevents it 
from becoming a successful act of defiance. Even when Judas 
seems to make choices of his own — as Irina Dumitrescu argues 
is the case in the Middle English ballad “Judas” — he is beset by 
external obstacles and internal weaknesses, unwillingly forced 
to sell Christ as a consequence of his own sexual susceptibility 
to a quick-fingered lover. This is hardly the picture of a master 
insurgent. In the end, Judas remains thoroughly subject to the 
rules of the game set out by divine authority. Cuteness may val-
orize a certain deviation from perfection, but it also requires 
that the object be placed in a position of powerlessness. The sort 
of deviation that carries the danger of overturning this hierar-
chy — established between Judas and God, and by virtue of the 
approval of orthodoxy, between Judas and the medieval audi-
ence — is strictly forbidden, or rather, functionally impossible. 
As someone who occupies a niche consonant to cuteness in me-
dieval theology, Judas is unable to cut himself free from the con-
straints of the role. If “adorable things are often most adorable in 
the middle of a pratfall or a blunder” (Harris 6), admittedly the 
man whose whole life is one long mistake (as in Matthew 26:24, 
“It had been better for him if he had not been born.”) seems to 
have been crafted for the part.
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But that life ends with Judas suspended between heaven and 
earth, his intestines tumbling from the broken ruin of his body. 
As mentioned earlier, the physical properties of the anti-cute as 
set out by Harris are often coterminous with those of the cute; 
however, only the anti-cute seems to be capable of evoking feel-
ings of disgust, caused by the witnessing of ruptured bodies. 
Harris writes of the anti-cute Gremlins (in pointed contrast to 
Gizmo, who is pronounced cute): “[they] are constantly being 
squished and disemboweled, their entrails spilling out into the 
open” (20). In addition to the power to disgust, the anti-cute 
also possesses violent intent, often housed in the form of a “cor-
rupt, possessed, even satanic” child (17). And as the Oedipal tra-
dition has it, years before his entrails spilled out into the open, 
Judas was spending his childhood on Scarioth beating his adop-
tive brother to death. Even as he functions as the model for a 
theological understanding of cuteness, elements of the anti-cute 
flicker like a shadow across the figure of Judas. To the last, while 
unable to destroy the structures that contain him, Judas makes 
the borders of those structures strain under the effort it takes to 
keep him subsumed — a limit case for salvation, and in his past 
and future roles as demon-child and ruptured body, a limit case 
for cuteness as well.
The Melancholy of Judas Iscariot
In the Easter prank chapter of Saint Young Men, Peter and An-
drew lead Jesus to believe that they’ve accidentally made Judas 
wait outside in the cold for hours on account of having forgot-
ten he was there. “No… Never mind me… I’m sorry that I’m 
Judas…” he trails off when they open the door. “Haha… It’s ac-
tually better that I stayed out of it. If someone like me were to 
be around on a good day like this… Since I wasn’t even there for 
the surprise resurrection show… Ah, but still. When Jesus said, 
‘It had been better if he (Judas) had not been born,’ it did give 
me that sinking feeling” (Nakamura 5:108). After a panel of si-
lence, the three disciples enthusiastically reveal that this morose 
entrance by Judas was also part of the prank. “But how much 
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of this just now was a prank, exactly?” Jesus asks in equal parts 
relief and consternation (108).
Harris writes of cuteness that “pity is the primary emotion of 
this seductive and manipulative aesthetic that arouses our sym-
pathies” (4), and specifies that products intended to be cute pro-
ject “an aura of motherlessness, ostracism, and melancholy […] 
[Cuteness] aestheticizes unhappiness” (5). Along similar lines, 
Ngai describes the cute object in terms of “helplessness, piti-
fulness, and even despondency” (65). SYM’s Judas is introduced 
to the reader as a pitiful loner with a hesitant speech pattern 
and a peek-a-bangs haircut (“Peek-a-Bangs”), whose dialogue 
primarily consists of berating himself for his former betrayal 
of Christ: “Of course I should eat on the floor, since I’m Judas” 
(Nakamura 5:109); “Strike me down […] I deserve to be cut in 
half ” (9:14); and, while expertly tying a hangman’s noose, “I’m 
quite used to getting rid of myself ” (15). His despair is played for 
both laughs and sympathy, intended to draw from the reader a 
reaction akin to the desperate compassion that Jesus displays in 
response to Judas’s offer to eat on the floor: “Sit at my right hand, 
Judas!!” (5:109). Instead of being the unforgiveable cardinal sin, 
despair has now become a toothless source of cuteness.7
In the secular world order of contemporary manga, even Ju-
das’s attempt to venture outside of cuteness is figured in radi-
cally different terms. “Let us be grateful for the miracle of an-
other day of life spent with friends!” (11:3) he shouts at Peter and 
Andrew by way of greeting when they show up to work at the 
pearly gates one day, alarming them with his newfound enthu-
siasm. He has embarked on a path of affirmation and positiv-
ity, adorning his desk with hand-painted postcards emblazoned 
with motivational quotes and attending lectures by lifestyle 
7 One caveat is that sym’s popularity has been driven primarily by the inher-
ent cuteness of Jesus the character, portrayed as a wide-eyed blogger who 
is fascinated by Japanese culture and fancies himself a Johnny Depp look-
alike. This requires exploring a vastly different notion of cuteness that elimi-
nates much of the darker valences that Ngai and Harris point out. There are 
alternate manifestations of cuteness that do not involve the denigration of 
the object.
148
the retro-futurism of cuteness
coaches. “How does it look to you? Is this dangerously verging 
on religious conversion?” (5) Peter asks Andrew, staring at Ju-
das’s shelf full of self-help books. Judas pins his bangs out of his 
face and goes shopping for new clothes, trying to define himself 
as a faithful and repentant follower of Christ with a completely 
transformed attitude. 
By the end of the chapter, Judas is paying Jesus a visit to share 
his bright outlook on life. “With this new mindset… I won’t let 
‘Judas’ remain the byword for betrayal,” he vows. “And until 
13 becomes a lucky number… until yellow becomes a popular 
color… until this Judas cross [in the shape of a noose] adorns 
churches all across the world, I will keep visiting the earthly 
realm!” (13). But just as he is in the middle of pledging on his 
knees that he will never make the same mistake again, Jesus cuts 
him off in a burst of eager agape: “You sold me for thirty pieces 
of silver, so sell me again for thirty coins… or thirty pieces of 
gold… no, even gift certificates or smart cards are fine… No 
matter how many times you betray me, I’ll forgive you…! I’m 
fine with you selling me over and over again!” (14). With the 
wind abruptly taken out of his sails at the implication that Jesus 
neither wishes for him to change nor believes that he can, Judas 
lets his hair fall back into his face even heavier than before, mut-
tering, “Once a traitor…”
Despair may have a different function within the SYM uni-
verse, but the discrepancy in power that pigeonholed Judas into 
the niche of the theologically “cute” and bound him there is still 
as active and dominant as ever. Cuteness, even when secular-
ized into its aesthetic dimensions, retains the same interplay of 
appreciation and subjugation that was present in the medieval 
configuring of Judas as a limit case for salvation. There may be 
something quite insidious lurking beneath the surface of Jesus’s 
unconditional acceptance at the prospect of being exchanged 
for a sheaf of gift cards. Once again, divinity takes control of 
the narrative; the defiance of betrayal is rendered insignificant if 
the betrayal has been unequivocally sanctioned by the party to 
be betrayed. Jesus gently returns Judas to his accustomed place 
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as the aestheticized embodiment of despair, and Judas has no 
choice but to play his role.8 
The operations at work in appreciating and subjugating Judas 
thus mirror each other in their medieval and modern incarna-
tions, but the affective surge of protectiveness or fondness a read-
er is meant to feel for SYM’s Judas appears to be a different beast 
from the slightly begrudging theological acceptance of Judas in 
medieval output. Or is it? Are there medieval texts that cast Ju-
das as a target of compassion rather than acknowledgement, that 
encourage the reader to weep for him instead of theorizing how 
the extent of his sins necessitates radical reaches of divine mercy? 
Can we be moved for Judas as a person through our encounters 
with medieval texts, and not merely moved by the mystery of sal-
vation? The field of disability studies, I believe, offers a valuable 
framework with which to approach this question.
Tobin Siebers writes that aesthetic representation has al-
ways been influenced by a distinct lack of “harmony, integrity, 
and beauty” (64), that “beauty always maintains an underlying 
sense of disability” (65). Because medieval theorizations of the 
aesthetic were inclined to conceive of beauty in terms of reli-
gious morality, deviations from perfection were more readily 
considered necessary evils rather than the sine qua non of the 
larger picture of all creation. But in the Suspencio Iude, a conten-
tious pageant appended in a later hand to the Towneley Plays, 
the literary creates a space for readers to develop an empathetic 
response to imperfection instead, encouraging a radical identi-
fication with those who diverge from wholeness.9 With its first-
person speaking voice (Judas) and its theme of lamentation (for 
8 Regarding the influence of manga-as-genre on the inertness required of 
Judas: Judas’s character type is closer to moé (萌え) rather than straightfor-
wardly cute, and the inherent “itself-ness” that drives moé is what makes his 
transformation away from it all the more undesirable. The Japanese moé is 
a rough analogue to Roland Barthes’s punctum — something intensely per-
sonal, irregular, and painfully affecting in its itself-ness — but applicable to 
the physical and personality traits of fictional characters.
9 On the question of whether the Suspencio Iude is a dramatic text at all, see 
Stevens and Cawley 14; Meredith; and Epp. 
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his Oedipal and Christian sins), the Suspencio most resembles 
the planctus in its form; this was a genre performed out loud as 
part of church ritual, which possesses emotive and perspective-
taking qualities that render it performative in nature. When en-
countering the Suspencio on the page, the reader is meant to 
take on the role of Judas in his grief.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, in describing the activist Har-
riet McBryde Johnson, admiringly calls her “charismatic rather 
than cute, ironic rather than pathetic, self-assured rather than 
suffering” (193). Underlying Garland-Thomson’s rhetorical 
move to explicitly distance Johnson from the adjective cute are 
the darker valences of cuteness explored in this essay; to de-
scribe Johnson as cute would be to call her flawed, and to sub-
jugate her to the judgmental gaze of the beholder. On the other 
hand, Judas in the Suspencio is absolutely pathetic, vocal about 
his suffering, and — after our fashion — a certain kind of cute. 
The reader is never given the possibility of identifying with him 
in the same affirmative way that Johnson’s gawkers are invited to 
identify with her “full humanity” (192), since this Judas is por-
trayed as a broken figure with a noose around his neck, murder 
in his past and disembowelment in his near future, someone 
more Gremlin than human.
Instead, the vector of empathy flows in the reverse direction 
in the case of the Suspencio, and readers find themselves iden-
tifying with Judas’s brokenness. The specificity of Judas Iscariot 
as a character involved in the narrative of the Passion is only 
heightened by providing him with a detailed Oedipal past, and 
his sins become more distinct as his story accumulates elabora-
tions, as his silhouette acquires a defined outline different from 
that of the reader or audience member. After all, very few of us 
can claim to have been thrown into the ocean in response to the 
prophetic dreams of our parents. But when the specifics of Ju-
das’s story have been discarded, what is left for us to empathize 
with is only his despair. All we can do is mourn with his mourn-
ing. What we recognize in him is not that he is as whole as we 
are, but that we are as broken as he is; this is the compassion that 
makes it possible, five centuries later, for a character like SYM’s 
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Judas to be let in from the cold. When we take on Judas’s voice 
in the Suspencio, we see ourselves bound to him in the sin of 
despair, every one of us a Gremlin.
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Cute, Charming, Dangerous: 
Child Avatars in Second Life
Alicia Corts
What should a society do when a child’s performance isn’t that of 
a child? In the physical world, society rarely faces that question, 
needing only to reconcile the difference between performance 
and appearance when faced with a situation such as a celebrity 
who has undergone plastic surgery or a child who suffers from 
progeria. A person’s appearance quickly establishes their age be-
cause the image of the body acts as a symbol of temporal status 
in the presentation of self, allowing others to define appropriate-
ness in future interactions (Goffman 4–5). The child’s biological 
body signals others to interact with him or her in ways that are 
appropriate to his or her developmental level. As the child grows 
taller and more mature with time, the temporal signs he or she 
displays change and signal to society that the child is ready for 
different levels of interaction. Society, in other words, uses the 
symbol of the temporal body as a way of binding a child to a 
specific set of acceptable performances. The focus of this chap-
ter is a world in which the body is no longer held by the tem-
porality of biology, making what appears to be a child’s perfor-
mance unstable. Virtual worlds mask the biological body of the 
user behind the digital body of the avatar. While an avatar might 
look like a child, the user behind the screen is a verified adult, 
creating temporal dissonance. Using Brian Massumi’s notion of 
the positional grid and Pierre Bourdieu’s definition of habitus, I 
want to investigate how this temporal dissonance played out in 
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the early days of one particular virtual world, Second Life, and 
how that particular virtual society utilized cuteness to regulate 
performance.
Established in 2003, Second Life is a persistent virtual world, 
an environment “implemented by a computer (or network of 
computers) that simulates an environment” in a way that allows 
users to share information within a persistent space (Bartle 1). 
This world looks like a video game, but there are no game rules 
and no overarching narrative. The computer user isn’t a player, 
but a resident of a world where he or she builds a life, a “second 
life,” of his or her choosing. Users in the physical world craft 
a highly detailed digital body called an avatar. By performing 
through that avatar, the user grows into a resident of the world 
who understands how society functions in its virtual space. 
Millions of people have created an avatar in Second Life, and 




several thousand residents are online at any given moment. 
Residents have complete control over the environment and 
their own performances, and users are free to craft lives inside 
the virtual space that explore a variety of identities denied to 
them in the physical world. The choices residents make inside 
the virtual world can bleed over to the physical world; Nick Yee 
and Jeremy Bailenson suggest that even small decisions such as 
changing an avatar’s hair color can make a difference in a user’s 
behavior both on- and offline (272–74). Rather than being sepa-
rate, the virtual and the physical intertwine to alter behaviors in 
both worlds, challenging while also reifying social norms car-
ried into the virtual performance space from the physical world. 
Residents make choices within Second Life based both on the 
habitus of that virtual world as well as the carried-over social 
norms of the physical world.
While there is an interdependence of the physical and virtual 
worlds, some differences in the technical aspects of the Second 
Life platform allow for specific freedoms that are impossible in 
the physical world. Since the user can leave behind the restraints 
of his or her biological body, for example, his or her avatar can 
reflect a desired identity that transcends the temporal signs of 
his or her biology in the physical world, such as age and physical 
limitation. Child avatars represent one type of identity that was 
much discussed in the pioneering days of Second Life. Every 
Second Life user has the ability to craft her avatar’s look within 
the program, from the shape of her nose, to the length of her 
torso, to how fat the avatar will appear. Second Life requires 
age verification for all users, and the programmers behind the 
world designed the basic avatar shape to give the impression of 
an adult body. Given the user’s ability to manipulate this body, 
however, some residents played with the avatar configuration 
menu to present a far more childlike look. With the addition 
of children’s clothing, these residents began calling themselves 
child or kiddie avatars. “Steller Sunshine,” the world’s very first 
resident, started the first group for “big kids that just refuse to 
grow up. =0)” in early 2003. Today, these child avatars perform 
carefully orchestrated, static behaviors that society designates as 
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cute, carefully avoiding the temporal dissonance caused by an 
adult user appearing as a child avatar. Virtual society mitigates 
the danger of the adult user by carefully regulating the child’s 
behavior in terms of something akin to aegyo, a common South 
Korean performance style. Koreans perform aegyo as a means 
of confining sexuality with linguistic and nonverbal “charming, 
cute behavior” (Strong 29). Not all cute performances, however, 
necessarily fall under aegyo. Aegyo is “cuteness made visible,” a 
performance that is learned and circulated with the intention of 
codifying specific behaviors, namely how women behave toward 
men (30–31). Rather than simply allowing women to perform 
their attraction to men in any way they choose, aegyo requires 
women to act specifically in accordance with the strictures of 
culturally accepted practice. If a woman wants to indicate an 
attraction to a man, for example, she might extend the vowel 
sound in the last word of each sentence, use a specific hand 
gesture in the shape of a heart as the man approaches, or add 
extra consonants to the end of words (Korean Aegyo: The Seven 
Levels). While some women end up with an extremely child-
like performance, the most acceptable versions of aegyo involve 
naturalized performances that appear “cute and sweet” without 
giving the impression that the performer is trying to attract a 
man (Stawski). By regulating flirtation in terms of cute perfor-
mance, society controls femininity by requiring specific, codi-
fied types of performance that are easily recognizable to other 
members of society. In addition, aegyo reinforces masculinity 
through appearances of helplessness that stand in contrast to 
conventionally manly performances, such as when a man opens 
a door for a woman, helps her into a car, or otherwise performs 
in a way that suggests protection (Manietta 3–7).
Second Life society formed similarly bounded behaviors in 
response to the entrance of child avatars into the virtual perfor-
mance space and to the temporal dissonance that their appear-
ance and behavior caused within it. At first, residents performed 
childhood for short periods, reverting to adult avatars for the 
majority of their activities. The performances were playful and 
were labeled as such by the participants themselves: They made 
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no suggestion that they intended to continue the performances 
in the long term. Residents played with cute behaviors during 
these intervals as short-term, non-permanent behavior that 
used the abilities of the Second Life program to alter the tempo-
ral nature of the avatar but only within the behavioral limits set 
for children in the physical world.
The practice of adult users switching freely to child avatars 
for short periods changed as this virtual world matured and 
grew, and many of these residents gave up their adult alter-egos 
in favor of performing as children full-time. The temporal ava-
tar bodies indicated childhood: talking like children, adding an-
imations to skip around like children, and interacting with adult 
avatars as a child in the physical world might do. Today, these 
behaviors include many of the characteristics of aegyo, such as 
“pounding of feet […] pouting, bloated cheeks, distorted child-
like voice and decontextualized linguistic elements implying 
helplessness or confusion” (Puzar 99). As an example of aegyo 
in Second Life, I offer the story of my excursion to an adoption 
agency where child avatars look for parents to role-play with 
them. One little girl skipped over to me and told me my dress 
was very pretty, and she wanted to be pretty like me one day. She 
then spoke to me through the text-based chat feature of Sec-
ond Life: “I’m Mery! I’m 3! I like PINK! Alls I wears is pink. 
my stuffie am-i-nals are pink and I am da pink princess. *smiles 
brightly*.”1 Despite Mery’s aegyo performance, I was immediate-
ly faced with temporal dissonance. A person with a three-year-
old body, as she presented herself, would not be able to type as 
smoothly and quickly. Her statement would lead one to assume 
either that she was a prodigy who learned to write at the age of 
1 Second Life uses text-based chat as the primary means of communication. 
There is a feature that allows a user to speak and be heard by other residents 
while in the world, but most child avatars avoid using this voice feature 
to keep a consistent performance. Throughout this chapter, I present text 
from Second Life and the Second Life forums as presented by the residents. 
Spelling and grammar are often cast aside in favor of typing faster. In order 
to maintain the performance as it was offered, I do not note errors that ap-
peared in the original text.
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three or that an adult user behind the screen wrote this state-
ment as a declaration of intention: “I am performing as a child.” 
My interaction with Mery was consistent. She performed 
as a child throughout our interaction, adding giggles, pouts, 
and childish antics throughout. Yet despite the performance, I 
know that Mery’s user behind the screen must have been at least 
eighteen years old to be using Second Life, since she would have 
had to be age verified when she signed up for the program. My 
own experience exemplifies temporal dissonance, since I had 
to come to grips with the fact that the sign I saw in front of 
me didn’t match the perceived biology of the person control-
ling the digital body. With this dissonance comes the question: 
What should I expect from such a digital image of a child? A 
child’s behavior? Or will this body act as an adult? These ques-
tions result not just from the virtual performance but from the 
physical world’s social norms: Adults playing at being children 
may be transgressing what the physical world considers correct 
performance. 
Second Life residents wrestled with this temporal disso-
nance, and they looked for ways to define child avatar identity in 
a way that would stabilize the temporality of the performance. 
This virtual society started by designating child avatars as a 
form of role-play, a specific cultural category within the world. 
As residents first arrived in Second Life, they quickly set up 
specific areas with the characteristics of an environment, like a 
Wild West town. Residents occupying that space would clothe 
themselves and behave in roles suited to that environment, such 
as a saloonkeeper or gunslinger. Role-play is still confined to a 
single area in today’s Second Life, like a game, never leaving the 
bounds of that area. Role-players are free to go to other, more 
general areas of the virtual space, but while in those spaces, their 
performance is confined to widely acceptable social behavior. 
Other residents don’t wish to be involved in role-play; they see it 
as impinging on their own Second Life experience. Gunslinging, 
for example, is discouraged in general areas because guns sym-
bolize physical world violence. If a role-player arrived at a dance 
with a gun in a holster, other residents would send him a private 
161
cute, charming, dangerous
message — the equivalent of taking him aside and speaking to 
him privately — to ask him to remove his weapons if he wished 
to remain in the area. If he refused, the owner of the land could 
click a button and transport that role-player away instantly, the 
Second Life equivalent of kicking him out. Guns themselves 
don’t pose a threat to the lives of avatars. No one can kill another 
avatar in Second Life, even by shooting a gun directly at another 
resident. But though there is no way to murder an avatar, guns 
symbolize role-play, and residents in non-role-playing environ-
ments either ban avatars with guns outright or ask offenders 
to remove the weapons. When role-playing avatars enter these 
spaces outside of their designated play areas, the symbols used 
in the role-playing are no longer viewed as part of specific role-
playing, but instead, residents see the symbols as identity-based. 
The gun symbol does not represent danger in the virtual world, 
since the avatar body is immune to weapons. The gun does show 
the propensity of the avatar toward violence, and that identity is 
rejected based on the symbol of the role-play. 
In the same way, child avatars are a form of role-play that 
must be tightly controlled and defined for both the physical 
and virtual worlds, since Second Life residents have decided 
the symbols of child avatar bodies represent dangerous identity 
play. While the initial intent behind them was innocent, some 
residents began exploring new potential with these avatars. 
Age-play involves child avatars going into the adult-rated sexual 
areas of Second Life and participating in sexual situations with 
other avatars while role-playing children. Second Life allows 
residents to create and upload animations, and one of the earli-
est and most popular uses of this ability was and is fashioning 
sexual positions that two avatars could enjoy. Some enterprising 
residents developed animations for sex acts between a child and 
an adult, resulting in the practice of age-play. When the practice 
was uncovered by the physical-world media in 2007, the press 
headlined one example of a child avatar who claimed to be a 
ten-year-old girl offering blowjobs to any adult male avatar in 
her vicinity (Dobson). In that case, both the user portraying the 
child and the one representing the adult would choose to use the 
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animation and watch as the avatars engaged in underage sexual 
play. Even before the media storm that engulfed the practice, 
residents struggled with whether to allow age-play, especially 
since the sexual activity occurred between avatars controlled by 
consenting legal adults. In other words, the temporal symbol of 
the avatar body suggested the interaction was inappropriate and 
caused a visceral reaction of disgust for the physical-world user, 
yet the user’s biological body in the physical world, that of an 
adult, would make the sexual interaction appropriate. As one 
Second Life user stated on a forum post about Linden Lab al-
lowing child avatars:
Can you please just explain to us why or why is Linden Lab 
giving child avatars so many rights over common sense? I 
also still do not understand why any adult would ever want 
to RP as a child in an adult environment. I hate to keep re-
peating myself but why allow them that? Am I the only one 
that finds this sick? Please help us to understand this mad-
ness, Jack. (Vryl Valkyrie)
Getting to the root of how Second Life dealt with this temporal 
dissonance requires digging into the history of the world itself. 
The earliest reference to child avatars and sexual play in the Sec-
ond Life forums, the discussion area outside of the world where 
residents often continue pertinent discussions, occurred in ear-
ly 2006, three years after the opening of the world. Residents 
didn’t immediately associate age-play with deviant behavior. 
In fact, it was first considered a protected form of play within 
the world, and residents who spoke against it found themselves 
facing a backlash of virtual opinion based on an earlier com-
ponent of Second Life society: the belief in each resident’s free-
dom to create. Linden Lab, the company that runs Second Life, 
sent an employee to openly admonish “bella Ophelia,” the first 
user to post about age-play in the forums, for violating Second 
Life’s community standard for personal disputes. The admon-
ishment suggests that the very act of asking if avatars can en-
gage in age-play is an example of intolerance, since bringing 
163
cute, charming, dangerous
up its appropriateness puts those practicing age-play in a nega-
tive light (Linden). Age-play forum posts show, however, that 
the issue became buzzed about by the end of 2006, with most 
residents expressing significant “negative emotional responses” 
over the practice (Adams 56–57). Other residents tried to fight 
that growing societal mistrust by repeating that child avatars are 
consenting adults pretending to be children in sexual situations. 
One such resident, “Taco Rubio,” an active age-play proponent, 
started an entire gallery of age-play pictures in a little-used area 
of the forums to attempt to make it “one of the few places where 
we [don’t] have to deal with constant negativity […] let’s keep it 
that way!” 
Taco Rubio was reacting to the burgeoning habitus surround-
ing age-play in-world. Habitus, in its most basic definition, is a 
system that regulates social norms. In Pierre Bourdieu’s defini-
tion, habitus represents “systems of durable, transposable dispo-
sitions, structured structures, that is, a principle of the generation 
and structuring of practices and representations which can be 
objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the 
product of obedience to rules” (72). Habitus acts as an invisible 
web guiding residents of Second Life through paths of appro-
priate and inappropriate behaviors, masking its own existence 
through the belief that the regulations are “natural.” Despite his 
pushback against habitus, Taco Rubio and others in the age-play 
community felt the constant pressure from the larger Second Life 
society, the result of habitus placing age-play at a lower level of 
taste and class than other activities. After seeing performances of 
age-play and wrestling with the temporal dissonance that child 
avatars presented, society rejected this type of performance, 
deemed it inappropriate, and reacted to child avatars by avoiding 
them and reacting negatively to discussions of age-play in the 
forums. Older residents passed on their disregard for child ava-
tars to newer residents as they arrived, assigning deviant status 
to child avatars through the transmission of habitus, regardless 
of the intentions behind each child avatar’s performance.
While society within Second Life reacted to child avatars 
with specific repercussions, the company behind Second Life 
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was forced to deal with the issues around temporal dissonance 
on a more formal level. Once mass media uncovered the prac-
tice of age-play, Linden Lab was confronted by German and UK 
pornography laws that prohibit images of child sexual behav-
ior from being transmitted via the Internet, even in the form 
of animation. Faced with having the program banned in those 
countries, the company relented on its previous position of al-
lowing the practice and banned age-play completely. The offi-
cial Second Life wiki states that residents may use child avatars 
for fun and play, such as swinging on a playground or going to 
school. But sexual behavior of any kind, including baring the 
“genital or chest regions,” is strictly prohibited and can result 
in a permanent ban (Second Life Wiki Contributors). Without 
the need to confront child avatars engaged in age-play, residents 
ceased their vocal opposition to the practice, but remnants of 
the habitus remain. Residents still view child avatars with suspi-
cion, despite the fact that age-play has nearly disappeared from 
the grid. Even when child avatars are participating in the fun 
and games that Steller Sunshine first proposed, residents con-
sider them deviant and suspicious. These perceptions of devi-
ance rest in the knowledge that behind the temporal sign of the 
child’s body lurks an adult user who is capable of performances 
that step outside the appropriateness of the virtual body they 
present.
Society’s general mistrust of child avatar performance mani-
fests itself in the way these avatars are forced to remain on the 
Second Life mainland. Linden Lab controls the area known as 
the mainland, and all activity there is to be generally acceptable 
to the community, meaning no sexual activity or other behavior 
that is deemed appropriate only for adults. Child avatars cannot 
be banned from this area unless they step outside the written 
rules for their behavior, such as any discussion or overt acts of 
age-play. Owners of private areas off of the mainland are free 
to enact rules that allow for mature or adult behavior, and even 
at benign events like a sailing competition or a fashion show, 
child avatars are instantly banned. No explanation is required. 
Landowners regularly kick out and permanently ban child ava-
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tars simply for their appearance. In 2013, “kiskoshka Resident” 
took to the forum to complain about the treatment he received 
as a child avatar:
I can’t even begin to express the tremendous hurt and frustra-
tion I feel over the discrimination and prejudice against child 
avatars that is absolutely rampant in SL. It happens a dozen 
times a week; I was recently told that a woman wouldn’t sell 
me a prefab house because my child avatar offended her. Just 
today, I was ordered to leave an arcade on a moderate sim. 
The place was abandoned, there was no adult content what-
soever, but the sim manager approached me and told me to 
change my shape or get out. 
In response, many residents mentioned their discomfort with 
child avatars, with “Porky Gorky” stating: 
The world is full of sick bastards who either abuse and hurt 
children or fantasize about such things. SL is an ideal envi-
ronment for these perverts to role play their sick urges and 
desires […]. I am not saying that this is your motivation for 
being a child Av. However, based on what I have seen in SL in 
the past, I view every child avatar with suspicion. 
Notice that Porky Gorky states that he doesn’t know the rea-
sons behind a resident’s decision to play with a child identity, 
but that discomfort comes not from the virtual space, where 
performance isn’t limited by the biological body, but from the 
physical-world norms that dictate children should not be sex-
ualized. His overwhelming assumption is that the motivation 
for the performance rests in “sick urges and desires,” a negative 
opinion passed on through habitus from both the physical and 
virtual worlds. Age-play has mostly disappeared from the virtu-
al environment because of Linden Lab’s written rules, but Porky 
Gorky’s first thought remains based in the beliefs formed before 
those rules were put in place. Even in 2012, five years after age-
play was banned and basically eliminated, residents still react 
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with unease when child avatars arrive. Since deeply held beliefs 
are critical pieces of habitus, society’s conviction about child av-
atars marginalizes and casts suspicions on their activity, tightly 
regulating when, where, and how they can behave. Linden Lab’s 
rules dictate that child avatars can’t engage in sexual activity, but 
habitus perpetuates the belief that child avatars are suspicious to 
ensure that the virtual society determines what will and will not 
be considered appropriate childhood performance. 
Habitus works with the overt rules of society to bind a resi-
dent to the positional grid, a notion developed by Brian Mas-
sumi. In his work, a virtual space such as Second Life is an event 
space, a world where potentials unavailable in the physical 
world suddenly reappear. He uses the example of a field turn-
ing into a game of soccer. At first, the field is empty, with no 
boundaries, players, or rules for how it should be used. A single 




person enters the field and begins kicking a ball, then another 
person enters to kick the ball back and forth with them. Soon, 
many people are kicking the ball wildly around the field, which 
turns into chaos. In order to turn chaos into order, the group 
gives players positions to play and a host of rules to follow. A 
referee stands in the field to make sure the players follow the 
rules of the game. What was once simply an open field turns 
into a soccer field, a bounded area of performance with specific 
rules and expectations. Players are defined in relationship to the 
field, occupying a specific role within the space. The potential 
still exists for a player to run off, kicking the ball out of bounds 
and ruining the game, but he is held in position with the expec-
tations surrounding the space (79–80). 
In Second Life, residents enter the open event space, which 
is filled with potential for creating bodies and identities that 
include choices beyond those that exist in the physical world. 
As residents interact with the potential to mask their biologi-
cal bodies, they determine which types of performances are 
socially acceptable, often bringing physical-world norms and 
habitus into these decisions. Only residents who choose poten-
tial appearances and behaviors that are within accepted societal 
parameters can continue to enjoy the social and creative aspects 
of Second Life. By coming into contact with each other, these 
actors shift the potential of the space. When one resident tries 
out a potential identity, the way other residents react determines 
how the field of potentialities will look in the future. When ani-
mal avatars first appeared, for example, society was faced with 
Second Life users performing outside of biologically human 
bodies. Society then had to examine the potential of these per-
formances and agree on whether they would be accepted or not. 
Just as with Massumi’s soccer example, residents still hold the 
potential to perform outside of these boundaries, but habitus 
keeps them reperforming within the same socially acceptable 
expectations.
The number of potential performances in this virtual world 
far exceeds those of the already habitus-bound physical world, 
and early residents could and did play with the potentials avail-
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able to them. As residents interact with specific potentials, they 
approve and disapprove them. Society whittles down the ac-
ceptable potentials to set boundaries for behavior, a framework 
called the positional grid that governs future resident behavior. 
Massumi explains that all actors within a society are placed on 
a framework that classifies their bodies in terms of sets of bina-
ries: child/adult, male/female, gay/straight (Massumi 2–4). The 
grid eventually becomes so engrained in the participants that 
its positions seem fixed and set, and movement between points, 
the no-man’s land where transgression can occur, is obscured 
so that the grid seems immovable. Second Life had the barest 
minimum of a positional grid when it began, and even as bod-
ies became defined, movement between grid positions kept the 
available categories of identity fluid. 
Child avatars serve as an example of both dynamic interac-
tions and the limiting of potential as well as the way bodies are 
defined within a positional grid through habitus and overt rules. 
The culture remained open to the potential of child avatars un-
til residents had a chance to interact with the potential and de-
termine its reasonable place within the world. Most important, 
society had to determine how virtual child bodies would be 
categorized on the positional grid, most critically in terms of 
the binary of child/adult. Children should not engage in sexual 
activity, and since the adult position on the grid included sexual 
behavior, child avatars needed to have a grid position defined in 
opposition to that. Residents came across child avatars, observed 
their sexual behavior, and expressed their disapproval. This dis-
approval stemmed mainly from the blurring of the positional 
grid points: a performance could not involve both child/avatar 
and adult/user, for such a performance causes constant move-
ment between two grid points — child and adult — that results 
in a blurred, chaotic performance. When a resident interacts 
with a child avatar like Mery from the above example, he or she 
sees the digital body of a child and a performance that matches 
that image. Because aegyo cuteness is noted for its “static set of 
expressions” (Puzar 99), bringing aegyo into Second Life means 
that the performances of child avatars are controlled, under-
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stood, and bound. Only the static, approved set of expressions is 
allowed. If Mery were to say to other residents that she needed 
to log off for a time to smoke a cigarette, she would break the 
rigid set of behaviors acceptable for child avatars. Nonconform-
ity with aegyo jolts other residents into an awareness of the adult 
body on the other side of the screen. 
In Second Life, aegyo is used as a positional grid point in op-
position to the adult avatars on the grid. Within grid positions, 
speech and movement is tightly restricted to a specific set of pos-
es (Massumi 48–49). Parents in the physical world, for example, 
might allow a child to play for hours. The playing pose works 
for a child grid position, but if an adult were to play for hours 
on end, society might declare that person lazy or incompetent. 
The adult grid position does not allow for play in the same way 
that the opposite position does for a child. Aegyo stands in stark 
contrast to adult performances. As a grid position, aegyo stands 
in contrast to the adult, sexual behaviors within the world. Par-
ticipants are carefully guided to the baby talk, the appropriate 
animations for displaying cuteness, and the areas in Second Life 
where such performances are welcome. By tightly controlling 
avatar poses, Second Life society ensures that anyone choosing 
to appear as a child avatar remains far from the sexual behavior 
child avatars were permitted to exhibit in the past.
Child avatars in today’s Second Life rarely step outside of this 
cute boundary. Consider Mery: she skipped, giggled, snuggled 
with her mother, and used the expected vocabulary of a toddler 
for most of the conversation. Such a performance demonstrates 
the necessary aegyo, the childlike cuteness that essentially pre-
sents innocence. At one point, Mery asked permission from her 
“mother” to join the adult conversation. Mery was essentially 
asking for the ability to shift away from the cute performance 
she was maintaining. When released, Mery didn’t use baby talk 
or smaller vocabulary words. Her pose shifted, rather like a 
marionette that suddenly came free of its strings. Parts of the 
earlier aegyo remained, such as her look and the fact that she 
remained seated in her mother’s arms. The conversation topic 
and her ability to engage in the adult conversation, however, was 
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outside of what society would deem acceptable for a child. She 
swore, talked of sexual behaviors, and laughed at crude jokes. 
The shift was startling; as a spectator, I found myself wonder-
ing why I felt such discomfort when watching this performance. 
When Mery was finished with her story, she giggled, signaling 
a return to her original cute performance, and told her mother 
she wanted to be put to bed for a nap. In other words, Mery went 
back into her grid position, the one that matched the temporal 
image of her avatar body. My discomfort immediately eased. 
The temporal dissonance of the adult user making an appear-
ance made it difficult for me to view the child avatar without 
suspicion, but the cute behavior, the aegyo, reinforced and set-
tled my concerns.
Second Life society looks at child avatars as potentially 
dangerous performers because of the potential for age-play. In 
sexual situations, the child avatar is no longer in a pose society 
can approve, even though that avatar is in a child’s grid position 
and exploring a potential available to that position. To keep that 
potential at bay, society presses specific limits of cuteness onto 
child avatars, tightly watching and controlling how they are al-
lowed to appear to adult residents. Mery exhibits these poses: 
the giggling, the baby talk, the feigned innocence, and the ani-
mations designed to allow her avatar body to skip and play com-
bine to restrict residents with child and adult avatars to specific 
behavior. In fact, the animations available for child avatars en-
sure that even their bodily movements are limited to a cycle of 
distinct images. Mery started by swaying from side to side, then 
stooped to wiggle her shoelace, then threw up her hands in the 
air with joy. These three animations cycled over and over again, 
giving the illusion that the child continually and perpetually 
performed aegyo. Just as her visual appearance remained the 
same, Mery’s words and conversation style remained consistent. 
Her childlike posing included all aspects of her performance: 
the conversation, the motions, the style of dress, even the choice 
of her name. She returned again and again to those same poses 
to reinforce her cute performance. Given the nature and history 
of child avatars in Second Life, this performance also reinforces 
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what Ngai describes as cuteness’s “way of sexualizing beings and 
simultaneously rendering them unthreatening” (72). Second 
Life society has moved these avatars, who could once engage in 
sexual behavior, toward a specific grid position, rendering them 
unthreatening with the cycle of poses available in that specific 
grid position.
To return to the question I posed at the beginning of this 
chapter, when a virtual performance of childhood is not enacted 
by a physical-world child, society steps in to bind the perform-
er’s avatar to the grid position that requires appropriately cute 
behavior so that the symbolism of the avatar can only be read 
as “child.” While this chapter uses Second Life as an example, 
I suggest that other virtual spaces similarly rely on aegyo-type 
behaviors to control the temporal dissonance surrounding adult 
users who take on the appearance of children. In graphic virtual 
worlds — such as IMVU, Kitely, and the Open Grid — that allow 
users to mold the avatar body, child avatars remain potentials 
that must be regulated. Frameworks of cuteness, in these cases, 
give these communities a way to overcome the temporal dis-
sonance between the adult user and the child avatar, confining 
the possible danger of the performance. Physical world habitus, 
while challenged by the virtual space, seeps into the virtual to 
smooth the temporal dissonance, leaving child avatars with but 
one way to perform: as cute, charming, and, always, potentially 
dangerous.
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What’s Cute Got To  
Do With It?  
Early Modern Proto-Cuteness 
in King Lear
James M. Cochran
In the past twenty years, the field of cute studies has grown ex-
tensively.1 Cuteness, as we conceive of it, has its origins in the 
nineteenth century. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
cute, defined as “attractive, pretty, charming,” comes from “U.S. 
colloquial and Schoolboy slang,” with its earliest recorded usage 
in 1834. Despite the origins of cuteness in the nineteenth cen-
tury, this chapter searches for earlier traces of cuteness — an early 
1 For example, much of cute scholarship has focused on Japanese culture and 
the concept of kawaii or cool, and particularly on the relationship among 
cuteness, animation, and sexuality. For example, in her 1999 chapter “Cute 
but Deadly: Women and Violence in Japanese Comics,” Kanako Shiokawa 
uses a feminist lens to examine the gendered qualities of cuteness and the 
ways in which cuteness changes as gender stereotypes develop. Thorsten 
Botz-Bornstein’s 2011 book considers the similarities and intersections be-
tween Japanese kawaii and African American cool. Botz-Bornstein’s work is 
particularly useful because of his cross-cultural analysis of cuteness, which 
helps move the study of cute aesthetics beyond a Japanese context. Beyond 
cross-cultural treatments of cute aesthetics, some studies center more on 
the cute’s relation to power dynamics. For example, in her 1996 chapter 
“Cuteness and Commodity Aesthetics,” Lori Merish argues that cuteness 
has a racial and class-based component and that cute aesthetics provides a 
means for subsuming the Other. 
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modern protocuteness — asking if earlier structures, systems, 
and concepts anticipate our contemporary definition of cuteness. 
Do Shakespeare’s works, particularly King Lear, offer insight into 
a seventeenth-century ancestor of cuteness? Can Shakespeare 
speak to our contemporary cute age? Is Shakespeare ever cute? 
Drawing largely from Daniel Harris’s 2000 book on aesthetics 
and consumerism, this chapter seeks to answer these questions 
by offering a critical investigation of the intersection between 
early modern culture and contemporary aesthetics.
For some early modern scholars, the notion of a cute King 
Lear might be troubling, and some critics might wonder what 
Shakespeare could possibly have to do with cuteness. Many crit-
ics, in fact, would quickly reject any “cute” approach to Shake-
speare because his plays are tragic, fantastic, and sublime — but 
far from cute. As Doug Lanier observes, “King Lear is the Mount 
Everest of Shakespeare — often forbiddingly bleak and challeng-
ing, but for those who scale it, it offers an unparalleled vista on 
man’s condition and its own form of rough beauty. More than 
any other Shakespeare play, Lear exemplifies what Immanuel 
Kant labeled the ‘sublime,’ by which he meant those objects that 
inspire an awe that simply dwarves us rather than charms.” For 
many, an investigation of cuteness in the early modern period 
is too anachronistic. Shakespeare’s world is full of bearbaiting, 
brothels, and beer; surely, this is a world devoid of cute objects. 
Initially, cuteness seems to have neither a place nor a predeces-
sor in the early modern age. A critical investigation of cuteness 
takes a leap of faith, but once we start looking for it, we find 
glimpses of cuteness throughout the age. 
Before transitioning to the central parts of this chapter, I will 
briefly offer one example of how the cute aesthetic lurks beneath 
the surface of Shakespeare’s works. Let us consider dogs, crea-
tures that are often contemporary cute figures.2 Initially, Shake-
speare’s dogs seem far from cute: as an insult, Lear calls Oswald, 
2 For some contemporary cute depictions of dogs, see, for example, Chie 
Hayano’s 2009 Cute Dogs: Craft Your Own Pooches and J.H. Lee’s 2011 Boo: 
The Life of the World’s Cutest Dog.
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“you whoreson dog, you slave, you cur!” (4.75–76).3 Lear cruelly 
casts Oswald as a worthless and contemptuous dog. Upon fur-
ther investigation, however, we discover that dogs function be-
yond cruel insults, and perhaps, they demonstrate a distant link 
to contemporary cuteness.
One dog that offers a glimpse of cuteness is “Sweetheart.” 
Lear exclaims, “The little dogs and all, / Tray, Blanch, and 
Sweetheart — see, they bark at me” (13.56–57). Marjorie Garber 
explains that Troy, Blanch, Sweetheart are likely “lapdogs or toy 
spaniels, then very much in fashion” (189). Lapdogs, Joyce Salis-
bury, explains, have their origins in the medieval period, con-
tinuing through the early modern period to today: 
The original medieval pets in the purest sense — as non-
working animals — were small dogs, lapdogs, for noble ladies 
[…]. What characteristics marked these lapdogs? As we have 
seen, the main characteristic of all domestic animals is pedo-
morphosis, that is, the retention of juvenile characteristics, 
both in body shape and in personality characteristics, such 
as whining and submissiveness. The most extreme example 
of the retention of juvenile traits comes in toy dogs: in addi-
tion to their small size, they have disproportionately broad 
heads, small limbs, large eyes, and smaller noses and mouths. 
All these are characteristics of human infants and thus evoke 
what the Nobel Prize–winning ethologist Konrad Lorenz de-
fined as the “cute response.” Thus, toy dogs are not just juve-
nile; they are almost neonatal in appearance. In fact, people 
frequently see the small dogs as substitutes for children. (116)
Beginning in the late medieval period, noblewomen began to 
own what we now call “lapdogs.” Continuing into the early 
modern age, noblewomen owned lapdogs as pets. By linking the 
dogs, as neonatal figures (or what we would now call cute ob-
jects), to the feminine, we find earlier strands of the femininity 
3 All quotations from Shakespeare’s King Lear come from the Oxford Shake-
speare.
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often associated with cuteness.4 The link between the neonatal 
and the feminine continues today with the alignment of cute-
ness and femininity. In Shakespeare’s play, Lear shows affection 
toward Sweetheart, a dog that is small and serves as an object 
for Lear to possess. As a lapdog with an endearing name, Lear’s 
Sweetheart demonstrates one historical predecessor to contem-
porary cuteness.5
Shakespeare’s Sweetheart is one example in which cute-
ness is not initially obvious and only becomes more evident 
after a close reading. However, the rest of this chapter consid-
ers the way that cuteness — or at least early modern protocute-
ness — plays out within the relationship between Lear and his 
daughters. Lear’s desire to control his daughters correlates with 
what later, in the twentieth century, becomes the desire to con-
trol the cute object. From a cute perspective, then, Lear’s desire 
to control his daughters — and consequently project cuteness 
onto them — stems from his own fears about his old age and his 
potential to become, himself, a cute object. This chapter identi-
fies and traces two particular types of cuteness: one associated 
with infantilization and one associated with senility.
Cuteness and Controlling Children
Because cuteness deals primarily with the childlike and the 
feminine, this chapter focuses most of its attention on Lear’s 
treatment and conception of his daughters. Describing cuteness 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Lori Mer-
ish argues, “Cuteness stages a problematic of identification that 
centers on the child’s body. This problematic involved anxieties 
4 I do not want to exaggerate the relationship between cuteness and early 
modern dogs. Certainly, lapdogs with their neonatal qualities and their re-
lation to noblewomen speak to the contemporary alignment between dogs 
and cuteness, as well as cuteness and femininity. Yet, most dogs did not 
fare so well. Early modern authorities slaughtered dogs during plague out-
breaks. See Mark S.R. Jenner.
5 Many have warned me that there is nothing cute about Shakespeare and 
especially not Lear. I thank my colleague Aaron Hatrick for pointing out 
that Shakespeare has a “Sweetheart” among his curs and mongrels.
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about the cultural ‘ownership’ of the child […] cuteness rep-
resents lines of interpersonal, intergenerational identification, 
promoting affective bonds of social affiliation and cohesion” 
(187–88). In her discussion about cuteness, cultural anxiety, and 
control over children’s bodies, Merish explores mass immigra-
tion to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries. According to Merish, the cute aesthetic provides 
an avenue through which white Anglo-Americans come to un-
derstand and integrate the “Other” into their society: “Specifi-
cally, cuteness engenders an affectional dynamic through which 
the Other is domesticated and (re)contextualized within the hu-
man ‘family’” (188). Cuteness allows for and encourages the as-
similation of the Other by integrating the child, as both cute ob-
ject and possessed object, into the social and familial system. We 
cannot carry over these precise concerns and anxieties — about 
mass immigration — to our reading of protocuteness in Lear be-
cause of early modern England’s very different circumstances 
and concerns, but we can still use Merish’s observation about 
cute aesthetics and children’s bodies to inform the following dis-
cussion about intergenerational control and stability.
Even beyond Merish’s specific context, the cute aesthetic is 
concerned with the control of children. While Lear’s daughters 
are not the age that children are when they are most often asso-
ciated with cuteness, Shakespeare’s Lear still deals with “lines of 
interpersonal, intergenerational identification” as well as “bonds 
of social affiliation and cohesion” (Merish 187). The majority 
of Lear’s speeches look forward to the future of the kingdom, 
through his daughters’ marriages and inheritance of the divided 
land. Lear recognizes the future marriage of Cordelia to one of 
the “two great princes, France and Burgundy — / Great rivals 
in [Cordelia’s] love” (1.41–42). The intergenerational focus even 
exceeds Lear’s immediate children; he looks forward to a con-
tinuing family legacy. Lear gives land not only to Gonoril6 but 
also to her descendants:
6 Following the Oxford Shakespeare edition of King Lear, I adopt the spelling 
“Gonoril.” Some whom I quote use “Goneril”; I have retained their spelling. 
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Of all these bounds even from this line to this,
With shady forests and wide-skirted meads,
We make thee lady. To thine and Albany’s issue
Be this perpetual. (1.57–60) 
The land becomes synonymous with Lear’s legacy and the future 
descendants who will eventually, in Lear’s vision, rule over the 
land. His gift of the land is a “perpetual” gift that will continue 
his family line. An interest in familial lineage is not necessarily 
part of the cute aesthetic, but it is this same concern about con-
trolling children out of which the cute aesthetic later emerges.
Another way that Lear’s opening speeches reinforce the 
emphasis on social cohesion is through his insistence that his 
daughters declare their love for him. In one sense, as we shall 
see, the need for his daughters’ declarations of love is ridiculous, 
unnecessary, and unwise. Yet in another sense, such declara-
tions of love serve to establish and reinforce the bonds between 
fathers and daughters, creating stability for the family and argu-
ably even the nation. Lear demands order, and he specifically 
wants his daughters to submit to his commands and explicitly 
express their loyalty to him. Lear declares, “Tell me, my daugh-
ters, / Which of you shall say we doth love us most, / That we 
our largest bounty may extend / Where merit doth most chal-
lenge it?” (1.44–47). Later, Lear casts familial loyally as an ethi-
cal duty: “Thou better know’st / The offices of nature, bond of 
childhood, / Effects of courtesy, dues of gratitude” (7.334–36). 
Lear’s daughters must profess their love for their father and 
submit to his commands. Lear’s concerns about ownership and 
control over his daughters are different than the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century social and racial concerns about owning and 
integrating immigrant bodies; even so, Lear’s interest in control-
ling his daughters parallels the later impulse to control migrant 
children because, in both occurrences, conceiving of children 
as submissive and passive ensures familial stability and, conse-
quently, social or national stability. Thus, relationships between 
Lear and his daughters serve as a starting point for this cute 
reading because, ultimately, the family is the unit that deploys 
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the cute aesthetic as a means of controlling and continuing the 
familial lineage. 
Along with cuteness’s interest in intergenerational and social 
bonds, a central force behind constructing cuteness is the de-
sire for control and the construction of the ridiculous. Daniel 
Harris writes, “The process of conveying cuteness to the viewer 
disempowers its objects, forcing them into ridiculous situations 
and making them appear more ignorant and vulnerable than 
they really are” (6). Often, the person in power subjects the cute 
object to a ridiculous situation, heightening the cute object’s dis-
empowered state. Harris offers the comical situation of Winnie 
the Pooh struggling to reach honey and getting stuck in a honey 
pot. While this modern situation is foreign to Shakespeare’s 
world, the power relation between the subject and the cute ob-
ject is not. At no point in the play does Lear get his head stuck 
in a honey pot, but his actions, such as his cruel treatment of his 
daughters, stand outside of rational behavior. Lear’s actions are 
not ridiculous or ignorant in the same way as Pooh’s, but as Lear 
acts cruelly and alienates those around him, his actions demon-
strate his ignorance and, ultimately, his loss of power. 
Even as Lear acts as the ridiculous, Pooh-like character, he 
forces others into disempowered situations. For example, Lear’s 
demand that his daughters quantify their love for him dem-
onstrates the tendency of individuals to force cute objects into 
ridiculous situations — though not into “honey pot” situations. 
Lear’s love-test is unwise and unnecessary. G. Wilson Knight 
critiques Lear’s demands: “The incident is profoundly comic 
and profoundly pathetic. […] Lear is selfish, self-centered. The 
images he creates of his three daughters’ love are quite false, sen-
timentalized: he understands the nature of none of his children, 
and demand[s] an impossible love from all three” (117). Simi-
larly, Noel Hess recognizes the scene’s ridiculousness: “Regan, 
Goneril and Cordelia are subjected to a ritual public humili-
ation whereby, in order to gain their inheritance, they must 
openly compete with each other for their father’s love and state 
that their devotion to him is unlimited and unequalled” (210). 
Whether we adopt Knight’s description of “profoundly pathetic” 
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or Hess’s description of “public humiliation,” the ritual is, at its 
core, ridiculous. 
Anti-Cute Daughters
Lear wants to be able to control his daughters and have them 
submit to his authority. Yet he finds that they exist beyond his 
control. For Lear, his daughters move from the realm of control, 
or what we might now call the realm of the cute, to what Har-
ris terms the anti-cute, an aesthetic closely tied to the perverse 
and monstrous. This perverse cuteness represents the child as the 
“vehicle of diabolical powers from the Great Beyond, which have 
appropriated the tiny, disobedient bodies of our elfish change-
lings as instruments for their assaults on the stability of family 
life” (Harris 17). Similarly, Maja Brzozowska-Brywczyńska de-
scribes the fragility of the boundary between cute and anti-cute: 
“The fascinating metamorphosis of cute into anti-cute reflects the 
above-mentioned circularity of the cute concept — for when cute 
acquires wicked features it in fact goes to the excess of cuteness, 
exploiting and parodying the sweetness to its very limits, poi-
soning itself while retaining the artificially lovable texture. Cute 
becomes grotesque” (219–20). In this manner, the cute is gentle, 
inviting the viewer’s sympathy, but the cute object’s gentleness 
easily transforms into the monstrous, threatening the viewer. 
Unable to control his daughters, Lear constructs them as an-
ti-cute offspring who threaten stability and order. The cute eas-
ily gives way to the perverse and monstrous. The first to upset 
Lear is Cordelia, and Lear casts her away and disinherits her be-
cause he sees her actions as, in the words of the King of France, 
“so monstrous” (1.207). Later in the play, Lear casts Gonoril as a 
“marble-hearted fiend, / More hideous when thou show’st thee 
in in a child / Than the sea-monster — detested kite, thou liest” 
(4.251–53). Not only does Lear consider Gonoril a “sea-monster,” 
he exclaims that she is “serpent-like,” aligning her with the devil 
and, more broadly, evil (7.317).
Additionally, the anti-cute body is one that rejects normative 
reproduction. In her queer reading of Chucky, a contemporary 
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anti-cute figure, Judith Halberstam writes that the Child’s Play 
movie series that features him “offers a critique of the human, 
exposes the relations between human and normative gender-
ing and reproduction, and offers an alternative formulation of 
embodiment, desire, and identity” (147). Expanding on Hal-
berstam’s analysis of Chucky, I suggest that the anti-cute rejects 
normative modes of reproduction, even “altering” reproduction 
into something that is unrecognizable as reproduction. For ex-
ample, in Shakespeare’s play, Lear envisions a normative repro-
ductive line, one in which his daughters marry, inherit his land, 
and eventually give that land to their children. Yet Lear’s norma-
tive vision quickly dissolves after he discovers that he does not 
have power and control over his daughters. Instead, in Lear’s 
view, his daughters have a dangerous and monstrous procreative 
power. Criticizing Gonoril, he announces: 
Thou art my flesh, my blood, my daughter — 
Or rather a disease that lies within my flesh,
Which I must needs call mine. Thou art a boil,
A plague-sore, an embossed carbuncle
In my corrupted blood. (7.378–82)
Gonoril is no longer Lear’s daughter but a disease or infection 
in his “corrupted blood.” As Julia Reinhard Lupton and Kenneth 
Reinhard argue, “Goneril is figured not as Lear’s offspring but 
his ‘inspring’: like a disease, the bad daughter is presented as 
flesh that has mutinied from within. She is both one with the 
subject (‘And yet thou art my flesh, my blood, my daughter’) 
and an invasive foreign body (‘Or rather a disease that’s in my 
flesh’)” (159). Gonoril, as the anti-cute object, becomes a dis-
eased body, potentially infecting Lear, corrupting rather than 
continuing his bloodline. The anti-cute dissolves the procreative 
line, transforming it into a disease. 
What is significant about the shift in Lear’s daughters from 
loving to monstrous is that the sudden change reinforces the 
flexible boundary between the contemporary cute and anti-
cute. The body that seems cute might actually harbor the mon-
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strous, anti-cute body. The contemporary cute body, with its 
often big eyes and stubby limbs, also carries the threat of break-
ing into the anti-cute. Many of the insults directed toward the 
daughters disrupt any stable boundaries that separate cute and 
anti-cute, loving and hateful, and feminine and monstrous. For 
example, Albany critiques and condemns Gonoril’s false ap-
pearance: “See thyself, devil. / Proper deformity shows not in 
the fiend / So horrid as in woman” (16.57–59). He continues, 
“Thou changed and self-covered thing, for shame / Bemonster 
not thy feature” and “Thou art a fiend, / A woman’s shape doth 
shield thee” (16.61–62, 16.65–66). On the surface, Gonoril has “a 
woman’s shape,” but Albany accuses her of being a “self-covered 
thing,” who hides a sinister, even demonic, interiority. Similarly, 
Lear sees his daughters as “women all above” but “down from 
the waist / […] centaurs” (20.119–20). In the same way that the 
boundary between the cute and anti-cute is fragile and shifting, 
the boundary between “women” and “centaurs” is ambiguous.
With the fluid and fragile boundary between cute and anti-
cute, it is not surprising that, in the opening scene, Lear sees 
Cordelia as monstrous but, in the final scene, wants to re-
main with Cordelia and “laugh / At gilded butterflies” (24.13). 
Throughout the play, Cordelia asserts her own authority, acting 
outside of Lear’s control; she is arguably far from cute. Yet in 
comparison to her sisters, Cordelia is a better representation of 
a cute figure. In fact, in his 1888 artistic representation of Cord-
elia, William Frederick Yeames seems to pick up on Cordelia’s 
charm. Yeames presents Cordelia with rounded features and big 
eyes, a rendering that, while not as extreme, almost anticipates 
contemporary cute objects whose eyes seem to overrun their 
faces. 
Perhaps our perception of Cordelia as the cute daughter stems 
from the play’s tragedy. The cute object is one that is controlled 
and contained, and by the play’s ending, Cordelia is contained 
and “controlled” by death. Even Lear’s lamentation about Cord-
elia’s death constructs her as a cute object as he relies on a con-
ception of the feminine as gentle, quiet, and passive. As Cordelia 
dies, her father reflects, “Her voice was ever soft, / Gentle, and 
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low, an excellent thing in women” (24.268–69). Although Lear’s 
lamentation predates the emergence of a cultural concept of the 
cute, the feminine ideals of softness and gentleness point to later 
cute aesthetics’ celebration of docility and gentleness, features 
that I will later discuss when examining Lear’s old age.
The Cuteness of Old Age
Lear conceives of his daughters as cute objects primarily because 
he attempts to contain them, but control is not the only motive. 
Generally, children are the targets of cuteness, but the elderly, 
too, have become cute objects. Lear’s projection of cuteness, 
then, stems from anxieties about old age. Before turning to the 
relation between Lear’s old age and our reading of him as a cute 
object, we should briefly examine how critics and the play itself 
conceive of Lear’s old age. One such critic is Hess, who, in his 
1987 study, reads Lear — and contemporary elderly people — as 
having anxiety regarding helplessness and abandonment:
Through the character of King Lear, therefore, Shakespeare 
has allowed us valuable insight into some of the crucial un-
conscious processes of ageing: not only that ageing is expe-
rienced as a narcissistic injury but that it contains the threat 
of helplessness, dependency, and loneliness, which is often 
defended against by a tyrannical control of the elderly per-
son’s world and his objects. (211)
Hess argues that Lear accurately depicts the emotional difficul-
ties of aging in which elderly patients act tyrannically in an at-
tempt to maintain power and control. More recently, in his 2012 
book on old age in the early modern period, Christopher Mar-
tin argues that Lear navigates fears about dependency and the 
public “performance” of old age. According to Martin, “Lear’s 
fateful resignation of power marks neither the old king’s self-
destructive vanity nor his senile dotage, but a radical (though 
abortive) effort to synthesize constitutional self-perception with 
the generationally conditioned designs of youth” (27). In this 
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view, the younger generation expects Lear to perform his old 
age through his resignation, ensuring the legitimate transfer 
of power to that generation. As I will show, Hess’s claim about 
power and anxiety about ageing and Martin’s claim about the 
performance of old age inform a “cute” reading of Lear because 
cuteness is both performed and projected as a means for control 
over the cute object. 
Critics are not the only ones who point to the play’s empha-
sis on Lear’s age; within the play, several characters draw atten-
tion to Lear’s aging mind and body. Gonoril and Regan often 
discuss Lear’s age and the problems that have emerged as a re-
sult of it. For example, Gonoril announces, “You see how full 
of changes his age is […] with what poor judgment he / hath 
now cast her [Cordelia] off appears too gross” (1.278, 1.280–81). 
Regan responds, “Tis the infirmity of his age” and expects fre-
quent “unconstant starts” (1.283, 1.289). Lear’s old age becomes 
a central cause of his actions and a key feature of the identity he 
and others create. 
From a cute perspective, Lear’s anxiety about old age, and his 
performance of it, anticipates the contemporary construction of 
the elderly as cute. Lear’s projection of cuteness onto others is 
the result of fear about his own potential to be regarded as a 
cute object — and perhaps, his fear speaks to a reality in which 
his daughters infantilize him, similar to the contemporary con-
struction of the elderly as cute objects. In her recent analysis of 
elderly care, Karen Hitchcock reflects, 
At every morning handover in every hospital in Australia, a 
registrar will report admitting an elderly patient — perhaps a 
92-year-old who fell taking out the garbage — and say, “He’s 
so cute” or “She’s so adorable.” As if the patient were a baby 
or a kitten. This doesn’t seem so terrible. It is not meant to be 
cruel or disparaging. But what does it tell us about the way 
we view the elderly?
If you are old and in the hospital, you can be one of three 
things: cute, difficult, or mute. If you want people to be nice 
to you, I’d recommend cute. It’s easy to be cute: just say some-
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thing any normal human might say. Because you are ancient, 
it will be interpreted as cute. 
Throughout the play, Lear is the “difficult” elderly person, one 
who is emotionally unstable and even mad at times, but to-
ward the play’s closing he becomes Hitchcock’s “cute” figure. 
Like Hitchcock’s ninety-two-year-old patient who is cute and 
childlike when he or she falls, Lear is described as if he were a 
baby. Cordelia laments that her father is now “child-changed” 
(21.14). Earlier in the play, Gonoril voices the proverb, “Old fool 
are babes again” (4.19). Vincent F. Petronella observes a similar 
inverse relationship between old age and infantile behavior. Ac-
cording to Petronella, Lear, the ideal image of an aged monarch 
is one who maintains a stable and secure family, but Lear’s in-
fantile actions cause him to fall short of this ideal. Lear loses 
political, social, and familial power by regressing to “childhood 
games (bo-peep and handy-dandy), and […] Jack the Giant 
Killer, invoked in Poor Tom’s ‘Child Rowland to the dark tower 
came’ (3.4.182). Lear returns to the nursery, so to speak” (44). 
Shakespeare, without access to the contemporary concept of 
cuteness, infantilizes Lear as a result of his old age. 
What we might now read as Lear’s fear of being constructed 
as a cute object is rooted in an anxiety about power, specifi-
cally his fear of losing control and power. While his actions 
and speeches often demonstrate cruelty, his fears about con-
trol stem from a legitimate concern. Throughout the play, 
Lear’s daughters, the Fool, and others connect Lear’s old age to 
his declining stability. As I previously mentioned, in the first 
scene, Regan reflects, “’Tis the infirmity of his old age; yet he 
hath ever but slenderly known himself ” (1.282–83). Gonoril 
responds that Lear had been rash before old age, and she pre-
dicts that his elderly state will worsen his rashness: “The best 
and soundest of his time hath been but rash; then we must 
look to receive from his age but alone the imperfection of long-
engrafted condition, but therewithal unruly waywardness that 
infirm and choleric years bring with them” (1.284–88). In his 
daughters’ view Lear had already been mentally instable, both 
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“rash” and “wayward,” and his old age will only hasten his con-
dition.
Not only do characters comment on Lear’s old age and his 
declining mental and emotional stability, they also reflect on 
Lear’s potential and actual loss of power. Regan declares, 
O sir, you are old
Nature in you stands on the very verge
Of her confine. You should be ruled and led
By some discretion that discerns your state
Better than you yourself. (7.303–7)
At this point, Regan has little patience for Lear and his rowdy 
army. According to Regan, Lear’s old age suggests his inability 
to make sound and smart political decisions; he needs someone 
else to take care of and decide what is best for him.
Similarly, the Fool often comments on Lear’s increasing lack 
of actual power. Responding to Lear’s question about the Fool’s 
sudden singing, the Fool comments, “I have used it, nuncle, ever 
since thou madest thy daughters thy mother; for when thou gav-
est them the rod and puttest down thine own breeches” (4.163–
65). Scott F. Crider describes the reversal of power in terms of 
sin and redemption, but his observation still illuminates a cute 
reading of Lear: “Goneril and Regan treat their father like a 
child, then even like an animal. The violated bond in the family 
leads to psychological and political tyranny, which itself leads to 
self-consuming savagery” (139). In both their speeches and their 
actions, Lear’s daughters and the Fool reinforce Lear’s new posi-
tion as one who should be controlled and led rather than one 
who should rule and command. In public perception and argu-
ably in reality, Lear, as elderly and thus potential cute object, 
shifts from a position of power and control to one of powerless-
ness in which he becomes “like a child” or “even […] an animal.” 
Toward the end of the play, Lear’s docile state reinforces his 
potential as a cute object. Harris argues that “cuteness is […] the 
aesthetic of sleep[,…] the pose we find cutest of all is not that of a 
rambunctious infant screaming at the top of his lungs but that of 
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the docile sleepyhead […]. The world of cute things is transfixed 
by the spell of the sandman, full of napping lotus eaters whose 
chief attraction lies in their dormant and languorous postures, 
their defenseless immobility” (7). We find children especially 
cute when they are sleeping rather than running around. Simi-
larly, in the play, Lear’s docile state of sleep corresponds with his 
general powerlessness. Before falling asleep in the storm, Lear 
predicts the loss of power that coincides with his sleeping state, 
questioning his self-identity and power. He wonders, 
Doth any here know me? Why, this is not Lear.
Doth Lear walk thus, speak thus? Where are his eyes?
Either his notion weakens, or his discernings
Are lethargied. Sleeping or waking, ha?
Sure, ’tis not so.
Who is it that can tell me who I am? (4.217–22).
Lear’s confusion regarding his state of “sleeping or waking” fore-
shadows the later moment when he falls asleep during the storm. 
Even these six lines demonstrate how power and knowledge are 
connected to each other. In his lethargic state, anticipating his 
later sleep, Lear loses the power to discern between reality and 
illusion. He is unable to determine whether he is sleeping or 
awake, whether he is known by others or unknown, whether he 
is Lear or not Lear. He lacks the power to fulfill his role as king 
because he is not even certain that he is King Lear. The image of 
the docile and confused Lear reinforces our conception of him 
as a monarch who lacks control and power. 
Lear’s confused and docile state echoes the inversion of 
power that the Fool describes earlier. Asleep, Lear has become a 
child: Lear is “child-changed” (21.14). No longer a powerful fa-
ther figure, Lear becomes a child dependent on the help of oth-
ers. Lear, asleep, is carried offstage to Dover. Shortly after this 
moment, the first gentleman explains, “In the heaviness of his 
sleep / We put fresh garments on him” (21.19–20). Lear becomes 
like a child who is dependent on others for “fresh garments.”
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Foppery, too, is a likely predecessor of cuteness. Today, cute 
humans and animals are often those that stumble or move in a 
way that demonstrates a lack of bodily control or balance. We 
might think of the clumsy Bambi, stumbling on ice. The central 
difference between stumbling babies or Bambi and the foolish 
Lear is one of bodily action versus mental state. Lear’s problem 
is not necessarily balance or bodily control but a foolish intel-
lectual life. Yet stumbling actions and foolish thoughts both sug-
gest a lack of control — whether bodily or mental — that is com-
mon to children. In addition to Lear’s loss of bodily control, he 
demonstrates a loss of mental control as he falls asleep and be-
comes childlike. He cries, “Pray do not mock. I am a very fool-
ish, fond old man” (21.57–58). Shortly after, Lear asks Cordelia 
to “forget and forgive” because, he says, “I am old / And fool-
ish” (21.82–83). Lear’s foolishness draws attention to his lack of 
“sense or judgement” (“Fool,” def. 1). By his own admission, Lear 
is like the contemporary cute object who is a bodily being with 
a lack of intellectual life. 
Moreover, Lear’s self-recognition as a “foolish, fond old man” 
establishes himself as one who is to be pitied. As a “foolish, fond 
old man,” Lear recognizes and asserts his own insignificance 
as someone in a powerless position. Additionally, Cordelia re-
fers to Lear as “poor,” whether as a “poor perdu” or a “poor fa-
ther” (21.33, 21.36). “Poor” literally describes Lear’s loss of con-
trol — his state of near-complete destitution and dependence on 
others — but “poor” also describes “that [which] provokes sym-
pathy, or compassion; that [which] is to be pitied; unfortunate, 
wretched, hapless.” (“Fool,” def. 5). Thus, Lear becomes the cute 
object he had feared as he comes to recognize his own foolish-
ness and insignificance by the end of the play.
From a cute perspective, the play’s closing is the moment at 
which Cordelia’s cuteness and Lear’s cuteness collide: death ul-
timately marks both the young, feminine Cordelia and the old, 
masculine Lear as docile or contained. As mentioned previously, 
docility and containment are central to the cute aesthetic; death, 
then, is the ultimate instantiation of the features common to the 
cute aesthetic. As the play ends, Cordelia and Lear are docile, 
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contained and controlled by death. Part of King Lear’s tragedy is 
that no matter how we construct others or ourselves, death will 
contain and consume us all.
Cute Conclusions and Contemporary Cute King Lear
What does a cute reading of King Lear mean for the future of 
early modern studies? My intention throughout this chapter has 
been clear: to consider the early modern structures and relation-
ships that speak to our contemporary understanding of cuteness, 
but not to force cuteness onto King Lear. I want to reiterate that 
cuteness as we know it did not exist in the early modern period, 
and thus Shakespeare’s works are, in a strict sense, far from cute. 
Yet early modern literature offers us structures, systems, and mo-
ments that speak to the contemporary cute aesthetic. Exploring 
the intersection of cuteness and early modern studies can mean 
searching for ancestors of contemporary cuteness in early mod-
ern studies or examining the similarities between early modern 
concepts and structures and contemporary cuteness. 
Thinking through Shakespeare’s play from a cute lens draws 
attention to the politics of containment at play throughout the 
tragedy. Lear constantly attempts to control and contain his 
daughters, even as they burst outside of his constructions of 
them. Additionally, a cute reading notices how Lear desperately 
attempts to control others in response to his own loss of power. 
Finally, the tragedy of King Lear, that of Cordelia and Lear dy-
ing, offers a new way for us to conceive of death. As we attempt 
to contain and control others — through cute aesthetics or other 
political and cultural means — death stands as a constant threat 
because it will ultimately contain us. The cute aesthetic is one 
of many ways in which we fleetingly grasp and maintain power. 
A cute approach to King Lear speaks to contemporary per-
formances of the play as well. As has been stated throughout this 
chapter, early modern audiences did not walk away from King 
Lear thinking about how cute the characters were, how some 
characters resisted cuteness, or how some became cute while 
desperately projecting cuteness on others. But more recent 
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performances have been fairly cute. For example, in 2015, the 
Courtyard Theatre in London performed King Lear with Sheep, 
a play with one human actor and a cast of nine sheep. Surely 
this play was cute but also, at times, chaotic, when the sheep did 
not perform with the discipline of human actors. How might we 
make sense of a cute, sheep-filled adaptation of King Lear? One 
answer is that Shakespeare’s play is cuter than we have realized. 
Shakespeare’s play contains the very structures and systems 
upon which the aesthetics of cuteness later forms. Given the 
early modern play’s interest in the family unit, gender relations, 
control, and power, we should not be surprised by performances 
of King Lear with Sheep because the adaptation, with its sheep as 
both cute animals and actors, makes explicit the play’s concerns 
about power and control that I have here teased out as concerns 
related to the cute aesthetic. 
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Hamlet, Hesperides, and the 
Discursivity of Cuteness 
Kara Watts
Using aesthetics alongside affect theory and queer philology, 
this chapter interrogates the ability of Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
(1604) and Robert Herrick’s Hesperides (1648) to endure and 
broaden the scope of what Sianne Ngai, Lori Merish, Dan-
iel Harris, and others have theorized as the cute. Ngai, in Our 
Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (2012), explains the 
cute as a contemporary and commodity-driven category, an aes-
thetic that discloses a “surprisingly wide spectrum of feelings, 
ranging from tenderness to aggression, that we harbor toward 
ostensively subordinate and unthreatening commodities” (1). To 
consider the cute, then, is to consider our documented fascina-
tion with the private, the relations of subjects and objects, and 
the power dynamics between the appreciator and the appreci-
ated, adorer and adored. Even so, I suggest we think otherwise. 
What if we think about the cute less as an aesthetic response to 
commodity, per se, than a discursivity? Cuteness is an aesthetic 
category that relies on a spectrum of appreciation, from disin-
terested nonreaction (think, for example, of the inundation of 
“cute” things to respond to on websites like Buzzfeed or Reddit) 
to a heightened affective experience of an object or artwork, one 
more closely related to classic Kantian or Burkean experiences 
of beauty. But aesthetic experience demands a commodity-
driven, consumptive closeness that Theodor W. Adorno finds 
goes beyond object relations to fuel our relationships to texts. 
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In “Lyric Poetry and Society,” Adorno purposefully points to 
poems that depart from the genre’s more common “delight in 
things close at hand” in order to resist the bourgeois subject’s 
desire to “reduce [these texts] to objects of fondling” (51). Aes-
thetic experience becomes, then, not only a sensuous or haptic 
relationship to objects, but to texts, discourse, or language. We 
may then say that the cute is a puzzling aesthetic state, based in 
“an eroticization of powerlessness, evoking tenderness for ‘small 
things’” (Ngai 3). Cuteness’s willingness to be provoked, fondled, 
entertained — its “tenderness” — suggests to me its openness to 
theory. Cuteness can open an intricate dialogue that destabilizes 
the basic dichotomies of power and disempowerment, subject 
and object, and simplicity and complexity. To examine early 
modern texts’ rhetorics of cuteness, then, will provocatively en-
courage reflection on our current obsessions with the cute and 
other contemporary aesthetic categories.
When we reorient the cute from its commodity drives and 
instead toward discourse itself, we may find key texts from the 
English Renaissance and early Restoration to be rich theoretical 
exercises in what we think we recognize as cuteness. I’d argue 
that in the English Renaissance, a tone or mode of precious-
ness appears in texts that historically predate our twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century thing-centered notion of the cute. Shake-
speare’s title figure, Hamlet, voices a “manic cuteness,” and Her-
rick’s manipulative authorial persona in Hesperides indicates the 
cutely cunning ways in which the reader can have an aesthetic 
experience with the book at hand. Drawing on the possibilities 
opened by minor or alternative affective and aesthetic catego-
ries, and renewed interest in subjects and objects in Renaissance 
culture, I’d like to examine how the cute is productively deployed 
in Hamlet and Hesperides through these texts’ discourses of the 
little and the cherished, exposing early modern obsessions with 
disempowerment, language as object, and audiences’ relation-
ships to text itself.1 To begin here, then, is to begin on a wide-
1 It is anachronistic to investigate the “cute” in a seventeenth-century context 
when the term had not yet been coined in its modern sense and did not en-
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ranging scale beyond commodity relations: What does it mean 
to rely on language’s preciousness, to depend on an evacuation 
of profundity or power? Can we consider cuteness a particular 
discursive disorder, when it is released from historicist etymol-
ogy and into a broader philological genealogy of aesthetic en-
gagement?
With these questions in mind, I first examine the cute’s ap-
pearance within the pinnacle of revenge tragedy, Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet, through a reading of Hamlet’s “antic” discursive practice 
of self belittling, exchanges that are undercut with eroticism and 
violence. The play invests its interest in childishness, feminin-
ity, and ultimately power, as discourse objects. Hamlet’s feigned 
madness, or “antic disposition,” is the most apparent spectacle 
of cuteness. As Hamlet assigns himself the role of dominated 
object, he places himself physically and semantically into pow-
erless positions. Take, for instance, his first noted appearance in 
the play after putting “an antic disposition on” (1.5.192). Ophelia 
ter popular use until the early twentieth century. While, of course, we ought 
not to abandon historicization entirely, we ought to “historicize differently” 
when it comes to aesthetics and, specifically, categories of aesthetic experi-
ence. As Ngai explains, “To restrict the analysis of [aesthetic categories] to 
a single artifact, or even to a cluster of artifacts produced in a thin slice of 
time, would be to immediately cut off a proper analysis of their meaning as 
aesthetic categories, which is to say objects widely distributed across what 
most literary and cultural scholars would consider culturally heterogeneous 
areas of time and space” (17). To examine vernacular styles “not only per-
mits but in a certain sense requires relating artifacts that prevailing, period-
based methods of doing cultural history discourage us from considering to-
gether” (17). Moreover, doing so in this context permits a wider reading and 
theoretical focus than a strictly historical study would allow, an approach 
that picks up on recent interest in time’s anachronisms, as iterated by Jona-
than Gil Harris. Harris explains that the “vice-like grip that a certain kind 
of historicism continues to have on scholarship in the field” is challenged by 
revised impulses to separate “now” from “then,” a new embrace of anachro-
nism’s “temporal distance and difference.” Harris reads Frederic Jameson’s 
famous imperative to “always historicize” as also suggesting that “histori-
cism needs to do more than simply read synchronically or diachronically; 
it also needs to consider how its objects are anachronistic assemblages that 
are temporally out of joint with themselves and their moment,” a timely 
“out-of-timeness” that resonates deeply with Hamlet’s own disjointedness. 
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tells her father of an odd encounter, when Hamlet appears to 
her:
…with his doublet all unbraced,
No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled,
Ungartered, and down-gyved to his ankle,
Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other,
And with a look so piteous in purport… (2.1.87–92)
Hamlet has clearly put work into his disordered appear-
ance — his clothes are askew or missing, much like a child at-
tempting to clothe himself. Ophelia seems therefore to be ob-
serving Hamlet as cutely childish in his disarray. Grounding the 
pathetic helplessness in this description are Hamlet’s “fouled” 
stockings, a possibly scatological detail about which Will Stock-
ton wonders, “Has Hamlet dragged his stockings on the ground, 
or just perhaps, has Hamlet soiled himself?” (x).2 With such 
echoes of infantilism, Hamlet seems to be a diminutive and 
powerless object. But the cute, as we know, cannot sustain such 
stable relations. Ophelia — whose innocent girlishness should, 
we assume, render her the cute party in this exchange — calls 
Hamlet “piteous,” and repeats the sentiment as she recounts that 
Hamlet “raised a sigh so piteous and profound” (2.1.106). The 
play’s logic of “know[ing] not ‘seems’” (1.2.77) allows us to read 
Hamlet’s apparently pathetic display of disorder as a disruptive 
display of power. Ophelia explains that as the unkempt Hamlet 
departed, he kept his eyes set on her, going “out o’ doors he went 
without their helps,” while his gaze “to the last bended their light 
on me” (2.1.111–12). This final gesture overturns the expectation 
that Hamlet is indeed piteous — while he appears pathetically 
disheveled, his intense final gaze places him as the active mem-
2 Hamlet’s “regression” to the anal stage of development — a stage that, ac-
cording to Freud, is associated with disciplines of organization, cleanliness, 
and self-control — seems feasible if the line is read within the discourse of 
psychoanalysis. While the soiled stockings will prove critical later in my 
analysis, my reading of the scene for now will move away from psychoa-
nalysis to better examine its most immediate dynamics of “cute” power.
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ber of the exchange, asking to be looked upon. Ophelia quickly 
turns from the observer/adorer to the observed/adored — a re-
minder both that Hamlet’s disorder (and Ophelia as love object) 
remains under his control, and that cuteness tends to upend and 
dishevel expected subject/object relationships.
The cute in Hamlet gains further complexity as Hamlet’s 
childlike antics, particularly with Ophelia, are clearly not all 
as innocent as childishly soiled stockings and gazes. Cuteness 
closely abuts the erotic. During the staging of “The Murder of 
Gonzago,” Hamlet slings sexual taunts at Ophelia, including 
asking, “Lady, shall I lie in your lap?” (3.2.119). Hamlet’s cute 
childishness makes visible the erotic charge of the lap, one that 
lies between maternal and sexual affections. Merish explores 
a similar collusion in child star Shirley Temple’s films, as her 
construction as innocent required “not so much the absence of 
sexuality as its active disavowal” (195).3 The sexuality of the cute 
meets the innocence of the cute in a highly charged scene. Mer-
ish argues that “staging cuteness as a mini-seduction met not by 
sexual violence or assault, but by protective care […] reinforce[s] 
a primary mythology of patriarchal ‘civilization’” (195). Moreo-
ver, Hamlet chooses to sit with Ophelia after a direct invitation 
to sit with his mother: “Come hither, my dear Hamlet, sit by 
me,” Gertrude implores (3.2.115). Hamlet refuses as he takes up a 
place near Ophelia. Replacing a childlike cuddle in his mother’s 
lap with the sexual request to “lie in [Ophelia’s] lap” (3.2.119), 
Hamlet disavows an incestuous desire for the mother figure 
while simultaneously posing Ophelia as a maternal counter-
point to his “inert” cute childishness. Again, his madness skews 
childish, as he refers to “merry-making,” “hobby horses,” and 
3 Films such as Poor Little Rich Girl (1936) and Dimples (1936) skirt the ideas 
of incest and pedophilia, particularly with Shirley’s characters and their fa-
thers. A scene in Poor Little Rich Girl finds Shirley singing of her desire 
to marry her fictional father as she cuddles in his lap, courting spectators’ 
desires by charming and disarming the adult men in her films. This scene, 
of course, is inverted in Hamlet — a cutely antic Hamlet ends up staging a 
potentially threatening sexual advance in front of Ophelia’s father, assault-
ing the purity that has been a frequent subject within the play.
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puppetry, all with erotic overtones. Hamlet’s cunning cuteness 
often relies on imagery of cutting or keenness — literalizing 
cute’s etymological base in acute, a wit or intelligence. Consider 
this exchange from the same scene:
HAMLET: I could interpret between you and your love, if I 
could see the puppets dallying.
OPHELIA: You are keen, my lord, you are keen.
HAMLET: It would cost you a groaning to take off mine edge.
OPHELIA: Still better and worse. (3.2.270–75)
Hamlet’s reliance on the figures of “keenness” and “edge,” and 
Ophelia’s equivocal response “better and worse,” indicates a gra-
dient of sharpness. In obvious sexual innuendo, Hamlet invites 
Ophelia to take his discursive “edge.” This echoes the language 
of sharpness begun with Hamlet’s first lines in the play, spoken 
in response to Claudius’s reference to Hamlet as his son. Hamlet 
responds with a volumetric and punning “little more” and “little 
less”: “A little more than kin, and less than kind” (1.2.67).
Hamlet, I argue, can therefore be established as a cutely antic 
figure as he puts on cuteness for purposes of power. Yet to what 
extent does cuteness put him on? I’d like to press this further, to 
examine what a cute Hamlet changes about our theoretical un-
derstanding of cuteness as a distinct aesthetic. In a realm reliant 
on the machination of subject and object, activity and passivity, 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cuteness begins to erode bi-
nary categories in a mode that echoes Lee Edelman’s urgings to 
review binarisms that place in opposition “a valued activity and 
a derogated passivity, in a way that is ultimately tied to the for-
mation and articulation of the subject in culture” (Masten, “Fun-
dament” 135). Jeffrey Masten explains the “modern regime” as 
one in which the “civic authority of subject status” is “purchased 
through the projective refusal of the luxurious ‘passivity,’ […] 
that signifies the erotic indulgence of the self that always threat-
ens to undo the ‘self ’” (135). If we accept Hamlet “being cute,” 
we may entertain the modern gloss on “being cute” as being a 
smart-ass. The term smart-ass, likely unknown to the Renais-
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sance, nonetheless opens the discourse of the cute in Hamlet by 
returning us to Hamlet’s soiled stockings in Act II.4 Rather than 
connecting them to a Freudian or Lacanian anal stage, Masten 
returns to the anal in Renaissance culture to the foundation or 
fundament, a rhetoric that “may participate in the rhetoric of 
the low,” yet is a “lowliness with a positive valence — the foun-
dational is hardly a negative rhetoric in this culture” but is rather 
connected to a depth, grounding, or profundity (134). John Flo-
rio’s translation of the Italian fondatamente, Masten notes, takes 
its meaning from this constellation of terms, thereby aiding a 
rethinking of what we call the anus and its connections to seats 
of power and seats of “privately owned subjectivity” (135). Re-
sisting binarism of high and low then lies in “a strangely active-
passive position: It is the ground but also the groundwork; the 
seat but also the offspring; the founding and the foundation” 
(135). This becomes an ascribed “queer cuteness,” of sorts, which 
continually jeopardizes active/passive binaries. 
This kind of cuteness opens us to queer philology. Masten 
explains this philology as an etymological mode that releases us 
from backward-looking history, as it “forces us to develop ever-
expanding lexicons of erotic and affective terms and their rela-
tions” (“Toward” 374). Queer philology “considers vocabularies 
of sexuality, desire, affect, and kinship as points of contact that 
draw surprising connections between past and present and defa-
miliarize seemingly transhistorical affective lexicons” (Nicolaz-
zo 206). Instead of focusing temporally on when certain terms 
4 While this exact phrase was not known in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, it is not unconscionable that the idea of it was present. James M. 
Bromley, writing on anilingus in “Rimming the Renaissance,” a chapter in 
the collection Sex before Sex, explains that Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist (1610) 
suggests Subtle directing Face to the backside of his body, “with the com-
mand to lick,” a “barb akin to the modern ‘kiss my ass.’” Bromley’s chapter 
therefore supports the ahistoricizing I suggest here, with the purpose of ask-
ing what work these sexualized references do in “gesturing toward alternate 
organizations of bodies, pleasures, and subjectivities even in contexts that 
load them with negative affect.” His anachronism is “productive in linking 
early modern and modern interruptions in the abstraction of sexual identi-
ties from sexual practices” (171).
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appear or develop, queer philology asks about relationships of 
terms and their networks. This stresses some of Ngai’s registers 
of the cute, and opens some intriguing avenues. To speak of the 
cute draws attention not only to the cute in itself, but to the way 
in which we speak about the cute. Those who are judging ob-
jects or persons as cute are often “cute” themselves, and echo 
the coos and babble of the cute object — putting on a passiv-
ity that the speech means to recognize passivity in an other. As 
Ngai observes, cuteness then calls attention to the “centrality of 
discourse (its compulsive use by aesthetic subjects to publicize 
or share their feelings) to aesthetic judgment in general” (60). 
Cuteness productively and uniquely embeds the kind of philo-
logical kinship between speaker and spoken, subject and object, 
that philology itself theorizes. Drawing on philological kinship 
systems further in theorizing the cute, I return to Masten’s ref-
erence to Florio. Florio’s work is especially useful in inquiring 
about the queer philology of the cute, since the multiple ways in 
which he translates the Italian acuto marks a revealing range of 
the term’s meanings. Synonyms that echo contemporary senses 
of the term appear — “sharpe pointed, keene, subtill, wittie, poli-
tike, wilie, warie, ingenious” — but then Florio adds, “Also a pin 
or peg of wood” (33). Not only does this the corroborate the 
keenness, wiliness, and political edge of acute that surfaces in 
my reading of cuteness and Hamlet’s wit, but also the secondary, 
physical meaning of acuto — a pin or peg. 
A much-discussed passage of Hamlet of course revolves 
around a particular peg, the “bunghole” that gathers up the 
play’s dynamic attentions to bodily waste, dirt, and erotics and 
has clear resonance with penetrative erotic acts.5 In the grave-
digging scene, Hamlet contemplates the mortality of Yorick, his 
childhood jester, and then remarks to Horatio:
5 I use the term erotic acts here rather than intercourse largely to accommo-
date the historical differences between our concept of intercourse and that 
of the Renaissance. A product of discourse, as Foucault has noted, sex could 
refer to any number of acts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from 
chin chucking to anilingus to sex with trees or plants. For a full examination 
of this subject, see Sex before Sex, as mentioned in note 4.
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To what base uses we may return, Horatio! Why may not 
imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander til he find it 
stopping a bunghole? […] and why of that loam whereto he 
was converted might they not stop a beer barrel? (5.1.209–19) 
The bunghole is, in fact, literally dirty, being made of “dust” or 
“loam.” Yet more figuratively, the act of plugging or “stopping” 
holes makes the act of vaginal or anal intercourse both “dirty” 
acts, conflating the licit and illicit as the era’s definitions of per-
missible erotic acts were in continual flux. Confusions continue 
in the very etymology of bunghole. The Oxford English Diction-
ary explains its etymology from Dutch (bonghe) and German 
(punt, punte), with similar adoption in French as bonde. All of 
these terms, however, have been theorized to stem from the Lat-
in puncta, or hole, a word that shifts its referent between both 
the hole of the barrel and its stopper. As early as the sixteenth 
century, its meaning transfers to the slang usage of bunghole as 
anus. As discourses of the vaginal and anal begin to conflate in 
the active/passive binaries of the cute or acute, shifting both lit-
eral and figural positions of parties involved in the erotic act, so 
too do the referents begin to lose their precision in the etymol-
ogy of the word bunghole itself. Richard Halpern’s explanation 
of sodomy as something that cannot be represented, constitut-
ing “a kind of empty hole in discourse, about which nothing 
directly can be said,” dredges up an image of holes and emp-
tiness that echoes the physical imagery of Hamlet’s “peg” and 
“bunghole” in this erotic-yet-also-discursive sense (Halpern). A 
hole in discourse, empty and unspeakable, is precisely what the 
cute relies on, as cuteness evacuates language’s profundity and 
reduces it to coos. 
Consider Hamlet’s discourse, which “speak[s] daggers” 
(3.2.429), yet also speaks passive softness. Hamlet’s soliloquies 
frequently utilize languages of sleep, melting, and immobility 
that paint Hamlet himself as disabled and innocuous. Feign-
ing insanity, Hamlet manages a conversation with Polonius 
that is equally soft and acute in Act III, when Polonius appears 
to beckon Hamlet to speak with his mother, Gertrude. Ham-
204
the retro-futurism of cuteness
let, however, will have none of Polonius’s manipulative duplic-
ity, and makes his own demands in turn. “Do you see yonder 
cloud that’s almost in shape of a camel?” (3.2.406), Hamlet asks, 
only to then declare, “Methinks it is a weasel,” and finally, “like 
a whale” (3.2.409, 411). Not only does he wrest control of the 
conversation by redirecting Polonius’s attention to cloud gazing, 
Hamlet also controls what Polonius finds he is seeing as he ap-
peases Hamlet’s caprice. The soft and innocuous clouds become 
a tool for Hamlet’s manipulations. Hamlet does not only achieve 
this manipulation with others onstage but with us as well, as 
images of his body and will accumulate as injured, melted, or 
malformed. In his first soliloquy, he muses, “O, that this too, 
too solid flesh would melt, / Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew” 
(1.2.133–34). The images of the line bring in proximity the image 
of melting flesh — a grotesque thought — and the “cuteness” of 
the malleable, liquefiable, vulnerable body. Later, in 2.2, another 
soliloquy places Hamlet and his own body again as vulnerable: 
“what a rogue and peasant slave am I!” (2.2.577), he cries, a “dull 
and muddy-mettled rascal” (2.2.594) who is beardless, femi-
nine, childlike, and “pigeon-livered” (2.2.604). And, in 3.1, his 
soliloquy invites “sleep,” a sleep “to say we end / The heartache 
and the thousand natural shocks / That flesh is heir to — ’tis a 
consummation / devoutly to be wished. To die, to sleep —  / To 
sleep, perchance to dream. Ay, there’s the rub” (3.1.69–73). Since 
these lines of soft bodies and sleepy muteness are not spoken to 
other characters, Hamlet deftly begins cooing to us, too, of his 
powerlessness. 
This also resembles Hamlet’s antic muteness as he sharply 
refuses to speak or wrests control of conversation in the play, a 
characteristic of the cute’s general antidiscursivity. After recall-
ing Alexander, Hamlet shifts back to verse to muse on “imperi-
ous Caesar,” who, like Alexander, once “dead and turned to clay / 
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away” (5.1.220–21). Hamlet 
here seems to worry less about the processes of degeneration 
and decomposition of the body than he does about the uses of 
the body’s remnants after this process as a stopping of discourse, 
or “wind,” as it reads here. A connection of spirit, breath, and 
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speech, Carla Mazzio explains in “The History of Air: Hamlet 
and the Trouble with Instruments,” wind is connected to a sense 
of rhetorical self in its roots in the Greek pneuma. What be-
comes of this self when it is connected to the “seat of subjectivi-
ty”? Is Hamlet saying more than he thinks in declaring, “what an 
ass am I!” (2.2.611)? If we believe what Masten argues — that the 
rhetoric of baseness and anality in the Renaissance was actually 
a rhetoric of productive subjectivity — then Hamlet’s concern 
over the malleable softness of the body, which he dramatizes 
in his antic cuteness, is actually a rehearsal for the subjectivity 
that seems only to be evident after death, when one does stop 
the barrel. Stephen Greenblatt’s reading of Hamlet’s first solilo-
quy on “too solid flesh” arrives here, too, at an encounter with 
the grave (and at Masten’s “other grave”) that voices Hamlet’s 
anxiety over the materiality of human remains. Once kings, Ju-
lius Caesar, Alexander, and, in some senses, King Hamlet are all 
now reduced to basal bunghole stoppers, something both com-
mon and royal, active and passive, powerful and powerless, all 
alchemized through the “matter” of being.
The play encourages such attentions to the animating and 
deadening powers of language, as well as the empty seat of 
subjectivity of the speaking body. The play’s metatheatrical-
ity — with the staging of “The Murder of Gonzago” the most 
obvious evidence — brings to light “puppetry.” Puppets, obvi-
ously, are child’s toys or are designed for children’s entertain-
ment, empty and soundless save for performed manipulations. 
Though seemingly childish and minor, “puppet moments,” as 
Kenneth Gross calls them, ask us to inquire about the actor’s 
gestures, or gestures that are the actor, and they further physi-
calize and remind us of the actor’s body onstage, something as 
important to contemporary drama as it was to Shakespeare’s 
theater. These moments call attention to multiple competing 
“theaters” of ambiguous mastery on psychological, political, and 
metaphysical registers (276). The idea of puppets, in material 
and immaterial modes, evokes patterns of mastery and manipu-
lation, the very workings behind Hamlet’s antic cuteness and 
deployment of passivity and activity. Gross points to the scene 
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in Act III where Hamlet asks Guildenstern to play a wooden 
recorder, though Guildenstern insists he cannot play it. “Do you 
think I am easier to be played upon than a pipe?” Hamlet asks. 
“Call me what instrument you will, you cannot play upon me” 
(3.2.360–63). Hamlet’s response “gives vent to his rage, com-
plaining that he himself is not a pipe to be played on by such an 
incompetent musician of guile, such a crude interpreter of his 
absolute mysteries” (279). Hamlet’s anxiety over becoming pup-
pet himself is apparent here, even as he childishly puts on the 
puppet show of antics for others. Mazzio observes of this scene 
that while Hamlet’s body “may be interpellated as an ‘instru-
ment,’” it is an instrument “that cannot, he stresses, simply be 
breathed into by another in order to produce ‘discourse,’ sweet 
airs, not more to the point, recordable knowledge” (158). Cute-
ness and plays of cuteness, then, become all the more duplici-
tous as distinctions blur between object and subject, player and 
played, and manipulator and manipulated.
Hamlet’s “being cute,” in conjunction with what is already 
transpiring in the play (and within recent Shakespeare scholar-
ship) on Hamlet’s assery and excrement, solidifies the cute’s cu-
rious work through Renaissance rhetoric. This work extends to 
other Shakespearean texts. Take Nick Bottom’s literal transfor-
mation into an ass in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, after which 
he tells the story of his dream that “hath no bottom” (4.1.209). 
While it is unclear whether bottom and ass were understood as 
synonymous in the Renaissance, it is worth noting that Bottom’s 
depths of imagination have no foundations, or are “‘antifunda-
mentalist’ in the sense that the locus of textual, interpretive au-
thority is persistently elusive” (Stockton 354). And certainly, this 
elusiveness is of equal import in Hamlet. 
That Hamlet chooses a “cute,” lingually-driven insanity al-
lows him to brush against his own threatening nature — he 
speaks openly of the erotic with Ophelia, speaking the danger 
that Polonius feared for his daughter’s innocence, and speaks so 
openly to Claudius that he gives away his sadistic hand, gaining 
effusive pleasure at the potential discomfort he causes Claudius 
during what he childishly names “The Mousetrap” (a term that 
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itself discloses the pleasure at catching and torturing cute, soft 
things). The cute easily occludes the threat it contains, or be-
comes threatening — from Hamlet’s language of childishness, 
disempowerment, and play, we arrive at the question of look-
ing, of observers and the observed. When the players voice con-
cern over the “little eyases” that are, indeed, the literal threat 
of child’s play — children’s theater groups that encroached upon 
Shakespeare’s and other acting companies in the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries — we are reminded that the cute also 
occludes what we may think is certain about foundations of au-
thority, meaning, and where the “seat” of discursivity lies.
To further entertain the ways in which the cute can inform 
our contemporary understandings of aesthetics and discourse, 
subject and object, I turn to Herrick’s supposedly simple poetry 
in Hesperides, a work that has taken long to recover from fre-
quent critical admonishments of its “cuteness.” His minute at-
tention to objects, his considerations moving “piece by piece,” 
makes not only his poetic subjects small, but also his poetry it-
self slight. “Upon his Departure Hence,” for instance, consists of 
twenty-nine words over fifteen lines, a frustratingly “thin” poem 
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It is perhaps because of this smallness of focus that “for many 
of the poet’s early twentieth-century critics, Herrick’s seduc-
tive poetic surfaces bespoke a lack of depth, a shallowness of 
thought that excluded him from being categorized among the 
great ‘metaphysical’ poets of his age” (Johnson 149). But, I ask, 
what exactly in Herrick’s works has been misread so as to cutely 
hobble his already adorable poetics?
As the collection’s introductory poem, “The Argument of his 
Book,” indicates, the poems within evaluate the world in parts 
as the poems “sing of brooks, of blossoms, birds, and bowers,” 
taking their subjects “piece by piece,” as small as the “court of 
Mab, and of the fairy king” (H-1). The work’s delight in its own 
small verses belies the length of the volume itself — comprised 
of 1,402 brief poems, it necessarily “exhausts the attention, both 
of reader and of writer […] one is always starting over again, 
only to go not very far” (qtd. in Dobranski 153). In modern 
criticism, Herrick’s trivial subjects receive an eviscerating con-
demnation — apparently, something “major and male is absent” 
(Kerrigan 155). For all of Herrick’s delight in details of his be-
loved’s body or small objects, or in the pastoral fantasies of May 
Day, Gordon Braden brazenly declares:
The emphasis on foreplay and nongenital, especially oral, 
gratifications, the fixation on affects (smells, textures) and 
details (Julia’s leg), and general voyeuristic preference of per-
ception to action […] are all intelligible as a wide diffusion of 
erotic energy denied specifically orgiastic focus and release. 
What is missing in Hesperides is an aggressive, genital, in 
other words, “adult” sexuality. (223) 
While this necessarily must be understood as a dated criticism, 
I find Braden’s assumption of knowing Herrick’s aesthetics re-
sults in a troubling misreading, particularly in light of the cute. 
While Leah S. Marcus and others have noted Herrick’s “trusting, 
childlike faith,” this makes his works no less erotic, and it reveals 
Braden as highly susceptible to the lure of the cute’s supposedly 
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innocent tease.6 Moreover, this opens a new line of much-need-
ed inquiry into Herrick’s alternative modes of talking about “po-
litical seriousness, allow[ing] [his poems] to be what they seem 
to be […] and also to be major achievements” (Kerrigan 157). I 
argue that Braden’s “something missing” is a productive empti-
ness or absence, which I’d connect to the bunghole discussion 
in Hamlet in “queering” what we consider significant sexualities 
or political motivations. William Kerrigan finds that Herrick 
“does not, like Sidney, Shakespeare, and Donne, negotiate with 
female honor […] [H]is relative disinterest in intercourse [at 
least, that which is explicitly named and not shied away from] 
is part and parcel of an aura of innocence […] [and] his regres-
sive and sexual imaginings, though full of retreats and expur-
gations, also make contact with a primal intercourse” (157). I’d 
agree that Herrick refuses to engage in debates over the conduct 
of women, and the cycles of self-hatred or loathing undergone 
in Astrophil and Stella, for example, are not present in Herrick’s 
work. Yet what Braden and others miss is Herrick’s readiness to 
engage in erotic relationships that are not sexual in our modern 
sense of the discourse, his troubling of that which seems politi-
cal and serious inquiry within seventeenth-century poetics, and 
6 Marcus specifically makes this point in Childhood and Cultural Despair 
(138). Childhood, Marcus writes, was an enduring and powerful symbol of 
nationhood and the nation’s future, “a symbol so compelling that the most 
extreme among [conservative Anglicans], quixotically abandoning their 
church’s orthodoxy out of devotion to an image of her past, denied or di-
luted her teachings on original sin and even went a considerable distance 
toward undoing the English Reformation” (Childhood 44). I have two cen-
tral thoughts about this. First, it cannot go unnoticed that in the same year 
as Braden, Marcus manages in this text to take a far more encompassing 
and nuanced view to Herrick’s works. And secondly, Marcus additionally 
has managed to use the seventeenth century to preview Lee Edelman’s later 
(and very twentieth- and twenty-first-century) work on the child as face 
of the future in No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Edelman 
outlines a vision of queer theory that overturns the pervasive figure of the 
child, which has become the face of heteronormative reproductive privi-
lege. His “no future” is an anti-negativist view, one that serves as a polemi-
cal call to overturn conventional ideas of futurism and forward thinking in 
light of queer theory.
210
the retro-futurism of cuteness
his ventures into other erotic desires, including the pressing and 
increasingly erotic need for textual consumption, or consum-
mation of the reader and text. 
The cute in Herrick’s poetry reveals the body as bawdy and 
inseparable from the text itself. The Julia poem, “Upon her Feet,” 
dotes on Julia’s detailed body parts:
Her pretty feet
Like snailes did creep
A little out, and then,
As if they played at Bo-peep,
Did soon draw in agen. (H-525)
The erotic feet, peeking out presumably from a woman’s skirt, 
play childishly at peek-a-boo, and the speaker himself mentions 
Bo Peep, a child’s nursery rhyme. A blazon, Herrick’s eroticiza-
tion of parts (and notably, childlike parts) was not unusual in his 
era. Cutting to pieces or cutifying the body — whether socially 
or symbolically — proliferated in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century England and Europe.7 All of these phenomena have giv-
en rise to recent criticism on the logic of fragmentation in early 
modern scholarship (Hillman and Mazzio xi). This piecing or 
parting of the body, however, was not always in fragment but a 
body that “is ‘in’ parts, that is constituted by a multiplicity of in-
dividuated organs” (xi). A critical “part” of this interest in parts 
was the fashion of blazons, poems devoted often to anatomical 
parts of a love interest that were then collected and itemized into 
a woman’s body (only one poet managed to write a full body). 
These poems were therefore an extension or exaggeration of 
the descriptive mode itself.8 As Nancy Vickers explains, “Bla-
7 This includes punitive dismemberment, pictorial isolation, poetic embla-
zoning, satirical biting, scientific categorizing, and medical anatomizing.
8 While this seems an admirable exercise, frequently these poems fell vic-
tim to their own stylization as they “attempted a microdescription that ul-
timately failed to be descriptive” and failed to establish synecdoche “as a 
properly operant trope by rhetorically stressing a fiction of lyric address in 
which the addressee was not a whole woman, but, rather, a part of a wom-
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zons not only describe the body parts they praise, they serenade 
them; they plead with them; they urge them to respond” (4). 
The details of the body become a catalog of discourse, qualities 
in which “evocative units, like aphorisms, generally could stand 
alone, could assume another position without sacrificing mean-
ing,” making them continually rearrangeable as the poems focus 
the reader’s eye on a single detail (4).
Mirroring the ways the blazonic textual body is in pieces, 
that which we may consider the aesthetic category of cutely 
or beautifully attractive appears already an affective response 
to unwholeness or incompleteness. For example, for Edmund 
Burke, beauty is already a response to powerlessness. He ob-
serves that beauty need not be contingent upon perfection, since 
in the female sex, beauty “almost always carries with it an idea 
of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this; 
for which reason; they learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to 
counterfeit weakness, and even sickness […] Beauty in distress 
is much the most affecting beauty” (1909–14). Beauty’s connec-
tion to the sleepy, infirm, or disabled makes Burkean beauty a 
gloss on the cute.9 The mutilated or pieced body, then, is also 
already a disturbingly cute body.
an — a nose, or a tooth, or a hand” (Vickers 4). This may be a reason why 
blazons are poorly anthologized. An anthology from the 1950s compiled 
by Albert-Marie Schmidt, for example, eliminated portions of the blazons 
he included. Modern editors have similarly and “unfailingly truncated and 
imposed an order on the collection,” reordering misplaced limbs and cor-
recting deformities to re-member the female body in a mode less uncon-
ventional, though perhaps still disturbing (Vickers 5).
9 Even today’s commoditized cuteness retains this aesthetic theory. Cute dolls 
often are disabled, weakened, or missing limbs — in fact, the popular 1980s 
line of Cabbage Patch Kids was parodied by the Garbage Pail Kids. These 
“kids” resembled the plump-cheeked Cabbage Patch Kids, but sported 
missing eyes, cranial ruptures, and other impediments. A Google search for 
“injured teddy bear” turns up a range of buyable bears plastered with tiny 
bandages and clinging to petite crutches. Cute language often babbles or 
lisps, including that which is often pasted into online meme images of talk-
ing cats. For example, the famed “I can has cheezburger?” “lolcat” meme, 
created by Hawaiian blogger Eric Nakagawa and his friend Kari Unebasami 
in 2007, has now led to lolcat generators and an internet archive of lolcats 
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Herrick’s “argument of his book” is ultimately more than tak-
ing on small structures or small pastoral subjects, but takes a 
wider focus on the book’s cuteness. Herrick ostensibly employs 
the cute to create a portrait of a vanishing, innocent England. 
The poems — innocent as they may appear — are, of course, a 
careful intervention in both literary and political conflict. A roy-
alist eager to defend both the monarchy and the church against 
its opposition, his poetry celebrates the kinds of rural pastimes 
found in The Book of Sports, issued by James I in 1617 and then 
republished by Charles I in 1633. The book was designed to 
encourage rural activities such as dancing and Maypoles, and 
was “an attempt, often repeated, to link upper and lower classes 
against the austere, cerebral culture of the middle class through 
the medium of a shared popular culture” (Dimmock and Had-
field 8). Parliament would later demand the book be burned in 
1643. Herrick’s arguably most famous poem, “To the Virgins, to 
Make Much of Time,” explicitly encourages a delight in the ma-
terial gifts of the world: “Gather ye Rose-buds while ye may, / 
Old Time is still a flying: / And this same flower that smiles to 
day, / To morrow will be dying” (H-208). This carpe diem advice 
echoes what his Hesperides, in their bevy of adored objects, ar-
gue for implicitly. Here, Herrick’s navigation of the cute is par-
ticularly of interest in its relation to how one is to physically 
treat, digest, and understand a book as object. Cuteness, as it 
often does, seems to render things inert — a particular critique 
of poetry’s “uselessness.” Rather than acting as cutting commen-
tary on England’s political surround, poetry’s cuteness insulates 
it from making an impact, a phenomenon the Hesperides inter-
rogates. 
Herrick’s awareness of the materiality of his texts makes his 
Hesperides particularly concerned with the reader’s treatment 
of the book itself. Worried about his book’s treatment by print-
(www.icanhas.cheezburger.com). The popularity of lolcat and other memes 
showcases the continued aesthetic appeal of an animal, a toddler, or a young 
woman “putting on” the cute display of weak vulnerability through mis-
speaking and impediment.
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ers, and in turn his readers’ evaluation of the text because of 
this, Herrick asks in “To Sir George Parrie, Doctor of the Civill 
Law,” that the reader engage in a particular relationship to the 
book. With Parrie as surrogate for the reader, Herrick asks Par-
rie to read his works “first as Doctor,” to diagnose and assess, 
“and the last as Knight” to defend the verses (H-1062). He asks 
that perhaps “But one” poem is “hug’d and cherished” (H-1062). 
This language of hugging, cherishing, and valuing a piece or 
part to a whole invites a reader response, as one does to the cute. 
As the reader is asked to squish, to savor, to engage in a haptic 
relationship with the text, so does the cute invite (and, occasion-
ally, demand) touch — the romantic fantasy to grasp or cuddle 
the object. As Ngai notes, the distinction between the cute’s re-
lation to objects and that of other more accepted aesthetic cat-
egories is precisely in this relationship to touch and sensuous 
feeling. While the beautiful feels coldly distant, cute “homey 
objects [are] imagined as unusually responsive to the subject’s 
desire for an ever more intimate, sensuous relation to them,” 
she observes (54). Moreover, “cuteness contains none of beauty’s 
oft-noted references to novelty, singularity, or what [Theodor] 
Adorno calls ‘a sphere of untouchability’” (54). Beauty’s removal 
from the realm of haptics further distinguishes the cute as an in-
timate, physical closeness, making Herrick’s Hesperides encour-
age a closeness to physical text as aesthetic object, not merely a 
poetic beauty.
Herrick’s ideal reader, then, may choose to engage in this cute 
relationship through the recording of his verses in the reader’s 
sententiae or commonplace book, a common practice among 
educated classes in the seventeenth century. As print culture 
rose, readers increasingly began placing together small, “irrele-
vant” pieces of text into their “tables.” The practice of “chopping” 
and “piecing” aphorisms, adages, and proverbs “made cute” and 
collectible the lengthier rhetoric of the day’s literature — cutify-
ing the work. The subject’s relation to language and text then 
became more easily able or invited to be copied, consumed, and 
digested. These “cute” lines evidence an “almost universal taste 
for such things as proverbs, maxims, apothegms, aphorisms, 
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and sententiae — literary forms that were felt to encapsulate, 
briefly and pithily, universal perceptions and wisdom about hu-
man experience, both public and private” (Beal 135). Yet Her-
rick worries that readers will tear or cut up his book’s pages for 
less lofty purposes than such cherishing. One poem frets, “I see 
thee lie / Torn for the use of pasterie: / Or see thy injur’d leaves 
serve well, / To make loose gownes for mackarell” (H-844). His 
concern over the collection’s physicality (and potential for mis-
treatment) points to the risk of printing his “starry verse” into 
mere vessel for gustatory consumptions. For all of his poems’ 
delight in the simple pastoral life, or in a lover, or the nature of 
heaven and immortality, Herrick is equally vengeful upon the 
reader’s interpretive or physical violence to the book. If readers 
do physical damage to his book, Herrick hopes that “every ill, 
that bites, or smarts, / Perplexe him in his hinder parts” (H-5). 
If readers fail to find any enjoyment in his poetry, finding it “All 
disgustfull be,” Herrick wishes literal ill upon them: “The ex-
treame scabbe take thee, and thine, for me” (H-6), or that the 
reader’s hand will develop painful swelling, “for to unslate, or to 
untile that thumb!” (H-173). The charm of his poems becomes 
a weapon to strike the readers’ cut-up, fragmented body parts, 
from “hinder parts,” to skin, to thumbs — all parts necessary to 
physically peruse the book and figuratively digest it. This turn 
echoes ironically the blazoning that the poetry performs on Ju-
lia and others. While Herrick may cut his love object to pieces, 
the reader dares not do the same to Herrick’s poetry itself. 
The solid “objectness” of Herrick’s attentions to his physi-
cal “booke” and his readers’ bodily materiality may seem an-
tithetical to this chapter’s interest in working with and against 
Ngai’s theorization of the cute as necessarily coincident with 
capitalist consumption. However, I argue that in doing so, Her-
rick turns language into object, which itself may be consumed 
as a destabilization of precisely what may be consumed in the 
reading process. Ngai implies in her work that the cute arises 
in conjunction with the onslaught of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century consumer culture — that the cute is necessar-
ily consumptive. However, throughout this chapter, I set out the 
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idea that there is an ahistorical cuteness of text and of language 
in the Renaissance and early Restoration, one that exists beyond 
the realms of modern and postmodern consumption, jeopard-
izes the easy association of cute with consumability, and returns 
the cute to the problems of language and discourse. Perhaps this 
is the cute’s greatest, most unassuming threat — that an aesthetic 
did, and may continue to be able to, exist outside consumer cul-
ture.
Herrick’s cute verses become erotic, threatening, and power-
ful in their demands on the subject, much as Hamlet’s cute an-
tics — meant to soften and diffuse his ostensible political pow-
er — end up being the most acute threat throughout the play 
and, arguably, the most acute threat to the play. Herrick’s poems 
engage the cute in edged modes similar to Hamlet — ones that 
alter our ideas of power, bodies, discourse objects, and texts 
themselves. In destabilizing and threatening the typical struc-
tures of normativity and subjectivity, the discursivity of cute-
ness enables us to disassemble and broaden the ideas embedded 
within it. 
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Cute Lacerations in Doctor 
Faustus and Omkara
Tripthi Pillai
Bollywood’s sexy “item songs” and Christopher Marlowe’s 
scenes of bodily, erotic exchange are violently cute for simi-
lar reasons. They each “create or facilitate kinds of ‘between-
ness’ — relays, conduits, associations — that in turn facilitate 
the circulation of texts, objects, and signs” (Ngai 115). Bubbling 
confluences of cuteness and violence, the songs and scenes com-
plicate narratives of futurity by dismantling them from their 
core purpose and position of power, positing nothing concrete 
in their place — neither in terms of narrative directionality nor 
in the sense of purposefulness. So often associated with futil-
ity and fragility, cuteness erupts as a violent instrument of or-
ganizational breakdown in Marlowe’s play Doctor Faustus and 
Vishal Bhardwaj’s film Omkara (2006). In this chapter I attempt 
to make explicit the lacerating action within these texts that ren-
ders dangerous the invasive potentiality of cute substance. Spe-
cifically, I offer readings of two instances of cute laceration — a 
scene from Doctor Faustus and a song from Omkara — to high-
light the affective irreverence and aggression of cuteness when 
it collides with normative narratives of biological, reproductive 
futurity. While Marlowe’s text focuses on the development of 
cuteness as surreptitious manipulation of normative reproduc-
tion, Bhardwaj’s film bursts with “sinthomosexual” cuteness as 
the usurpation of symbolic meaning in narratives of futurity. In 
each instance, cuteness “item”-izes itself as violence in scenes 
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and gestures that, while seemingly insubstantial in their small-
ness, lacerate the central narrative’s spatial and temporal thesis.
Mapping the Violence of Cuteness
The implicit violence of cuteness may be diagrammed in the 
etymological action of cutting the word cute out of acute. Acute 
has various uses and related meanings, with the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED) tracing its earliest usage to 1398, in the medi-
cal context of sickness or disease. Acuteness retains its sense of 
sharpness throughout its development in the English language: 
as painful, pointed, penetrating, keen or intense, pungent, se-
vere or critical, and urgent. In its early use the word cute alludes 
to keenness or sharpness. But somewhere along its history it 
makes a violent break from acuteness and relocates its mean-
ing within the context of ineptitude. Daniel Harris reminds us 
that, in the context of modernity, “[s]omething becomes cute 
not necessarily because of a quality it has but because of a qual-
ity it lacks, a certain neediness and inability to stand alone, as if 
it were an indigent starveling, lonely and rejected because of a 
hideousness we find more touching than unsightly” (4). 
Although its most commonly recognized and desired qual-
ity is its ubiquity of appeal, cute substance is placed paradoxi-
cally within “a class of outcasts and mutations” (Harris 4), along 
with other socially maligned affective categories like horror and 
pornography (Ngai 3). The hideousness and violence associated 
with these other mutant aesthetics must not be overlooked in 
the case of the cute. For if cuteness typically elicits in modern 
humans what Hannah Arendt condemns as their petty quest for 
“being happy […] between dog and cat and flowerpot,” it also 
harbors a brutal potential for dislodging the foundations upon 
which these materials stand as objects capable of producing and 
representing commonplace happiness (qtd. in Ngai 3). 
It does so by coercing an environment of violent mutuality. 
For instance, cute objects elicit a certain violence of emotion 
from the uncute that defines their mutual relations. In its careful 
avoidance of sharpness, cute substance manages to present itself 
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immediately to the human as harmless, as matter and affect that 
require protection from acute states of being and feeling, includ-
ing human being and feeling. In other words, the protective im-
pulse that cuteness mobilizes in us thrives on our knowledge of 
our own ability to crush and destroy the thing we feel compelled 
to cuddle almost to the point of permanent damage or destruc-
tion.1 At the same time, cuteness thrives on the affective energy 
produced by its imitation of its Other. Cute objects become cut-
er when they choose to imitate uncute objects functioning with-
in uncute environs. As Harris explains, toddlers are considered 
especially cute when they embrace precociousness as opposed 
to helplessness and play the role of violent parents, “thrashing 
disobedient teddy bears” (12–13). The problematic cuteness of 
imitation hinges in part on the actors’ ability to lay bare actions 
most of us agree are best kept private: it is the toddlers’ exposure 
of parental violence that makes their role-playing both cute and 
disturbing. Similarly, children’s mimicry of the nuclear family 
setup is often interpreted as cute when they simulate erotic ac-
tion (kissing) and other motions that focus on the vulnerable 
body (bathing, urinating, defecating), just as their imitation of 
nondomestic cultures of adult professionalism is deemed cute 
when they mimic social environments that openly propagate 
unequal power relations (classrooms, doctors’ offices). While 
the adult actions they imitate aren’t violent in the strictest sense, 
children’s cute imitations of adult activity draw attention to the 
simultaneous pleasure and shame we experience in controlling, 
or failing to control, our own or others’ bodies. As Harris’s ex-
ample of “toddlers thrashing disobedient teddy bears” suggests, 
cute imitations of the uncute hint at the secret relationship to 
power that we otherwise strive to conceal. 
Thus, as Sianne Ngai notes, unlike the more stable aesthetic 
category of beauty, which can idealize both its subject and its 
1 In an important sense, our love affair with cuteness hinges on the para-
doxical resilience of cute substance that we expect will always bounce back 
each time, reshaping itself into a cuddly or fuzzy helpless mass, ready to be 
abused repeatedly by us while perpetuating our investment in its symbolic 
appeal as our Other.
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object, the “equivocal nature” of cuteness “clarifies […] that to 
aestheticize something is not necessarily to idealize or even re-
vere it” (23). Moreover, the equivocation of cuteness prompts 
in us anxiety regarding its manipulative capacity: “the aesthetic 
experience of cuteness is a pleasure routinely overridden by sec-
ondary feelings of suspicion,” claims Ngai (25). The suspicion, 
which science writer Natalie Angier suggests is a product of our 
angry recognition of “being exploited or deceived” or exposed 
by an object that we assume can easily be destroyed by us (qtd. 
in Ngai 24), undermines our initial sense of empowerment. Our 
suspicion also leads us to enact violence upon ourselves: we re-
strict our own actions, depriving ourselves of the predictable 
sensory and affective pleasures to be had from cuddling, touch-
ing, or helping cute substance. Fooled by the deceptive object, 
we punish ourselves for having fallen for cuteness. Our violence 
takes shape as repression cast as a lesson to be remembered by 
us for all our future encounters with cuteness.
I will focus on the agential violence of cuteness, or what I re-
fer to as the lacerating force of the cute, and discuss some of the 
ways in which cuteness engages violence unsystematically and 
purposelessly. The violence of cuteness is unsystematic in Faus-
tus and Omkara because it has no particular end other than 
the dismantlement of organized bodies of power that construct 
the cute as a more or less forgettable aesthetic of failure. Also 
unsystematic are the paradoxical and unpredictable means by 
which cuteness asserts its violent force in each of the texts. 
Cute substance fools us repeatedly because its irresolvable con-
tradictions baffle us continually. Recasting itself each time as 
a familiar thing or recognizable feeling, cuteness manages to 
surprise us each time. Like a petulant child, its stubbornness 
or refusal to be reasoned with gives it a sharpness that lacer-
ates the critical and aesthetic hierarchies constructed by human 
organization. In other words, despite its slippages in locations 
and temporalities, the brutally cute retains its connections to 
the radically acute. In so doing, cuteness erodes the sustainable 
means by which it might be consumed and fetishized by the 
human. 
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The term laceration is crucial to my reading of violent cute-
ness in Faustus and Omkara. For Ngai, cuteness is transgressive 
precisely because it disguises itself as powerlessness. Though its 
effects can be felt powerfully — according to Angier, they are 
comparable in intensity of experience to “sex, a good meal, or 
psychoactive drugs like cocaine” (qtd. in Ngai 25) — for Ngai 
cuteness mobilizes itself in the mundane realm of everyday 
taste. That is, cuteness makes itself available to us unremarkably, 
as “the continuousness and everydayness of our aesthetic rela-
tion to the […] merchandise that surrounds us in our homes, 
in our workplaces, and on the street” (58). But cuteness is also 
capable of producing spectacle in spectacular fashion. Specifi-
cally, cute substance is spectacular when it violently degrades 
and excoriates established structures of power, such as the fam-
ily and other state-supported institutions. As Arendt argues, the 
instrumentality of violent action signals the demise of power: 
“[v]iolence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its 
own course it ends in power’s disappearance” (56). Furthermore, 
although “[v]iolence can destroy power[,] it is utterly incapable 
of creating it” (58; emphasis added). Certainly, all violence is at 
least partially futile owing to its peculiar incapability to create 
power. But insofar as cuteness is an aesthetic that employs both 
violent action and violent emotion to entrap power within its 
opposite (powerlessness), it is a lacerating force of becoming 
that attacks the very foundations and institutions that systema-
tize power relations. In a Deleuzean sense, owing to its erosive 
capability, the violence of cuteness is magical — an “unnatural 
participation” not based in closed systems of filiation or iden-
tification but rather in contagion and contamination (Deleuze 
and Guattari 239–42). 
Magic, a contentious category of power and knowledge in 
the Renaissance, is portrayed as cute substance throughout Doc-
tor Faustus, capable not only of providing cheap thrills but also 
of making sharp incisions into the temporal and spatial fabric 
of the tragedy. Where Faustus literally turns to magic and uses 
it to cutely violate biological reproduction, in Omkara cuteness 
is sinthomosexual sorcery operating as laceration: as an “alli-
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ance inspiring illicit unions or abominable loves” that in turn 
“prevent procreation” (246). As I hope to make clear through 
my readings, there is great variety in the resistant aesthetics and 
lacerating praxes of cuteness that disrupt the normative forma-
tion of bodies and structures that depend on reproduction to 
propagate their power. 
Violating Futurity: Lacerating Pregnancy in Doctor Faustus
The Tragedy of Doctor Faustus is a notable exception to Mar-
lovian standards of violence. Surprisingly scant in its spilling 
of blood and guts, it focuses instead on Faustus’s tragic mental 
transformation. But even as the text consumes its protagonist 
with self-doubt and despair about the future of his body and 
soul, the play is riddled with cute substance that vehiculates 
multiple states of exception. Doctor Faustus comprises vari-
ous scenes of “anomic feasts” or confluences of law and life, as 
Giorgio Agamben might put it, where the violence of the law is 
anticipated and matched by the rhythmic cuteness or musical-
ity of resistance (State of Exception 72–73). In one sense, all the 
characters in Doctor Faustus could be called cute. The good and 
bad angels, for example, are potentially cute because they nip-
nip-nip at Faustus’s conscience. The matter of the soul, which is 
otherwise in the domain of the sublime and seemingly immune 
to the minor manipulations of cuteness, is in the end dragged 
away by cute carriers that, terrier-like, lacerate Faustus. For T.S. 
Eliot, Marlowe’s dominant aesthetic in Doctor Faustus is “always 
hesitating on the edge of caricature at the right moment” (54). 
Eliot may not have used the term cute to describe Marlowe’s 
style. But what is cuteness if not a well-timed hesitation “on the 
edge of caricature” — a caricature of all things serious: the law, 
the gods, the state, desire, the future? Hesitation lacerates these 
systems and contaminates them with the energy of cuteness. As 
a result, the state, the law, desire, and even the gods and devils 
become cute for an instant before they reterritorialize onto the 
plane of serious power in the play. 
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Doctor Faustus begins with cute hesitation. John Faustus is 
a man discontented with the molarity of his present condition 
and who obsesses over his future as he strives to escape the lim-
its of temporality by aestheticizing his experiences through non-
normative means. Weighing the benefits of established forms of 
knowledge and self-empowerment, he dismisses them hastily, 
announcing that the fields of “Oeconomy,” “Physic,” and even 
“Divinity” are limited in their scope, since they cannot help him 
“be eternalized” or furnish him with wisdom that could “make 
men […] live eternally” (1.1.14, 1.1.22). Faustus’s denunciation of 
the branches of institutionalized knowledge has to do with the 
fact that they cannot stretch to other zones of pleasure. Conse-
quently, he abandons these pursuits and promises instead to glut 
himself with magic — a medium through which he hopes to find 
pleasures of “omnipotence” (1.1.54). Magic, as Faustus imagines 
it, offers him the possibility of experiencing limitless move-
ment between spaces and forms. Even before he trades his soul 
with the devil, Faustus prophesizes his magical capabilities and 
claims boldly that he will have his “spirits fetch (him) what (he) 
please[s]” (1.1.78), be it “secrets” pertaining to “foreign kings” 
or rarities from India and the new world — pearls or fruits, cute 
objects whose physical qualities are pleasurable to touch and 
taste (1.1.86). 
But Faustus’s plans for experiencing transcendent power 
outside of time are promptly shattered by Mephistopheles. Re-
ceiving equivocation from Mephistopheles in place of guidance 
regarding the location and condition of hell, Faustus reverts 
to thinking more structurally about his material future: he de-
mands to have a wife who would satiate his “wanton and lascivi-
ous” desire to procreate (2.1.141). But Mephistopheles refuses to 
fulfill this normative drive, proclaiming it to be “but a ceremo-
nial toy,” a tiresome institution that would detract from Faustus’s 
quest for alternative aesthetic pleasures (2.1.146). He distracts 
the new recruit from seeking the sociolegal, Christian, and con-
tractual means of procreation and futurity, promising him in its 
place innocuous encounters with cuteness — sexually gratifying 
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experiences with courtesans that would necessarily be more im-
mediate, and less Christian or contractual, in nature. 
Important to note here are the differences in aesthetic judg-
ment that inform Faustus’s shifting desires. His initial quest for 
omnipotence and unbounded knowledge is unschematized, 
shattering the organization of epistemology, power, and the 
sublime. When Mephistopheles denies him the pleasure of un-
organized being, insisting on upholding Lucifer’s contract with 
the scholar that mandates the latter’s systematic codes of being, 
Faustus is forced to reduce himself to seeking futurity within 
earthly realms; thus his wish to be married. But even this desire 
is refused him because its institutionalized constituents conflict 
with those of Satan’s contract. With marriage taken out of the 
dynamic, Faustus is offered what seems to be a viable option 
for sexual gratification, perhaps even reproduction: countless 
encounters with diverse courtesans. However, the apparent 
freedom from the marital sexual economy is undercut by the 
twofold limit of the “courtesans”: being products of Mephis-
topheles’s conjuration, even if they are capable of bearing chil-
dren, surely they would be servile to their devilish maker and 
reproduce his ideology, not Faustus’s. Moreover, as courtesans 
and not wives, their wombs would be refused recognition as le-
gally valid spaces that generate proper bloodlines. 
Recognizing fully the precariousness of his offer, Mephis-
topheles is careful to throw in by way of additional recompense 
a cute tool to keep the Good Angel at bay and Faustus in check: a 
magic book that will instruct the scholar in ways of manufactur-
ing gold, “thunder, whirlwinds, storm, and lightning” (2.1.157). 
However appealing these shiny toys may be to Faustus, he rec-
ognizes them to be impotent in their generative capabilities 
and, in keeping with his acuteness of intellect (Prologue 16), he 
quickly sees the ineptitude of necromancy: it is a fickle pursuit 
that might provide him with cheap thrills but not with more sus-
tainable sources of proliferation. Having given up, perhaps pre-
maturely, the possibility of experiencing aesthetic becomings, 
Faustus reverts to lacerating the patriarchal ideology of secured 
biological futurity. The cuteness of the magic book enables Faus-
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tus to violently invade the body of the Other. From this point 
on, he combines his existent knowledge of the conventional 
arts and sciences (for instance, the Andromeda effect) with the 
petty privileges of magic to attempt to insert himself into the 
future. That is, he finds ways in which to make the cuteness of 
magic count toward a violent transformation of the organized 
spaces within which he must function. Since magic cordons off 
the experience of unearthly eternity and distances Faustus from 
marriage and its accompanying promise of legitimized conti-
nuity, he perverts his approach to futurity: he focuses on his 
monstrous potential to infect the female body with (his) desire, 
to disrupt the process of “natural,” biological reproduction and 
inject himself — as an object of “unnatural” female desire — into 
the pregnant woman’s body. He fuses magic and science to cre-
ate a cute substance that, consumed by others, would be capable 
simultaneously of lacerating their realms of being and of dis-
mantling the sublime affects of eternal damnation. 
The most striking instance of cute laceration in Doctor Faus-
tus is the scene involving the Duchess of Vanholt, whose body 
offers the protagonist the possibility of escaping the complete 
extermination and deterministic fatalism to which he has been 
bound contractually. Grape craving and pregnant, the Duch-
ess of Vanholt seems at first glance to be irrelevant not only to 
the grand scheme of the play, but also to the majority of critical 
conversations about the role of women or gender in the text. 
For example, Sara Deats’s Sex, Gender, and Desire in the Plays 
of Christopher Marlowe, which offers a “feminist reading” of the 
play, manages only once to mention the duchess (217). Indeed, 
the duchess is an oft-rejected figure in Marlovian criticism.2 Yet 
2 Even more recent critical studies of the play, such as Andrew Duxfield’s, 
mention the duchess merely in passing, concentrating instead on Faustus’s 
“stupidity” and ambiguity of intent in his turn to magic as a source of em-
powerment (68). As Robert Logan notes in his study of persistent patterns 
in the scholarship on Doctor Faustus, “[i]t is probably no surprise that tradi-
tional topics predominate: characterization, genre, religious attitudes, ethi-
cal values, the concern with magic and philosophical conflicts” (74). Even in 
cases of less conventional approaches to the play, the critical focus remains 
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she is one of two female human subjects in the play, and the only 
woman to escape omission from both “A” and “B” texts.3 I sug-
gest that the duchess survives these textual cuts because she is 
crucial to the play’s overarching investment in violent cuteness 
as potentiality and in pregnancy as cute medium for disruptive 
futurity.
No doubt because of its overt connection to reproduction 
and the production of cute substance, the pregnant woman’s 
body itself is considered cute in popular culture. In its ap-
pearance a pregnant woman’s belly might be likened to other 
cute objects, like overblown balloons or bubbles — round and 
smooth, stretched almost to the point of bursting. At the same 
time, the clumsiness of a pregnant woman’s gait likens her body 
to Shy Sherri, a doll so obviously “malformed” that it represents 
“anatomical disaster,” everything that opposes adult human 
investment in normative ability, functionality, symmetry, and 
proportion (Harris 3). Just as the body and actions of the child 
or baby are aestheticized as cute to “blur the profound drudg-
ery of child-rearing with soft-focused sentimentality” (15), so 
the mundane yet destabilizing transformations of the pregnant 
body — the physical discomfort and hormonal fluctuations, for 
instance — are reorganized in the popular imagination as cute-
ness, an aesthetic made available by nature that situates the 
woman in a future of maternity while serving to occlude her 
own and others’ vision of pain, mortality, and laborious domes-
ticity. 
The early modern investment in cutesy pregnancy may not 
have shared modernity’s aesthetic claims on the pregnant body, 
but the dominant narratives of the Renaissance were similarly 
keen to separate the female’s experience of bodily transforma-
on the protagonist’s self-doubt. In any event, none of the scholarship on the 
play dwells on the significance of the Duchess of Vanholt.
3 While the dramatis personae of the B-text include “A Woman Devil,” Alex-
ander’s “Paramour” (a spirit), “A Hostess,” “The Duchess of Vanholt,” and 
“Helen of Troy, a spirit,” only the hostess and the duchess qualify as human. 
The A-text’s list of characters makes no mention of the hostess, listing the 
duchess as the sole female human in the play. 
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tion by aestheticizing the imagination of pregnancy. The ma-
terial horror of pregnancy was not only linked to the horrors 
of mortality but to the pregnant body’s substantive potential to 
mark and impress other beings with her aberrant and secret de-
sires. Thomas Underdowne’s Æthiopian History (1569) is the first 
known English translation of Heliodorus’s Aithiopika, a popu-
lar tale of a dark-skinned queen, Persina, who, during concep-
tion, is affected by an image of the white-skinned Andromeda. 
Moved by the image to transform her own desire as well as the 
product of her sexual duty, Persina gives birth to a child, Chari-
clea, who is marked by the whiteness of the mythical princess 
and not by the blackness of her biological parents. 
While Sujata Iyengar suggests that the Andromeda effect 
made available the notion of racial passing and allowed for the 
benevolent reception of racial and biological difference, the 
tale’s popularity simultaneously betrays contemporary anxiety 
regarding the dangerous cuteness of unclean bloodlines, cor-
rupt lineages, and of the violent participation of nonbiological 
agents in the conception or manipulation of the human fetus. 
M.D. Reeve suggests that many Renaissance scholars and sci-
entists offered the notion of the maternal impression or the An-
dromeda effect to account for a child’s physical attributes: the 
child might be shaped in the womb by its mother’s perception of 
an image or by her secret desire for sources of pleasure. Marie-
Hélène Huet states that in the Renaissance “a remarkably per-
sistent line of thought argued that monstrous progeny resulted 
from the disorder of the maternal imagination” and desire. Con-
sequently, “[i]nstead of reproducing the father’s image, as nature 
commands, the monstrous child bore witness to the violent de-
sires that moved the mother at the time of conception or during 
pregnancy” and was scarred by her perverse desires instead of 
by the markings of its “legitimate genitor” (Huet 1). The effects 
of a pregnant woman’s fantasies could be as innocuous as to 
produce in the offspring “blemishes and birthmarks,” but they 
could also lead to “the creation of monsters” (Reynolds 436). 
Early modern scientists and philosophers were not only cau-
tious of fetal corruption caused by the Andromeda effect, they 
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also warned against female acts of transgressive desire, such 
as “sex with devils or animals,” that could lead to monstrous 
births (Huet 6). But even more innocent female fantasies were 
damaging. According to fifteenth-century philosopher Pietro 
Pomponazzi, it was commonly accepted that “[i]f a pregnant 
woman greatly desire[d] a chickpea, she [would] deliver a child 
bearing the image of a chickpea,” or “[i]f, during pregnancy, 
she desire[d] a pomegranate, she [would mark] her child with 
a pomegranate or something that resemble[d] it” (qtd. in Huet 
17–18). Clearly, in the early modern mind cute monstrosity re-
sulted from an intervention that “literally imprinted on progeny 
a deformed, misshapen resemblance to an object that had not 
participated in their creation” (Huet 5). While in rare instances 
the monster may have reflected the glory of God, as in the case 
of Chariclea, who bore the markings of white royalty, the most 
common assumption was that it was a horrible aberration that 
“shamelessly reveal(ed) its shameful origins” (31). 
Reading Faustus in light of the sinister implications of the 
Andromeda effect reveals the monstrous potentiality of the 
cute “little wart or mole” that marks the neck of Alexander’s 
otherwise “fair” paramour, whom Faustus conjures in the play 
(4.1.110–11). His conjuration anticipates a later scene when 
Faustus relies on common knowledge regarding “great-bellied” 
women’s desire “for things […] rare and dainty” to extract suc-
cessfully from the Duchess of Vanholt her craving for “a dish of 
ripe grapes” (4.6.10–15). The cute violence of Faustus’s “sweet-
est grapes” is undeniable (4.6.30). A culinary concoction con-
jured by the Devil’s advocate for consumption by a pregnant 
woman, the grapes become Faustus’s arch tool of laceration. 
Through the cute substance, the scholar makes a singular at-
tempt “to shun the snares of death” by securing the shape of 
his future within the duchess’s body (5.1.67). In the process, he 
perversely fulfills his earliest prophesy of conjuring “pleasant 
fruits” from the orient (1.1.81–84). More acutely, he uses magic 
and earthly knowledge to transform the Duchess’ body into 
“a vessel for reproducing […] [his] bloodlines” — into a cute 
space wherein his violent affects may be felt on the “products 
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of her body” as well as on the compromised power of the state 
(Jankowski 228). 
Faustus’s attempt to defy molar or high aesthetics and leave 
behind the cute monster-child of his desire finds echoes in 
Gilles Deleuze, who announces that when studying the ideas of 
a philosopher he imagines himself “taking (the) author from be-
hind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet 
monstrous,” a product of “buggery or […] immaculate concep-
tion” that is a violent mix of “all sorts of shifting, slipping, dis-
locations, and hidden emissions” (6). The philosopher’s fantasy, 
like Faustus’s devious productivity, emphasizes the violence of 
cuteness that, through appropriation and penetration, mobilizes 
simultaneously its own break from and the breakdown of organ-
ized modalities of power. 
Refusing Futurity: Sinthomosexual Lacerations in Omkara
The cuteness of violence that is implicit in the contradictory 
energies of “buggery” and “immaculate conception” forms the 
bedrock of Bollywood cinema and is made explicit in the films’ 
item songs. In this chapter I will concentrate on the song “Bee-
di” from Omkara. Not connected in any obvious sense to Faus-
tus, the film is a Bollywood adaptation of another Renaissance 
play marked by anxious futurity: Othello. But in its toying with 
the stylistic and generic — in a word, aesthetic — compositions 
of Bollywood films, Omkara mobilizes a lacerating cuteness that 
parallels the violent potentiality of Faustus. 
The word Bollywood, which came to be listed in the OED in 
2005, dates back to 1976. As its dating suggests, in one sense 
Bollywood, or the “[h]umorous blend of […] Bombay and Hol-
lywood” that is the mainstream Indian film industry, is rooted 
in modernity (“Bollywood”). Vijay Mishra notes that it “is noth-
ing less than a floating signifier which […] has come close to 
acquiring a transnational or pan-Indian meaning” suggestive 
of a cosmopolitan aesthetic (439). He explains that “there is no 
real cultural capital required to read or enact Bollywood”: “‘Bol-
lywood’ as a name, a fashion, a style, a way of doing things, has 
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no real location beyond its simulacral, ‘techno-realist’ image 
which is why it can be so readily packaged and re-packaged for 
consumption by almost anyone” (440). Owing to its cultural po-
rosity, Bollywood is understood as being quintessentially cute: 
an “innocuous” product “readily transmitted as the signifier of 
a non-threatening Indian modernity, […] the function of cul-
tural accommodation so that no one feels excluded” (440). But 
this Bollywood has a monstrous history concealed within the 
colorful kitschiness that defines its present aesthetic. For lurking 
beneath the gestural practices that the cinema typically absorbs 
in its easy-to-mimic, globally recognizable dance moves are the 
ancient aesthetic theories of rasa, which is Sanskrit for “taste.” 
The nine key rasas that inform the dynamic of art, particularly 
the dramatic and performance arts, are: shringara (love, eroti-
cism), hasya (mirth), adbhuta (wonderment), shanta (peace), 
raudra (anger, irritation), veera (courage, pride), karuna (sor-
row, pity, compassion), bhayanaka (fear, anxiety), and vibhatsa 
(disgust, loathing). Together the rasas comprise the aesthetics of 
the body. The gesturing or performance of each rasa mobilizes 
its respective bhava or mood, thus creating a template of affects 
easily recognizable to those familiar with traditional Indian per-
formance art forms like bharatanatyam and kathakali.4 
Mishra focuses on the rasa of karuna and claims an inextri-
cable relationship between it and the sentimentality that is the 
cornerstone of all Bollywood cinema. His point is well noted 
for, while Bollywood cinema draws in global audiences with its 
increasing popularity, its sentimental streak grows in strength 
and elasticity. Sentimentality stretched as violent, gestural cute-
ness is at the center of the item song in Bollywood. Amita Ni-
jhawan’s definition of the Bollywood item song captures its es-
sential function in the economy of the cinema: “[i]tem songs are 
big-budget song-and-dance numbers that […] work as snappy 
advertisements for a film and original music score with their 
4 See Prakruti Prativadi’s Rasas in Bharatanatyam for a basic and help-
ful guide to understanding the function of rasas in classical Indian dance 
forms. 
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quick cuts and sexy imagery” (100). Besides their crucial role in 
boosting the popularity of the films in which they feature, they 
also have a dense association with the performance of sexual de-
sire, particularly heteronormative desire. As Jenny Sharpe notes 
in her essay on the role of gender in Bollywood productions, the 
song-and-dance routine that comprises an item song, “which 
generally serves as a fantasy space […] provides an occasion for 
staging female desire, even if in the last instance this desire is 
contained” (67). Over decades the permissibility and limits of 
itemizing sexual desire through the songs has undergone sev-
eral transformations. Where the item song was once in the pur-
view of the vamp, or the male villain’s female sexual servitor, by 
the mid-1990s it came to be embraced as a routine that enabled 
the female protagonist to reveal her sexual energy. Its most re-
cent iterations are still looser in scope. Now, for example, as Jim 
Yardley notes in his article on Bollywood’s recent fetishization 
of the chiseled male torso, male characters can occupy the cen-
tral space of item songs as performers whose buff and well-oiled 
bodies are intended to draw out female sexual desire within the 
films. Despite variations, the central theme of the item song re-
mains the articulation and mobilization of sexual desire, specifi-
cally heterosexual desire. 
At the same time, the song-and-dance routines enable cute 
manipulations of spatial and temporal realms within the films, 
reconfiguring the possibilities of envisioning nonnormative 
sexual energies. Punctuating the scenes featuring the “real” 
experiences (mostly struggles) of the central characters, they 
simultaneously “provoke […] fascination and anxiety” — for, 
while designated “as a ‘fantasy’ space,” the item song “is often 
denied ‘realness,’ […] yet it is a space with potential for pro-
duction of emerging cultural and gender ideals,” as Nijhawan 
notes of the recent item songs that have come out of Bollywood 
(100). Indeed, located on the cusp of reality and fantasy, the item 
song is Bollywood’s primary medium of acuteness. Through it, 
Bollywood cinema narrativizes transversal sexual possibilities 
of pleasure that, in rubbing against the fabric of the central 
forces of the story, often lacerate the structures that the main, 
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heteronormative plot strives to uphold or protect. As elabo-
rate productions of cute pleasure, item songs also bear within 
them the potential to defy the molar structures of reproduction, 
biological or epistemological. Their potentiality emerges not so 
much through lingual or lyrical force as through their physical 
gestures or rasas, which enable the articulation of nonnorma-
tive pleasures that remain on lockdown within the confines of 
language.
Physical gestures in Omkara’s song “Beedi” unlock the film’s 
cute reproaches of heteronormativity, specifically of marriage 
and heterosexual union, while working throughout with the 
aesthetics of the item number. Bhardwaj, the film’s director as 
well as music producer, is an acclaimed composer and director 
whose recent adaptations of Shakespeare’s Macbeth (Maqbool, 
2003), Othello (Omkara), and Hamlet (Haider, 2014) have 
earned him a central place in early twenty-first century Bolly-
wood aesthetics. In an interview with Felicity Kendal, featured 
in the documentary film Shakespeare, India, & Me, Bhardwaj 
speaks of his investment in mainstream Bollywood culture that 
necessitates the inclusion of songs in his films. But where most 
songs in the cinema are hiatuses in the overarching scheme of 
storytelling insofar as they stop the progress of the central nar-
rative to spin their own fantasy tales of sexual desire, Bhardwaj 
declares of his songs that they are “justified” as organic parts of 
the main plot that carry forward the central story, which “keeps 
moving” in and through them. 
Bhardwaj suggests that pausing a film’s central narrative is it-
self an act of violence, a cute cutting apart of the primary mean-
ing of the story. He claims, moreover, that he has eliminated non 
sequiturs from his films while managing to include cute item 
songs. But violence is an act of seepage, and in Omkara it in-
vades the item song as gestural cuteness. The organic structure 
of the main plot, a violent retelling of Othello set in rural north 
India, is lacerated by another kind of violence: a cacophonous 
musicality that accompanies the demise of heterofuturity. De-
spite Bhardwaj’s insistence that the item song featuring Billo 
(Bianca) and the inebriated characters of Kesu (Cassio), Langda 
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(Iago), and Rajju (Roderigo) is both central to the main plot and 
truthful to the generic hybridity of his source text — which, as 
he notes, includes a drinking song (2.3.64–68) — “Beedi” ceases 
to be about the main characters or even about the related inci-
dents among the ancillary characters that thrust the chief dra-
ma — the marriage plot — into tragedy. Instead it concentrates 
on the gestural development of a homoerotic shringara rasa, on 
the physical movements of sexual pleasure that are transplanted 
from the meaningful heteronormative space (occupied in the 
song primarily by Billo and Kesu and, symbolically, by Dolly 
[Desdemona] and Omkara [Othello], whose impending coital 
union is included in the song’s narrative as pregnant pause and 
montage) and relocated onto men’s cutely violent bodily play 
with one another. The violent pleasure of gesture in “Beedi” is 
that it gestures cutely “toward the death drive that lives within 
reproductive futurism” (Edelman 132). The gestures embedded 
in the song scorn at “domestication in the form of romance” and 
playfully expose “the misconception on which its reality rests: 
the misconception that conception itself can assure the endur-
ance, by enacting the truth, of the Symbolic order of meaning 
and preserve, in the form of the future, the prospect of someday 
redeeming the primal loss that makes sexual rapport impossible 
and precludes the signifying system from ever arriving at any 
closure” (132, 134). 
The OED defines gesture as a “manner of carrying the body, 
bearing.” In the narrower sense, it is also a “posture” or an “atti-
tude,” a “movement of the body or limbs as an expression of feel-
ing.” “Gesture,” Elizabeth Cowie states, “is the performing of the 
body as a living being in specific time and space and social con-
text” (83). It is, besides, “a kind of event, crystallising meaning 
at a moment, while opening up to something next (83). There-
fore, “[t]o consider gesture in film is to be brought to think about 
the performance of an action as a movement that introduces a 
change,” as a paradoxical moment of hanging, a cutely violent 
push forward and back (82). For Agamben gesture is crucial to 
cinema because it reveals the failure of language by setting it in 
time and enacting it in or through motion: “what is at issue in 
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gesture is not so much a prelinguistic content as […] the other 
side of language, its speechless dwelling in language” that is al-
ways also a “gesture of being at a loss in language” (Potentiali-
ties 78). In the context of violent cuteness, gesture is pure lacera-
tion — it lacerates the time within which it is located, lacerating 
also language that fails as medium. Gesture enacts its violence 
by mobilizing an exaggerated cuteness that dismantles norma-
tive modes of articulation. Its violence toward language is espe-
cially potent when gesture simultaneously dislocates itself from 
contributing to a semiotics of symbolic meaningfulness, offering 
pleasure instead of directions toward continuity or the future. 
The lyrics of the song “Beedi” are steeped in sexual innuendo, 
just as the scene in which it is performed is a familiar tableau of 
cute seduction. Billo, Kesu’s lover and a professional singer and 
performer, bursts into song at the behest of her male audience, 
who wish to hear her sing “Beedi.” Prompted chiefly by Kesu, 
who initiates the song, Billo performs the song in true femme-
fatale fashion — as the jewel of the item number, in keeping with 
the expectations of the genre. There is no denying that the music 
is catchy, its rhythm pulsating and inviting, its lyrics repetitive 
enough to be memorable even if the dialect is unfamiliar. More-
over, the song’s thesis and accompanying symbolism are simple: 
Billo and the others sing about cigarettes and sex, the cigarette-
as-phallus the barely veiled if familiar metaphor propelling the 
song’s agenda. Billo asks her lover to light his cigarette with the 
fire he has kindled within her. The refrain “beedi jalai le jigar se 
piya, jigar ma badi aag hai” (light your cigarette with the fire 
raging passionately within me) punctuates verses saturated with 
double meaning: there’s much made of snatching blankets in the 
cold; stealing fires from the neighbor’s kitchen; bite marks from 
a lover that are deeper and sharper than those that might be 
made by a farmer’s sickle; and so on. The performance is also 
awash with hip thrusting, chest jiggling, and other jerky move-
ments that draw attention to the rhythm of the human sexual 
anatomy in the acts of foreplay and sex. Overall, the song cutely 
stands in for and means to give meaning to the mobilization of 
sexual desire. 
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But it is in its meaningless gestures that the song becomes a 
tool of laceration and prompts a becoming. It erupts simultane-
ously from the predictable rhythm of the narrative and the lan-
guage of desire to become a cute signifier of the instability that 
is pleasure without meaning or purpose, of what Lee Edelman 
calls “sinthomosexuality.” He stresses that in “denying the appeal 
of fantasy, refusing the promise of futurity that mends each tear, 
however mean, in reality’s dress with threads of meaning (at-
tached as they are to the eye-catching lure we might see as the 
sequins of sequence, which dazzle our vision by producing the 
constant illusion of consequence),” sinthomosexuality “offers us 
fantasy turned inside out, the seams of its costume exposing re-
ality’s seamlessness as mere seeming, the fraying knots that hold 
each sequin in place now usurping that place” (35). As Edelman’s 
use of the term tear makes clear, sinthomosexuality is a violent 
and lacerating force of resistance. While the song itself works 
as cute sinthome, a “template” or “knot that holds the subject 
together, that ties or binds the subject to its constitutive libidi-
nal career,” particular gestures within it refuse participation in 
the cohesive harmony of signification (35–36). In other words, 
the pleasure of these gestures is acutely enacted in sinthomo-
sexuality, in their cute refusal to be meaningful or symbolically 
relevant to the central scheme of the narrative. 
I will focus on those sinthomosexual gestures in the song 
that involve the physical object of the cigarette. In the context 
of the song, the cigarette is an object steeped in contradiction. 
The song’s title itself means “cigarette,” a beedi being a cheap 
cigarette made of unprocessed tobacco wrapped in leaves. As 
a signifier, the cigarette can hardly be called cute. In most so-
cial contexts, it symbolizes either a jaded adulthood or else a 
diseased precociousness, its most recent aura immersed in nar-
ratives of dangerous medical and social unhealthiness. At the 
same time, in the song the beedi transforms into cute substance, 
a thing that squishes together highly adult practices (sex, smok-
ing) with childlike forgetfulness and repetition. For, while in 
the performance Billo asks her lover to light his cigarette using 
the fire within her, notably she first claims to have forgotten the 
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lyrics and needs to be reminded of the words. Also, Billo’s ac-
tions toward the end of the song make clear that she despises 
cigarettes and seems to have an allergic response to them. (In 
fact, the fight that breaks out between Kesu and others is oc-
casioned by Rajju’s insistence on igniting another cigarette in 
Billo’s presence after Kesu puts out his first one.) Yet once it gets 
going and before it is forced to its conclusion, the song func-
tions like a catchy pro-smoking jingle that associates smoking 
with sexy bodies enacting heterosexual fantasies. Surprisingly, 
in a song that connects the beedi to the phallus, none of the men 
gyrating around Billo smokes. Pitted against the men who fan-
tasize about Billo as their beedi are Langda and Rajju, who revel 
in the thingness of the object that is the unlit cigarette and take 
pleasure in the violently cute gesture that it makes available to 
them. (In the song, after a few seconds of taking aim Langda 
successfully pops an unlit cigarette into Rajju’s mouth.5 Rajju is 
never seen lighting up this cigarette, but later in the song he car-
ries an ignited cigarette in his mouth, presumably the same one 
Langda offered him.) 
By itself the cigarette carries no relevance in the story other 
than becoming the occasion for Kesu to perform his drunken 
rage at Rajju for the seeming offense given to his lover. But as 
something exchanged between two men, it also refuses to bear 
the song’s overarching hetereonormative, metaphorical weight. 
Important to note in this context is the moment at which Lang-
da pops the cigarette into Rajju’s mouth. For a brief but crucial 
moment in the song, the camera shifts away once from Billo 
and the dancing men to a scene indoors that reveals the inti-
mate lovemaking of Omkara and Dolly. Omkara gifts Dolly his 
family’s most prized heirloom, a kamarband or waistband that, 
in previous generations, adorned the bellies of all the wives of 
his household, and commands her to keep it safe at all times, 
for it symbolizes both the dignity of his ancestors and the high 
5 Later in the chapter, I refer to Langda’s gesture — which resembles the ac-
tion of one preparing to throw a paper airplane across a room or aiming a 
dart at a dartboard — as the “cigarette pop.” 
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place in which he holds marital fidelity. Before handing over the 
heirloom, Omkara also tells Dolly that his birth broke a gener-
ations-long drought of offspring in his family. Having laid on 
her its symbolic weight of reproductive futurity and heterofidel-
ity, he asks to see Dolly wear the kamarband. Obediently, Dolly 
returns to their bedchamber with the kamarband around her 
waist. Omkara gently pulls her to him, presumably to initiate 
their coy sex act — coy insofar as the violence of their sex is le-
gitimated by monogamy and heteronormativity. At this critical 
moment, the scene cuts back to the raunchy festivity of the song 
“Beedi.” Only, the scene’s return to raunchiness is marked by a 
nonheteronormative gesture, for the camera focuses on Langda 
and Rajju’s pleasure of and through the cigarette. If the sexual 
encounter between Omkara and Dolly is meaningful in its po-
tentiality and optimism regarding the promise of reproductive 
fruitfulness (biological futurity), Langda and Rajju’s enjoyment 
of the cigarette, even if it is locked into the narrative of the song 
and twisted to occupy a metaphorical space within it, is remark-
able for its acute fruitlessness: its lacerating cuteness is disrup-
tive because it leads nowhere — the cigarette is unlit for the most 
part, after all. Counter to the heteronormative tropes of futurity 
that inundate the song, the lacerating gesture of the “cigarette 
pop” exchanged between Langda and Rajju in “Beedi” celebrates 
petulantly sinthomosexual pleasure as cute violence, pleasure as 
the death drive, and cuteness as the unhealthy means by which 
to extinguish meaning-making narratives of heterofuturity. 
***
Where Faustus manipulates matter purposefully to lacerate the 
otherwise powerful grip of the earthly and divine forces of or-
ganization, Langda and Rajju lacerate purposefulness itself, ren-
dering powerless the semantic force of systems and narratives 
that promote heterofunctionality. Varied in its approaches to its 
own invasive potentiality, cuteness in these texts commits vio-
lent action, at each turn cutting into the narratives and aesthet-
ics of maturity. Inserting itself into the lacerations it makes, it 
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stretches almost beyond recognition the spaces it invades and 
from which it erupts as paradoxical resistance — as blunt-force 
energy that is capable of violence precisely because it severs 
itself playfully from the predictable and unified aesthetics of 
acuteness, desire, and usefulness. Cuteness winks at us secretly 
or uselessly, refusing to offer us directives toward futures of res-
olution and cohesion. 
241
cute lacerations in doctor faustus and omkara
Works Cited
Agamben, Giorgio. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philoso-
phy. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
2000. Print. 
———. State of Exception. Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2005. Print.
Arendt, Hannah. On Violence. Orlando: Harcourt, 1970. Print. 
“Bollywood.” Oxford English Dictionary. Web. 9 July 2017.
Cowie, Elizabeth. “The Time of Gesture in Cinema and Its Eth-
ics.” Journal for Cultural Research 19.1 (2015): 82–95. Print.
Deats, Sara. Sex, Gender, and Desire in the Plays of Christopher 
Marlowe. Newark: U of Delaware P, 1998. Print. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Negotiations: 1972–1990. Trans. M. Joughin. 
New York: Columbia UP, 1995. Print. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapo-
lis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. Print. 
Duxfield, Andrew. Christopher Marlowe and the Failure to 
Unify. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015. Print. 
Edelman, Lee. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. 
Durham: Duke UP, 2004. Print. 
Eliot, T.S. “Notes on the Blank Verse of Christopher Marlowe.” 
The Sacred Wood and Major Early Essays. New York: Dover, 
1998. 49–54. Print. 
Harris, Daniel. Cute, Quaint, Hungry, and Romantic: The Aes-
thetics of Consumerism. Boston: Da Capo P, 2000. Print. 
Huet, Marie-Hélène. Monstrous Imagination. Cambridge: Har-
vard UP, 1993. Print. 
Ivy, Marilyn. “The Art of Cute Little Things: Nara Yoshitomo’s 
Parapolitics.” Mechademia 5 (2010): 3–29. Print.
Iyengar, Sujata. Shades of Difference: Mythologies of Skin Color 
in Early Modern England. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004. Print. 
Jankowski, Theodora A. “Defining/Confining the Duchess: 
Negotiating the Female Body in John Webster’s The Duchess 
of Malfi.” Studies in Philology 87.2 (1990): 221–45. Print.
242
the retro-futurism of cuteness
Logan, Robert. “The State of the Art: Current Critical Re-
search.” Doctor Faustus: A Critical Guide. Ed. Sara Munson 
Deats. London: Continuum, 2010. 72–95. Print.
Lukacs, Gabriella. “The Labor of Cute: Net Idols, Cute Culture, 
and the Digital Economy in Contemporary Japan.” positions: 
east asia cultures critique 23.3 (2015): 487–513. Print.
Marlowe, Christopher. The Tragedy of Doctor Faustus. Chris-
topher Marlowe: Doctor Faustus and Other Plays. Ed. David 
Bevington and Eric Rasmussen. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1995. 
Print. 
Mishra, Vijay. “Spectres of Sentimentality: The Bollywood 
Film.” Textual Practice 23.3 (2009): 439–62. Print.
Ngai, Sianne. Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting. 
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2012. Print. 
Nijhawan, Amita. “Excusing the Female Dancer: Tradition and 
Transgression in Bollywood Dancing.” South Asian Popular 
Culture 7.2 (2009): 99–112. Print.
Omkara. Dir. Vishal Bhardwaj. Shemaroo Films, 2006. Film.
Prativadi, Prakruti. Rasas in Bharatanatyam: First in a Series 
on Indian Aesthetics and Bharatanatyam. North Charleston: 
CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2017. Print.
Reeve, M.D. “Conceptions.” Proceedings of the Cambridge 
Philological Society 215 (1989): 81–112. Print.
Reynolds, Simon. “Pregnancy and Imagination in The Win-
ter’s Tale and Heliodorus’ Aithiopika.” English Studies 84.5 
(2003): 433–47. Print. 
Sharpe, Jenny. “Gender, Nation, and Globalization in Monsoon 
Wedding and Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge.” Meridians 6.1 
(2005): 58–81. Print.
Yardley, Jim. “A Quest for Six-Packs, Inspired by Bollywood.” 
New York Times 18 July 2012. Web. 29 Jan. 2017.
243
Katie Sokoler, Your 
Construction Paper Tears 
Can't Hide Your Yayoi 
Kusama-Neurotic Underbelly
Kelly Lloyd
A power struggle is inherent to cuteness, to the extent that this 
struggle, if unacknowledged and undirected, will manifest it-
self at the cute object’s expense. I examine this phenomenon 
through a close analysis of Katie Sokoler’s 2012 Tampax Radi-
ant tampon print advertisement and television commercial, and 
through a comparison of Sokoler to the works of Yayoi Kusama. 
I work from the colloquial definition of cuteness as “applied to 
people as well as things, with the sense ‘attractive, pretty, charm-
ing’; also, ‘attractive in a mannered way’” (“Cute”). Identified by 
infantile physical characteristics and behavior, associated with 
the feminine and deemed powerless, cuteness is an aesthetic, an 
affect, and a strategy. My understanding of cuteness comes from 
personal experience and is influenced by the work of Sianne 
Ngai, who argues that
[t]here is no judgment or experience of an object as cute that
does not call up one’s sense of power over it as something
less powerful. But the fact that the cute object seems capable
of making demands on us regardless, as Lori Merish under-
scores — a demand for care that women in particular often
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feel addressed or interpellated by — suggests that “cute’” des-
ignates not just the site of a static power differential but also 
the site of a surprisingly complex power struggle. (11)
Like many cute objects, tampon advertisements are so easily 
dismissible that even tampon companies, such as U by Kotex 
in their “Reality Check” advertisement, have chosen to sell tam-
pons through parodies of tampon commercials’ normalized 
absurdity. Associative logic, like cute objects and tampon com-
mercials, is similarly dismissed.
In Style in Costume James Laver pairs images of architecture, 
clothing, and furniture, one on either side of the page. Laver, 
the Keeper of Prints, Drawings and Paintings for the Victoria 
and Albert Museum between 1938 and 1959, demonstrates that 
connections can be made through seemingly superficial formal 
qualities like color and shape. As Elizabeth Grosz explains in 
Chaos, Territory, Art: 
Figure 1. A photograph by Katie Sokoler with her incredible number 
of balloons. “About Me,” Color Me Katie, 13 Sept. 2012.
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The capacity that all artworks have to be located within a 
milieu of other artworks — even as upheaval and innova-
tion — means that they are constituted not through inten-
tionality but through the work itself, through its capacity to 
be connected to, or severed from, other works. (70–71)
Since mainstream culture tends to dismiss cute objects, men-
strual products, and at times associative logic as employed by 
Laver, I seek to use associative logic in examining Sokoler’s 
Tampax Radiant campaign as a site of the power struggle inher-
ent to cuteness. My study is not a critique of Ms. Sokoler but an 
exploration of the power struggle inherent in the aesthetic and 
affect Sokoler had chosen. 
Katie Sokoler
“Hi there!” Sokoler greets readers of her blog (fig. 1). A self-
described “freelance artist and photographer living in Brook-
lyn” who creates, builds, styles, designs, performs, directs, and 
shoots, Sokoler studied photography at the Fashion Institute of 
Technology and has worked as a photographer for Gothamist, 
a New York City events and news website, and Improv Every-
where, a New York City–based prank collective. On her blog, 
Sokoler cheerfully announced her project with Tampax:
Super fun news! [Katie Sokoler] was contacted by Tampax to 
be a part of their new campaign about stand out girls. They 
wanted to feature three creative, unique, real women with 
their art. A street artist, yarn bomber, and balloon artist. It’s 
the first time they’ve ever used real women in their ads in-
stead of models! 
Sokoler’s Tampax Radiant print advertisement features her 
shielding herself from a purple, magenta, turquoise, and canary 
yellow construction paper rainstorm with a matching canary 
yellow umbrella. Cloud cut-outs and open paint cans, remnants 
of Sokoler’s artistic process, lie beside her bubblegum pink 
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rain boots as a gust of wind innocently lifts up the skirt of her 
blue-and-white polka-dot dress. The text superimposed on the 
photograph reads: “NEW TAMPAX RADIANT HELPS KEEP YOUR 
PERIOD INVISIBLE. HOW YOU CHOOSE TO STAND OUT IS UP TO 
YOU” (fig. 2). 
Figure 2. Katie Sokoler’s Tampax® Radiant tampon print advertise-
ment. “Tampax Ad,” Color Me Katie, 9 July 2012.
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Sokoler’s Tampax Radiant television commercial opens with 
Sokoler scooting across the screen with paper clouds tucked un-
der her arm. We see Sokoler climb a ladder in her polka-dot 
dress, polka-dot socks, and heels and tape construction-paper 
clouds and raindrops to the side of a white brick building. Pe-
destrians walk by, framed by the camera so that they are caught 
under Sokoler’s rainstorm (fig. 3). Sokoler’s Tampax activities 
are spliced with shots of her smiling through a piece of torn 
purple construction paper, and overlaid with audio from an in-
terview with the artist:
My name is Katie Sokoler and I am a fun maker. I am a pho-
tographer. I am an actress. I am a blogger and a street art-
ist. I wanted to try to try something new with photography. 
Instead of shooting models, I wanted to shoot real people. I 
thought of this idea of making interactive street art where I 
create a piece on the wall, and use my camera to photograph 
people walking under it. I like doing street art because I love 
making art, and I love putting art in public places so other 
people can enjoy them. Making street art helps me express 
myself. It all comes together when someone walks under it 
and I sort of almost think of it like they’re falling into this 
little trap. I have a few times had the cops called on me, and 
the cops come and they’re like, “Oh! This is just paper!” I 
think I stand out because I really like doing things that make 
other people happy. (“Tampax”)
Sokoler’s accessories are deliberately cute, as polka dots are a 
brightly colored graphic pattern most often used on children’s 
clothing, toys, and furniture; and her choice of artistic ma-
terials — brightly colored construction paper, scissors, and 
tape — are reminiscent of elementary craft projects. Wide-eyed 
and constantly smiling, Sokoler presents herself through a cute 
affect that reads as carefree, exuberant, pleasing, and genuine. 
Since her art exists in the public sphere, Sokoler deploys cute-
ness as an effective strategy to delight rather than upset her au-
dience when they are caught in her trap-like installations and 
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to soothe the fears of police officers who are concerned about 
maintaining the neutrality, however false, of public space. 
Language
Power struggle is evident in Sokoler’s introduction of her Tam-
pax Radiant tampon campaign. On her blog, Color Me Katie, 
Sokoler writes: “It’s the first time they’ve ever used real women 
in their ads instead of models!” (emphasis added). By identify-
ing herself, Jessie Hemmons (Tampax Radiant’s yarn bomber), 
and Jihan Zencirli (Tampax Radiant’s balloon artist) as real 
women, Sokoler implicitly argues that models are not real wom-
en. Although it might be useful to take Sokoler’s words, her art, 
and her choice of wardrobe and affect as her own rather than 
products of an artistic director, the distinction between real and 
nonreal women is problematic, as Sokoler gains leverage and 
authenticates her message by taking humanity away from pro-
fessional models. 
Figure 3. Screenshot of Katie Sokoler’s Tampax® Radiant tampon tele-




Katie Mellor, artistic director of Tampax, saw the fact that she 
“had to talk about something no one wants to talk about in an 
interesting way” as a challenge and envisioned the solution as a 
campaign that “used young girls who are doing visually creative 
things in the world and who don’t let their periods get in the way 
of standing out.” When Sokoler filmed her advertisement, she 
was twenty-five years old. Therefore, to speak of Sokoler, Hem-
mons, and Zencirli as “young girls” effectively infantilizes and 
disempowers them. Furthermore, to suggest that what keeps 
women who are doing visually creative work from standing out 
is anything other than gender inequality in the contemporary 
art world is dangerously misdirected. According to Gallery Tal-
ly’s October 2014 report, of the “over 4,000 artists represented 
in L.A. and New York […] 32.3 percent were women” (Reilly). 
Why did Mellor choose to establish herself and her project 
by referring to the women who starred in her campaign as 
“young girls,” characterizing their subject matter as something 
“no one wants to talk about,” and identifying menstruation as 
what keeps women “who are doing visually creative things in 
the world” from standing out? Perhaps it is the same reason 
Tampax Radiant crafted products featuring “designer packag-
ing and wrappers that compliment [sic] any girl’s unique style, 
making these products must-have accessories any time of the 
month” that are meant to help “KEEP YOUR PERIOD INVISIBLE” 
(“Tampax®”). I’m getting mixed messages here. As a person who 
menstruates, I too can stand out with these accessories designed 
both to complement my style and to help me to keep invisible 
something no one wants to talk about. 
Tampax’s “KEEP YOUR PERIOD INVISIBLE” is a mandate be-
cause if “you” failed to do so, you would be censored. On March 
24, 2015, Toronto-based poet and artist Rupi Kaur posted a pho-
tograph of her fully clothed sister on Instagram (fig. 4). Within 
twenty-four hours, Instagram took down the photograph and 
claimed it had violated the platform’s community guidelines. In-
stagram eventually restored the photograph, but only after Kaur 
penned an open letter on Facebook that garnered a significant 
amount of attention and support. As Kaur told the Washington 
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Post, “They allow porn on Instagram, but not periods? How dare 
they tell me my clothed body, the way I wake up at least once 
every month, is ‘violating’ and ‘unsafe?’” (Dewey).
Reading Aristotle’s Politics in The Human Condition, Han-
nah Arendt discusses the notion of who can exist in the public 
realm and who must be resigned to the private realm:
The distinction between the private and public realms, seen 
from the viewpoint of privacy rather than of the body politic, 
equals the distinction between things that should be shown 
and things that should be hidden. […] Hidden away were 
the laborers who “with their bodies minister to the [bodily] 
needs of life,” and the women who with their bodies guaran-
tee the physical survival of the species. Women and slaves 
belonged to the same category and were hidden away not 
only because they were somebody else’s property but because 
their life was “laborious,” devoted to bodily functions. (72)




Tampax’s dictate to “KEEP YOUR PERIOD INVISIBLE” falls within 
the tradition of relegating women and their bodily functions to 
the private realm. Before I can champion the exposure of two 
street artists who use feminized aesthetics, materials, and artis-
tic processes to alter public space, I find that Tampax contextu-
alizes their campaign by claiming to sell a product meant to help 
continue relegating women’s labor to the private realm. As two 
powerful means of cutification, infantilization, and feminiza-
tion work to evoke cuteness as what Ngai terms “an eroticization 
of powerlessness” that evokes “tenderness for ‘small things’ but 
also, sometimes, a desire to belittle or diminish them further” 
(4). While attempting to empower people who menstruate to 
stand out, Sokoler and Mellor leverage their power by publicly 
belittling models — their chosen standout girls “who are doing 
visually creative things in the world” — as well as customers who 
menstruate visibly. 
Violence
It is important to acknowledge and direct the power struggle 
inherent in cuteness; otherwise, this power struggle, which in-
Figure 5. Screenshot of Katie Sokoler’s interview during her Tampax ® 
Radiant tampon commercial. “Tampax® and Always®” Business Wire. 
YouTube, 8 May 2012.
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cludes elements of psychological abuse, such as the desire to 
belittle or diminish objects assumed to be powerless, will make 
itself visible. It is clear from Sokoler’s interview for her Tampax 
Radiant television commercial that something not entirely sac-
Figure 6. Jessie Hemmons’ Tampax® Radiant tampon print advertise-




charine is transpiring. Sokoler claims: “I wanted to try to try 
something new with photography. Instead of shooting models, 
I wanted to shoot real people […]. It all comes together when 
someone walks under it and I sort of almost think of it like 
they’re falling into a little trap” (“Tampax”; fig. 5). 
In her analysis of the power of photography, Susan Sontag 
argues that “to photograph is to appropriate the thing photo-
graphed. It means putting oneself into a certain relation to the 
world that feels like knowledge — and, therefore, like power” 
(4). For Sontag, photography bestows upon its viewer an im-
aginary possession of an unreal past and “of a space in which 
they are insecure” (9). To “load” film, “aim” a camera, “shoot” 
a subject, and “capture” an image are all common action verbs 
used to describe photographic processes that link cameras and 
guns, images and bodies, and representation and warfare. Dis-
tinguishing once more between real people and models, Sokoler 
deploys photographic idioms to describe her artistic process. 
Her language directs us toward an understanding of her street 
art as an act of aggression meant to claim a position of power 
and to gain control over public space, where she might normally 
feel insecure.
Hemmons, the yarn bomber, joins Sokoler as a standout girl 
who makes art that articulates itself through violent terminol-
ogy (fig. 6). In “Craft, Gender and Politics,” Amy Gilligan ques-
tions the term yarn bombing because the contemporary craft 
deliberately does not distance itself from its “maternal” gestures 
and instead consciously acknowledges and validates an arena 
where, historically, women artists could “stand out.” Gilligan 
contends that “even if the identification of craft in protest with 
women isn’t shouted about, the ‘feminine’ nature of craft is still 
there below the surface, and used as a contrast to the ‘masculin-
ity’ of war” (Gilligan). The contrast, Gillian argues, reinforces 
gender binarism that locates women as soft and caring and men 
as aggressive.
Neither the print advertisements nor the television commer-
cials that Sokoler and Hemmons designed for Tampax Radi-
ant speak directly of their choice of feminized aesthetics — the 
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materials and artistic processes with which they challenged 
the archetypical masculinity of warfare and the public realm. I 
wonder who exactly made the artistic and ideological decisions 
here. I am tempted to redirect the power I had previously seen 
in Sokoler and Hemmons because of the authenticity of their 
message and the politically relevant nature of their work, and 
to hand it over to anyone who can explain more clearly the par-
ticipation of the two street artists in this Tampax campaign. But 
why am I so quick to dismiss Sokoler and Hemmons? Would I 
be so quick to question their knowledge of their own artwork 
if they had worked within another aesthetic framework? This 
could explain how two visually creative women seemed like the 
right “standout girls” to sell products and push a message that, 
in actuality, contradicts directly the value of their feminized aes-
thetics, materials, and artistic processes in gaining possession of 
the public realm.
Figure 7. White on black infinity net painting. Yayoi Kusama, No. F 
(959). The Museum of Modern Art.
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I began this chapter by dismissing tampon commercials. I 
also acknowledged and examined the power struggle inherent 
in cuteness through Sokoler’s 2012 Tampax Radiant advertising 
campaign. But in trying to prove my argument, I too belittle 
Sokoler, Mellor, and Hemmons, women who I assumed were 
powerless in the first place. Have I joined them in being ma-
nipulated by the very aesthetic that I’m trying to deconstruct? 
Yayoi Kusama
When I saw Sokoler’s television commercial, I immediately 
thought of Yayoi Kusama and her all-encompassing polka-dot 
installations. What solidified the connection was the fact that 
Sokoler wears a polka-dot dress in her advertising materials, 
which alludes to Kusama’s propensity to dress in the same type 
of pattern. Moreover, Sokoler’s project is sponsored by a corpo-
ration, a sponsorship only slightly less glamorous than that of 
Louis Vuitton, with which Kusama has a business partnership. 
Kusama functions as a valuable comparison to the lack of clar-
ity surrounding Sokoler’s tampon project. (There I go belittling 
Sokoler again; this is a particularly nasty strain of cuteness…) 
Kusama’s early articulation of the power struggle and violence 
inherent to her polka-dot installations allows her to use, rather 
than be used by, cuteness to belittle others, only to remain ulti-
mately disempowered. 
Yayoi Kusama had her first solo exhibition at Brata Gallery 
in New York City in October 1959. The exhibition consisted of 
several white-on-black infinity-net paintings (fig. 7).
In her autobiography, Infinity Net, Kusama writes:
I often suffered episodes of severe neurosis. I would cover a 
canvas with nets, then continue painting them on the table, 
on the floor, and finally on my own body. As I repeated this 
process over and over again, the nets began to expand to in-
finity. I forgot about myself as they enveloped me, clinging 
to my arms and legs and clothes and filling the entire room. 
(20)
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Already existing off the canvas, Kusama’s infinity nets took spa-
tial form when she converted the nets’ negative space into polka 
dots. Kusama reflects on her intentions in using polka dots and 
on their connection to the infinity net:
My desire was to predict and measure the infinity of the 
unbounded universe, from my own position in it, with 
dots — an accumulation of particles forming the negative 
spaces in the net. How deep was the mystery? Did infinite 
infinities exist beyond our universe? In exploring these ques-
tions I wanted to examine the single dot that was my own 
life. One polka dot: a single particle among billions. I issued a 
manifesto stating that everything — myself, others, the entire 
universe — would be obliterated by white nets of nothingness 
connecting astronomical accumulations of dots. White nets 
enveloping the black dots of silent death against a pitch-dark 
background of nothingness. (23)
The first adventures of Kusama’s polka dots off the canvas took 
place in her solo exhibition, Infinity Mirror Room — Phalli’s 
Field, at R. Castellane Gallery in November 1965. According to 
Kusama,
The walls of the room were mirrors, and sprouting from the 
floor were thousands of white canvas phallic forms covered 
with red polka dots. The mirrors reflected them infinitely, 
summoning up a sublime, miraculous field of phalluses. 
People could walk barefoot through the phallus meadow, 
becoming one with the work and experiencing their own 
figures and movements as part of the sculpture. Wandering 
into this infinite wonderland, where a grandiose aggregation 
of human sexual symbols had been transformed into a hu-
morous, polka-dotted field, viewers found themselves spell-
bound by the imagination as it exorcised sexual sickness in 
the naked light of day. (48–51)
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Although Kusama arrived at the cute form of the polka dot, 
which delivers her ideas with humor, the polka dot developed 
out of the negative space of infinity nets that Kusama saw, expe-
rienced, and painted during episodes of severe neurosis. Kusa-
ma has spoken about the origin of her forms and their impact 
on the development of her ideas. Instead of her polka dots being 
used to possess space in the public sphere or to trap innocent 
bystanders, Kusama points out that the bystanders are already 
trapped, along with her, in a white net of nothingness that con-
nects the accumulation of dots that are our lives. 
Publics
As Michael Warner theorizes in Publics and Counterpublics, a 
public is a space organized by discourse. It is autotelic and exits 
only “by virtue of being addressed” (67). Not only do Sokoler 
and Kusama sell us tampons, handbags, and artwork through 
cuteness, they also create publics in which you and I partici-
pate. How is it that, regardless of their similarities, Sokoler and 
Kusama are creating different publics because of the differences 
in their manners of address? Looking at what kinds of spaces of 
discourse Sokoler and Kusama create is important because of 
the infectious nature of cuteness. This infectiousness, I argue, 
gives the artists the short-term power of constituting a public, 
which, in turn, makes cuteness seem like a suitable strategy. On 
the infectiousness of the cute, Ngai draws attention to the fact 
that “the admirer of the cute puppy or baby often ends up un-
consciously emulating that object’s infantile qualities in the lan-
guage of her aesthetic appraisal” (3), not unlike the automatic 
mimesis experienced by viewers of horror films, melodrama, 
and pornography.1 
A similar kind of mimicry is evident in the space of discourse 
that Sokoler has created on her blog, Color Me Katie. Of the 109 
comments Sokoler received on her blog post introducing her 
Tampax ad (fig. 8), “cute” comes in first place in the adjective 
1 See Linda Williams, “Film Bodies: Gender, Genre and Excess” (1991). 
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race, with a total of eighteen mentions. “Cool,” “awesome,” and 
“fun” are not even close seconds, with thirteen mentions each. 
Adjectives used in the comment section, in order of their fre-
quency, include: “cute” (including its variations of “super cute,” 
“very cute,” and “cutest”), “cool” (“so cool,” “really cool”), “awe-
some” (“beyond awesome”), “fun” (“super fun”), “great,” “ador-
able,” “amazing” (“pretty amazing”), “lovely,” “real,” “sweet,” 
“beautiful,” “fantastic,” “wonderful,” “creative,” “brilliant,” “ad-
dictive,” “funny,” “perfect,” “nice,” “phenomenal,” “fabulous,” and 
“pretty.” Furthermore, bloggers mirrored Sokoler’s enthusiasm 
in their choice of punctuation with no less than 182 exclamation 
points and twenty-five smiley-face emoticons: :), :-).
On July 9, 2012, at 1:05 p.m., Anna L. Roeder posted, “How 
amazing! probably the best tampon ad ever made. Actually 
makes it kind of cute. Love your art and radiance!” By “it” Roed-
er appears to refer to the menstrual cycle. This means that the 
Figure 8. Adjectives used by commenters on Katie Sokoler’s Color Me 




infectiousness of cuteness has in-
fected not only Sokoler’s audience, 
as articulated in the public space 
of discourse of a blog, but also her 
chosen subject matter. 
In comparison, Kusama has used 
cuteness to ease adults into conver-
sation around art, anxiety, infinity, 
nothingness, obliteration, death, 
sexuality, and sickness “in the na-
ked light of day.” Kusama addresses 
her public with her severe neurosis 
clearly by her side, seeking a shared 
obliteration.
Conclusion
Although we have no choice as to 
what publics we participate in, we 
can choose what brand of cuteness 
we will deploy to address others, which will create other publics 
and infect other spaces of discourse. Not being trapped, shot, 
infantilized, rendered invisible, bombed, or obliterated seem 
like ideal options. But if I had a choice in my space of discourse, 
I would go with the kind of public that is created by an artist 
who speaks to me as an adult and invites me into a conversa-
tion about power through the aesthetic of cuteness, rather than 
a public created by an artist or an artistic director, that seems 
to control their chosen aesthetic only to belittle the power of its 
participants, yet not enough to avoid ultimately being disem-
powered by it in turn.
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